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Articles 1 - 8 of 8
Full-Text Articles in Philosophy
Scurvy And The Ontology Of Natural Kinds, P.D. Magnus
Scurvy And The Ontology Of Natural Kinds, P.D. Magnus
Philosophy Faculty Scholarship
Some philosophers understand natural kinds to be the categories which are constraints on enquiry. In order to elaborate the metaphysics appropriate to such an account, I consider the complicated history of scurvy, citrus, and vitamin C. It may be tempting to understand these categories in a shallow way (as mere property clusters) or in a deep way (as fundamental properties). Neither approach is adequate, and the case instead calls for middle-range ontology: starting from categories which we identify in the world and elaborating their structure, but not pretending to jump ahead to a complete story about fundamental being.
How To Be A Realist About Natural Kinds, P.D. Magnus
How To Be A Realist About Natural Kinds, P.D. Magnus
Philosophy Faculty Scholarship
Although some authors hold that natural kinds are necessarily relative to disciplinary domains, many authors presume that natural kinds must be absolute, categorical features of the reality— often assuming that without even mentioning the alternative. Recognizing both possibilities, one may ask whether the difference especially matters. I argue that it does. Looking at recent arguments about natural kind realism, I argue that we can best make sense of the realism question by thinking of natural kindness as a relation that holds between a category and a domain.
Cautious Realism And Middle Range Ontology, P.D. Magnus
Cautious Realism And Middle Range Ontology, P.D. Magnus
Philosophy Faculty Scholarship
Anjan Chakravartty's book Scientific Ontology is centrally about how metaphysics is embrangled with epistemology. I begin by discussing the broader literature in science and values, where arguments akin to Chakravartty's have been much-discussed. Then I talk about my own preferred approach, middle range ontology, which does not fit neatly into any of the three stances Chakravartty discusses. Finally, I use these considerations to pose a dilemma.
The Self In Hume's "Treatise", David M. Krueger
The Self In Hume's "Treatise", David M. Krueger
Legacy Theses & Dissertations (2009 - 2024)
Much has been written about Hume's treatment of the self and personal identity in his Treatise. However the scholarship generally focuses on individual aspects of Hume's discussion of self and personal identity. This account is an attempt to elucidate Hume's view of the self and personal identity throughout the Treatise, including the Appendix. I argue for a consistent and cohesive interpretation of Hume's account, one that rejects a more traditional view of identity for an unreflective view of identity.
Toward Explaining The Gap : How A Particular View Of Explanation Underwrites The Explanatory Gap, Kimberly Van Orman
Toward Explaining The Gap : How A Particular View Of Explanation Underwrites The Explanatory Gap, Kimberly Van Orman
Legacy Theses & Dissertations (2009 - 2024)
In my dissertation, I consider a common argument for the existence of an unbridgeable explanatory gap between materialism and conscious experience which purports to show that we can determine a priori that conscious experience cannot possibly be explained by a materialist theory. The claim is: no matter what we might yet learn about the brain (or the world), we know enough right now about materialism and explanation to know that an explanation of conscious experience is beyond our reach. I argue that three well-known examples of this position (Jaegwon Kim, David Chalmers, and Joseph Levine) rely on a very narrow …
The Role Of The Simple Natures And Method In Descartes' Meditations, Thomas C. Fowler
The Role Of The Simple Natures And Method In Descartes' Meditations, Thomas C. Fowler
Legacy Theses & Dissertations (2009 - 2024)
ABSTRACT
The I Think, Self-Awareness And Reflexivity : A Reconstructed Kantian Model Of Self-Awareness, Jie Yin
The I Think, Self-Awareness And Reflexivity : A Reconstructed Kantian Model Of Self-Awareness, Jie Yin
Legacy Theses & Dissertations (2009 - 2024)
I aim to explore, in this dissertation, whether Kant has a plausible view on self-awareness in his Critique of Pure Reason, and that if the answer is positive, then in what way one could best appreciate his insight; and besides that, I also want to explore how Kant's view sheds light on contemporary debate on self-awareness. I aim to consider two questions addressed by Howell (2006) as below: (A) how exactly the I think functions, designatively, to represent the self and bring it to our thought-awareness, and (B) how, theI thinK orI, a simple representation and a mere designation of …
Art Concept Pluralism, P.D. Magnus, Christy Mag Uidhir
Art Concept Pluralism, P.D. Magnus, Christy Mag Uidhir
Philosophy Faculty Scholarship
There is a long tradition of trying to analyze art either by providing a definition (essentialism) or by tracing its contours as an indefinable, open concept (antiessentialism). Both art essentialists and art anti-essentialists share an implicit assumption of art concept monism. We argue that this is a mistake. Species concept pluralism, a well-explored position in philosophy of biology, provides a model for art concept pluralism. We explore the conditions under which concept pluralism is appropriate, and we argue that they obtain for art. Art concept pluralism allows us to recognize that different art concepts are useful for different purposes, and …