Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Discipline
- Keyword
-
- Absurdity (4)
- Irrationality (4)
- Belief (3)
- Norms (3)
- Deduction (2)
-
- Generalization (2)
- Hume’s problem of induction (2)
- Induction (2)
- Moore’s paradox (2)
- Research methodology (2)
- Assertion (1)
- Asymmetry (1)
- Circularity (1)
- De se (1)
- De se/non-de se asymmetry (1)
- Desire (1)
- Dialetheism (1)
- Eliminativism (1)
- Explanation (1)
- Expression (1)
- First-person (1)
- First-person/second-person asymmetry (1)
- G.E. Moore (1)
- Generalizability (1)
- Inductive analogy (1)
- Moore (1)
- Moore's paradox (1)
- Paradigm (1)
- Paradox (1)
- Self-falsification (1)
Articles 1 - 9 of 9
Full-Text Articles in Arts and Humanities
Eliminativism, Dialetheism And Moore's Paradox, John N. Williams
Eliminativism, Dialetheism And Moore's Paradox, John N. Williams
John N. WILLIAMS
John Turri gives an example that he thinks refutes what he takes to be “G. E. Moore's view” that omissive assertions such as “It is raining but I do not believe that it is raining” are “inherently ‘absurd'”. This is that of Ellie, an eliminativist who makes such assertions. Turri thinks that these are perfectly reasonable and not even absurd. Nor does she seem irrational if the sincerity of her assertion requires her to believe its content. A commissive counterpart of Ellie is Di, a dialetheist who asserts or believes that: Since any adequate explanation of Moore's paradox must handle …
Moore’S Paradox In Belief And Desire, John N. Williams
Moore’S Paradox In Belief And Desire, John N. Williams
John N. WILLIAMS
Is there a Moore’s paradox in desire? I give a normative explanation of the epistemic irrationality, and hence absurdity, of Moorean belief that builds on Green and Williams’ normative account of absurdity. This explains why Moorean beliefs are normally irrational and thus absurd, while some Moorean beliefs are absurd without being irrational. Then I defend constructing a Moorean desire as the syntactic counterpart of a Moorean belief and distinguish it from a ‘Frankfurt’ conjunction of desires. Next I discuss putative examples of rational and irrational desires, suggesting that there are norms of rational desire. Then I examine David Wall’s groundbreaking …
Further Reflection On True Successors And Traditions, John N. Williams
Further Reflection On True Successors And Traditions, John N. Williams
John N. WILLIAMS
No abstract provided.
David-Hillel Ruben’S 'Traditions And True Successors': A Critical Reply, John N. Williams
David-Hillel Ruben’S 'Traditions And True Successors': A Critical Reply, John N. Williams
John N. WILLIAMS
No abstract provided.
Moore’S Paradox And The Priority Of Belief Thesis, John Williams
Moore’S Paradox And The Priority Of Belief Thesis, John Williams
John N. WILLIAMS
Moore’s paradox is the fact that assertions or beliefs such as Bangkok is the capital of Thailand but I do not believe that Bangkok is the capital of Thailand or Bangkok is the capital of Thailand but I believe that Bangkok is not the capital of Thailand are ‘absurd’ yet possibly true. The current orthodoxy is that an explanation of the absurdity should first start with belief, on the assumption that once the absurdity in belief has been explained then this will translate into an explanation of the absurdity in assertion. This assumption gives explanatory priority to belief over assertion. …
The Completeness Of The Pragmatic Solution To Moore's Paradox In Belief: A Reply To Chan, John Williams
The Completeness Of The Pragmatic Solution To Moore's Paradox In Belief: A Reply To Chan, John Williams
John N. WILLIAMS
Moore’s paradox in belief is the fact that beliefs of the form ‘p and I do not believe that p’ are ‘absurd’ yet possibly true. Writers on the paradox have nearly all taken the absurdity to be a form of irrationality. These include those who give what Timothy Chan calls the ‘pragmatic solution’ to the paradox. This solution turns on the fact that having the Moorean belief falsifies its content. Chan, who also takes the absurdity to be a form of irrationality, objects to this solution by arguing that it is circular and thus incomplete. This is because it must …
Generalization And Induction: Misconceptions, Clarifications And A Classification Of Induction, Eric W. K. Tsang, John N. Williams
Generalization And Induction: Misconceptions, Clarifications And A Classification Of Induction, Eric W. K. Tsang, John N. Williams
John N. WILLIAMS
In “Generalizing Generalizability in Information Systems Research,” Lee and Baskerville (2003) try to clarify generalization and classify it into four types. Unfortunately, their account is problematic. We propose repairs. Central among these is our balance-of-evidence argument that we should adopt the view that Hume’s problem of induction has a solution, even if we do not know what it is. We build upon this by proposing an alternative classification of induction. There are five types of generalization: (1) theoretical, (2) within-population, (3) cross-population, (4) contextual, and (5) temporal, with theoretical generalization being across the empirical and theoretical levels and the rest …
Generalization And Induction: More Misconceptions And Clarifications, Eric W. K. Tsang, John N. Williams
Generalization And Induction: More Misconceptions And Clarifications, Eric W. K. Tsang, John N. Williams
John N. WILLIAMS
In ‘Generalization and Induction: Misconceptions, Clarifications, and a Classification of Induction’, we comment on Lee and Baskerville’s (2003) paper ‘Generalizing Generalizability in Information Systems Research’, which attempts to clarify the concept of generalization and classify it into four types. Our commentary discusses the misconceptions in their paper and proposes an alternative classification of induction. Their response ‘Conceptualizing Generalizability: New Contributions and a Reply’ perpetuates their misconceptions and create new ones. The purpose of this rejoinder is to highlight the major problems both in their original paper and in their reply and to provide further clarifications. Lee and Baskerville’s so-called ‘new …
Further Reflection On True Successors And Traditions, John Williams
Further Reflection On True Successors And Traditions, John Williams
John N. WILLIAMS
No abstract provided.