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Full-Text Articles in Arts and Humanities
How To Believe The Impossible, Curtis Brown
Belief States And Narrow Content, Curtis Brown
Believing The Impossible, Curtis Brown
Art, Oppression, And The Autonomy Of Aesthetics, Curtis Brown
Art, Oppression, And The Autonomy Of Aesthetics, Curtis Brown
Curtis Brown
No abstract provided.
Functionalism, Curtis Brown
Direct And Indirect Belief, Curtis Brown
Combinatorial-State Automata And Models Of Computation, Curtis Brown
Combinatorial-State Automata And Models Of Computation, Curtis Brown
Curtis Brown
David Chalmers has defended an account of what it is for a physical system to implement a computation. The account appeals to the idea of a “combinatorial-state automaton” or CSA. It is not entirely clear whether Chalmers intends the CSA to be a full-blown computational model, or merely a convenient formalism into which instances of other models can be translated. I argue that the CSA is not a computational model in the usual sense because CSAs do not perspicuously represent algorithms, and because they are too powerful both in that they can perform any computation in a single step and …
The Necessary A Posteriori: A Response To Tichý, Curtis Brown
The Necessary A Posteriori: A Response To Tichý, Curtis Brown
Curtis Brown
No abstract provided.
Internal Realism: Transcendental Idealism?, Curtis Brown
Internal Realism: Transcendental Idealism?, Curtis Brown
Curtis Brown
No abstract provided.
Naturalized Epistemology, Curtis Brown, Steven Luper
Naturalized Epistemology, Curtis Brown, Steven Luper
Curtis Brown
No abstract provided.
Implementation And Indeterminacy, Curtis Brown
Implementation And Indeterminacy, Curtis Brown
Curtis Brown
David Chalmers has defended an account of what it is for a physical system to implement a computation. The account appeals to the idea of a “combinatorial-state automaton” or CSA. It is unclear whether Chalmers intends the CSA to be a computational model in the usual sense, or merely a convenient formalism into which instances of other models can be translated. I argue that the CSA is not a computational model in the usual sense because CSAs do not perspicuously represent algorithms, are too powerful both in that they can perform any computation in a single step and in that …
Narrow Mental Content, Curtis Brown