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Full-Text Articles in Philosophy
A Critical Review Of Animal And Fetus Rights In Utilitarianism Or “How Come When It’S Us, It’S An Abortion, And When It’S A Chicken, It’S An Omelette?”, Katharine Mcdaid
A Critical Review Of Animal And Fetus Rights In Utilitarianism Or “How Come When It’S Us, It’S An Abortion, And When It’S A Chicken, It’S An Omelette?”, Katharine Mcdaid
Student Research Submissions
In this paper, I will be considering the moral standing of animals and fetuses within utilitarianism—by discussing the Time Relative Interest Account and Harm-Based Account—and how the question of moral standing relates to discussions of abortion. The Time Relative Interest Account provides a more effective framework for considering the rights of both animals and fetuses in utilitarianism, and a lack of access to abortion poses a significant challenge to the utilitarian viewpoint often espoused by anti-abortion advocates because they fail to consider the lack of access implications within their utilitarian approach. Therefore, the utilitarianism that is animal rights-based arguments used …
Demons & Droids: Nonhuman Animals On Trial, Gerrit D. White
Demons & Droids: Nonhuman Animals On Trial, Gerrit D. White
PANDION: The Osprey Journal of Research and Ideas
Nonhuman animal trials are ridiculous to the modern sensibilities of the West. The concept of them is in opposition to the idea of nonhuman animals—entities without agency, incapable of guilt by nature of irrationality. This way of viewing nonhuman animals is relatively new to the Western mind. Putting nonhuman animals on trial has only become unacceptable in the past few centuries. Before this shift, nonhuman animal trials existed as methods of communities policing themselves. More than that, these trials were part of legal systems ensuring they provided justice for all. This shift happened because the relationship between Christian authorities and …
Legal Purgatory: Why Some Animals Are Neither Persons Nor Property, Sharisse Kanet
Legal Purgatory: Why Some Animals Are Neither Persons Nor Property, Sharisse Kanet
Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects
All animals with non-borderline sentience are deserving of certain legal considerations independent of their use and relationship to human beings. That is, all sentient beings should have some rights. Given the current organization of the U.S. legal system, which divides all entities into property or persons, it is not surprising that animals are relegated to property status. I put forth a proposal to fix this whose central suggestion is that we create a third legal designation, legal patient, into which all non-person sentient animals (those which do not properly belong on either current category) would fit. These animals would receive …
Rethinking Rewilding Through Multispecies Justice, Danielle Celermajer
Rethinking Rewilding Through Multispecies Justice, Danielle Celermajer
Animal Sentience
Baker & Winkler’s argument that some humans, especially some Indigenous peoples, neither conceive of themselves as ontologically distinct from nature, nor do they organize their lives as such, is an important one. However, one needs to understand how colonialism and global capitalism have drawn Indigenous peoples and animals into new political economies. The new situation and the constrained opportunities available may have introduced a range of injustices or forms of violence that did not previously exist. This commentary proposes how a multispecies justice lens might assist in evaluating the most just arrangement for all parties, human and non-human.
Don’T Demean “Invasives”: Conservation And Wrongful Species Discrimination, C. E. Abbate, Bob Fischer
Don’T Demean “Invasives”: Conservation And Wrongful Species Discrimination, C. E. Abbate, Bob Fischer
Philosophy Faculty Research
It is common for conservationists to refer to non-native species that have undesirable impacts on humans as “invasive”. We argue that the classification of any species as “invasive” constitutes wrongful discrimination. Moreover, we argue that its being wrong to categorize a species as invasive is perfectly compatible with it being morally permissible to kill animals—assuming that conservationists “kill equally”. It simply is not compatible with the double standard that conservationists tend to employ in their decisions about who lives and who dies.
Fish Sentience Denial: Muddy Moral Water, Robert C. Jones
Fish Sentience Denial: Muddy Moral Water, Robert C. Jones
Robert C. Jones, PhD
Sneddon et al. (2018) authoritatively summarize the compelling and overwhelming evidence for fish sentience, while methodically dismantling one rather emblematic research paper (Diggles et al. 2017) intended to discount solid evidence of fish sentience (Lopez-Luna et al. 2017a, 2017b, 2017c, & 2017d). I explore the larger practical moral contexts within which these debates take place and argue that denials of animal sentience are really moral canards.
Fish Sentience Denial: Muddy Moral Water, Robert C. Jones
Fish Sentience Denial: Muddy Moral Water, Robert C. Jones
Animal Sentience
Sneddon et al. (2018) authoritatively summarize the compelling and overwhelming evidence for fish sentience, while methodically dismantling one rather emblematic research paper (Diggles et al. 2017) intended to discount solid evidence of fish sentience (Lopez-Luna et al. 2017a, 2017b, 2017c, & 2017d). I explore the larger practical moral contexts within which these debates take place and argue that denials of animal sentience are really moral canards.