Philosophy Commons^™

What Makes Us Change Our Minds In Our Everyday Life? Working Through Evidence And Persuasion, Events And Experiences., Jens E. Kjeldsen

OSSA Conference Archive

We know almost nothing about the reasoning that makes people change their minds in everyday life. Which role do arguments play in contrast to personal relations and ethos? Are people persuaded to change, or does change rather follow personal experiences? This paper examines the epistemologies people use to rhetorically work through their opinions, when moving from one conviction to another. The paper is based on research interviews with people who have changed their minds.

Doing Things With Arguments: Assertion, Persuasion, Performance, Blake D. Scott

OSSA Conference Archive

In “Three Perspectives on Argument,” Wenzel argued that scholars should orient their research around the well-known triad of rhetorical, dialectical, and logical perspectives on argument. Despite the success of Wenzel’s triad in orienting pluralistic research, he nonetheless maintained that an “eventual synthesis” of the three perspectives was both possible and desirable. In this paper I reconsider Wenzel’s idea by asking what might be preventing such a synthesis today. I argue that one obstacle to this is a common philosophical assumption about rhetoric that opposes assertion to persuasion, truth to effectiveness. Following Barbara Cassin, I challenge this assumption and consider how …

Commentary On Mckeon On Argument, Inference, And Persuasion, Daniel H. Cohen

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.

Argument, Inference, And Persuasion, Matthew W. Mckeon

OSSA Conference Archive

I move beyond Pinto’s (2001) discussion of arguments as invitations to inference by highlighting how arguments can guide the performance of inferences that they do not express. This motivates a distinction between two types of persuasive force arguments can have in terms of two different connections between arguments and inferences. I use this distinction to explain how an epistemically bad argument can rationally persuade addressees of its conclusion.

The Persuasive Ineffectiveness Of Arguing And Arguments, J. Anthony Blair

OSSA Conference Archive

Arguments intended to persuade have a chequered success record. Quite aside from failing to resolve deep disagreements, they are an inefficient means of persuasion in commerce and politics. The persistence of competing schools of thought in numerous fields of scientific and scholarly theorizing, despite argued advocacy, also raises questions about arguing’s persuasive effectiveness. Yet humans are irredeemably reason-expecting and reason-giving creatures. This paper offers some possible explanations of this paradoxical situation.

Persuading And Convincing, Adelino Cattani

OSSA Conference Archive

I’ll propose a distinction based on historical, theoretical, and linguistic considerations between:

- two different ways of inducing a change of mind, that is persuading and convincing.

- two different ways of proving, that is rhetorical argumentation and logical-experimental demonstration.

There is a tendency to keep a distance from persuasion in favor of conviction. In everyday language, the difference between the two terms appears clear, and it is a distinction developed theoretically by many authors from Plato and Kant to Perelman. In particular:

1. Persuasion is centered chiefly on the speaker: it enhances one’s will and ability to modify …

Deep Disagreement As Intellectual Colonialism, David Hitchcock

OSSA Conference Archive

Robert Fogelin has introduced the concept of a deep disagreement as one that makes rational argumentation impossible. People who think of themselves as enlightened may use this concept to dismiss the positions and arguments of those who seem to them misguided. I argue that there is always a basis for a rational discussion between people who disagree. If there are no external impediments to argumentative discussion, it is a form of intellectual colonialism to abandon argument for non-rational persuasion on the basis of a diagnosis of deep disagreement.

Negotiation As A Disagreement Management Tool, Diego Castro

OSSA Conference Archive

Can we negotiate our way out of disagreements? When the chances of persuading the counterpart are low, it might be possible to shift a persuasion to a negotiation dialogue. But what are the conditions for that shift? I will argue that, at least, the following conditions must hold: the disagreement must be practical rather than theoretical; and the parties must be willing to make a sacrifice. When that happens, disagreements can be negotiated, and such negotiation will be a type of practical argumentation.