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Articles 1 - 12 of 12
Full-Text Articles in Philosophy
The Dialectical Virtue Of Ideological Reduction, Keehyuk Nahm
The Dialectical Virtue Of Ideological Reduction, Keehyuk Nahm
Doctoral Dissertations
Many would agree that there is something generally appealing and attractive about reduction. By this, I do not mean that reductive theories are accepted across the board, nor do I mean that they should be. All I mean is that there is something recognizably “good” about the reductive method that may be outweighed by other considerations. For instance, it is extremely rare for one to reject the reductionist position of a given domain while conceding that the proposed reductive procedure is successful. Typically, the opposition consists in denying that the subject matter can be reduced. This suggests an unspoken rule …
Naturalized Human Epistemology Is Social Epistemology, Molly O'Rourke-Friel
Naturalized Human Epistemology Is Social Epistemology, Molly O'Rourke-Friel
Doctoral Dissertations
Our epistemic lives are ones of deep social dependence. Social epistemology is often understood as a subfield that stands apart from, but is compatible with, traditional individualistic approaches to epistemology. In my work I reject this view and argue instead that human epistemology is necessarily social epistemology. I argue for this as an epistemological naturalist. I understand epistemological naturalism as a commitment to the following: (a) the claim that empirical research from psychology, cognitive science, and evolutionary biology is relevant to epistemological inquiry and (b) the meta-epistemological thesis that knowledge and justification are reducible to natural phenomena. In Chapter 1 …
Indigenous Impositions In Contemporary Culture: Knotting Ontologies, Beading Aesthetics, And Braiding Temporalities, Darren Lone Fight
Indigenous Impositions In Contemporary Culture: Knotting Ontologies, Beading Aesthetics, And Braiding Temporalities, Darren Lone Fight
Doctoral Dissertations
This work covers Indigenous philosophy, history, aesthetics, ethics, axiology, pedagogy, temporality, and language. This is the necessary result of a central but implicit claim made throughout the project, which is that any exploration of Indigenous culture that does not work within such a multi- and inter-disciplinary approach and instead parses and isolates these elements from each other runs the risk of attenuating the complex-systems features of the Indigenous culture it examines. Indigenous cultures are a processual holism. I offer here a piece of cultural analysis/synthesis that is Indigenous from the inside and, as such, does not neglect philosophical foundations. Rather, …
Dissonant Forms: Landscape, Nature-Love, And Art, Taylor F. Benoit
Dissonant Forms: Landscape, Nature-Love, And Art, Taylor F. Benoit
Masters Theses
As artists continue the long and storied lineage of Landscape, are there aesthetic responsibilities that come with representing the forces that afford you the capacity to do so? As we delineate spaces into places, endless interconnectivity into knowable “systems”, and living matter into thing based taxonomies, who do these delineations serve and with what intentions do we proceed? My studio art practice explores what it means to give form to our Former—the Former being that from which we came, the here and now, our explicit ecological reality, the stuff of what we call nature. …
Defending Philosophical Knowledge, Jonathan Dixon
Defending Philosophical Knowledge, Jonathan Dixon
Doctoral Dissertations
This dissertation concerns whether philosophy as a discipline can, and does, produce philosophical knowledge. Specifically, this dissertation concerns several prominent arguments for philosophical skepticism. Some support philosophical skepticism by arguing that the philosophical practice of appealing to intuitions to justify philosophical beliefs is illegitimate because either intuitions are not a legitimate kind of evidence or intuitions are an unreliable source of justification. Others argue that philosophical knowledge is untenable because philosophers rarely, if ever, resolve their philosophical disagreements despite spending their professional lives attempting to do so. In brief, the purpose of this dissertation is to defend philosophical knowledge from …
The People Who “Burn”: “Communication,” Unity, And Change In Belarusian Discourse On Public Creativity, Anton Dinerstein
The People Who “Burn”: “Communication,” Unity, And Change In Belarusian Discourse On Public Creativity, Anton Dinerstein
Doctoral Dissertations
