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Full-Text Articles in Philosophy
Moore-Paradoxical Assertion, Fully Conscious Belief And The Transparency Of Belief, John N. Williams
Moore-Paradoxical Assertion, Fully Conscious Belief And The Transparency Of Belief, John N. Williams
Research Collection School of Social Sciences
I offer a novel account of the absurdity of Moore-paradoxical assertion in terms of an interlocutor’s fully conscious beliefs. This account starts with an original argument for the principle that fully conscious belief collects over conjunction. The argument is premised on the synchronic unity of consciousness and the transparency of belief.
Moore’S Paradox, Truth And Accuracy, Mitchell S. Green, John N. Williams
Moore’S Paradox, Truth And Accuracy, Mitchell S. Green, John N. Williams
Research Collection School of Social Sciences
G. E. Moore famously observed that to assert ‘I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I do not believe that I did’ would be ‘absurd’. Moore calls it a ‘paradox’ that this absurdity persists despite the fact that what I say about myself might be true. Krista Lawlor and John Perry have proposed an explanation of the absurdity that confines itself to semantic notions while eschewing pragmatic ones. We argue that this explanation faces four objections. We give a better explanation of the absurdity both in assertion and in belief that avoids our four objections.
Moore's Paradox, Defective Interpretation, Justified Belief And Conscious Belief, John N. Williams
Moore's Paradox, Defective Interpretation, Justified Belief And Conscious Belief, John N. Williams
Research Collection School of Social Sciences
In this journal, Hamid Vahid argues against three families of explanation of Moore-paradoxicality. The first is the Wittgensteinian approach; I assert that p just in case I assert that I believe that p. So making a Moore-paradoxical assertion involves contradictory assertions. The second is the epistemic approach, one committed to: if I am justified in believing that p then I am justified in believing that I believe that p. So it is impossible to have a justified omissive Moore-paradoxical belief. The third is the conscious belief approach, being committed to: if I consciously believe that p then I believe that …
Justifying Circumstances And Moore-Paradoxical Beliefs: A Response To Brueckner, John N. Williams
Justifying Circumstances And Moore-Paradoxical Beliefs: A Response To Brueckner, John N. Williams
Research Collection School of Social Sciences
In 2004, I explained the absurdity of Moore-paradoxical belief via the syllogism (Williams 2004): (1) All circumstances that justify me in believing that p are circumstances that tend to make me believe that p. (2) All circumstances that tend to make me believe that p are circumstances that justify me in believing that I believe that p. (3) All circumstances that justify me in believing that p are circumstances that justify me in believing that I believe that p.
Moore's Paradoxes, Evans's Principle And Self-Knowledge, John N. Williams
Moore's Paradoxes, Evans's Principle And Self-Knowledge, John N. Williams
Research Collection School of Social Sciences
I supply an argument for Evans’s principle that whatever justifies me in believing that p also justifies me in believing that I believe that p. I show how this principle helps explain how I come to know my own beliefs in a way that normally makes me the best authority on them. Then I show how the principle helps to solve Moore’s paradoxes.
Moorean Absurdity And The Intentional 'Structure' Of Assertion, John N. Williams
Moorean Absurdity And The Intentional 'Structure' Of Assertion, John N. Williams
Research Collection School of Social Sciences
No abstract provided.
Moore's Paradox: One Or Two?, John N. Williams
Moore's Paradox: One Or Two?, John N. Williams
Research Collection School of Social Sciences
Discussions of what is sometimes called 'Moore's paradox' are often vitiated by a failure to notice that there are two paradoxes; not merely one in two sets of linguistic clothing. The two paradoxes are absurd, but in different ways, and accordingly require different explanations.