The main intellectual problem I address in this study is how everyday communication activates the relationship between creativity, conflict, and change. More specifically, I look at how the communication of creativity becomes a process of transformation, innovation, and change and how people are propelled to create through everyday communication practices in the face of conflict and opposition. To approach this problem, I use the case of communication in modern-day Belarus to show how creativity becomes a vehicle for and a source of new social and cultural routines among the independent grassroots communities and initiatives in Minsk. On one level, I …
The Epistemic Dimensions Of Moral Responsibility And Respect, John Robison
The Epistemic Dimensions Of Moral Responsibility And Respect, John Robison
Doctoral Dissertations
What epistemic conditions must one satisfy to be morally responsible for an action or attitude? A common worry is that robust epistemic requirements would have disastrous implications for our responsibility attributing practices: we would be unable to make epistemically justified responsibility attributions, or we would be licensed to disrespectfully excuse agents for their sincerely held beliefs. Those more optimistic about robust epistemic requirements inadvertently make them too demanding to explain the moral successes of ordinary agents. The present project shows how both the pessimists and optimists rely on instructively mistaken assumptions in epistemology, ethics, and action theory, and it culminates …
Self-Knowledge, Choice Blindness, And Confabulation, Hayley F. Webster
Self-Knowledge, Choice Blindness, And Confabulation, Hayley F. Webster
Doctoral Dissertations
There are two kinds of epistemic theories about self-knowledge: the traditional account, and the inferentialist account. According to the traditional view of self-knowledge, we have privileged access to our propositional attitudes. “Privileged access” means that one can gain knowledge of one’s own propositional attitudes directly via an exclusive, first-personal method called introspection. On the other hand, the inferentialist view of self-knowledge postulates that we don’t have privileged access to our propositional attitudes and must infer or self-attribute them instead. In this thesis I argue that the traditional view of self-knowledge, which postulates that we have privileged access to our propositional …
Fallibility And Normativity, Joshua Dipaolo
Fallibility And Normativity, Joshua Dipaolo
Doctoral Dissertations
We are fallible, and knowledge of our fallibility has normative implications. But these normative implications appear to conflict with other compelling epistemic norms. We therefore appear to face a choice: reject fallibility-based norms or reject these other epistemic norms. I argue that there is a plausible third option: reconcile these two sets of norms. Once we properly understand the nature of each of these norms, we aren’t forced to reject either.
Understanding And Its Role In Inquiry, Benjamin T. Rancourt
Understanding And Its Role In Inquiry, Benjamin T. Rancourt
Doctoral Dissertations
In this dissertation, I argue that understanding possesses unique epistemic value. I propose and defend a novel account of understanding that I call the management account of understanding, which is the view that an agent A understands a subject matter S just in case A has the ability to extract the relevant information and exploit it with the relevant cognitive capacities to answer questions in S. Since inquiry is the process of raising and answering questions, I argue that without understanding, it would be impossible to engage in successful inquiry. I argue that understanding is indispensable for effective cognition and …
Agency And Reasons In Epistemology, Luis R.G. Oliveira
Agency And Reasons In Epistemology, Luis R.G. Oliveira
Doctoral Dissertations
Ever since John Locke, philosophers have discussed the possibility of a normative epistemology: are there epistemic obligations binding the cognitive economy of belief and disbelief? Locke's influential answer was evidentialist: we have an epistemic obligation to believe in accordance with our evidence. In this dissertation, I place the contemporary literature on agency and reasons at the service of some such normative epistemology. I discuss the semantics of obligations, the connection between obligations and reasons to believe, the implausibility of Lockean evidentialism, and some of the alleged connections between agency and justification.
On Epistemic Agency, Kristoffer Hans Ahlstrom
On Epistemic Agency, Kristoffer Hans Ahlstrom
Open Access Dissertations
Every time we act in an effort to attain our epistemic goals, we express our epistemic agency. The present study argues that a proper understanding of the actions and goals relevant to expressions of such agency can be used to make ameliorative recommendations about how the ways in which we actually express our agency can be brought in line with how we should express our agency. More specifically, it is argued that the actions relevant to such expressions should be identified with the variety of actions characteristic of inquiry; that contrary to what has been maintained by recent pluralists about …