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Kant On Duties To Animals, Nelson T. Potter Jr.

Department of Philosophy: Faculty Publications

According to Kant we human beings are finite rational beings, who also have an animal nature. Kant occasionally speculates that perhaps on other planets there may be quite different sorts of finite rational animals. But of course we have no specific knowledge of any such. Given that fact, all of our duties are duties to other human beings. We can have no duties to God because he is not an object of possible experience. There are no human beings such that they have only duties and no rights--they would be slaves or serfs. And the apparent duties that we have …

Applying The Categorical Imperative In Kant's Rechtslehre, Nelson T. Potter Jr.

Department of Philosophy: Faculty Publications

During the last forty years there has been considerable discussion of the application of the categorical imperative to derive conclusions concerning particular moral duties and rights in Kant's moral philosophy. Much attention was focused on the four examples of such applications that occur in Chapter Two of the Groundwork, especially the first presentation of those examples, in relation to the "universal law" formulation of the categorical imperative, as opposed to their second run through in the same chapter, in relation to the second formulation of the categorical imperative, on respect for persons. In more recent years the often fuller …

"The Principle Of Punishment Is A Categorical Imperative", Nelson T. Potter Jr.

Department of Philosophy: Faculty Publications

There has been a considerable renaissance in retributivism as a theory of the justification of punishment in the second half of this century. Retributivism is often defended as if it were a particularly hardy moral intuition, a basic free-standing moral principle that is underivable from any broader theory or set of principles. In this vein it is often "supported" through the presentation of outrageous and horribly cruel crimes, especially against persons, particularly murder, in order to elicit what may be thought to be the natural and appropriate emotional response, a response of anger, indignation, and desire for retribution. Under such …

The Synthetic A Priori Proposition Of Kant's Ethical Philosophy, Nelson T. Potter Jr.

Department of Philosophy: Faculty Publications

I will consider Kant's claim that the categorical imperative (CI) is a synthetic a priori proposition. We know from the first Critique that such propositions are likely to be very important, but also difficult to justify. Kant says exactly the same things about the CI in the Grundlegung: the CI is difficult to justify2, but if we do not succeed in justifying it, morality may be a mere "phantom of the brain.',3 Though little has been written on this topic, a correct understanding of this claim is important to understanding Kant's views.

Supererogation And Overdetermination In Kant's Ethics: Analysis And Interpretation At Their Best In Baron, Nelson T. Potter Jr.

Department of Philosophy: Faculty Publications

Marcia Baron's book tackles two very difficult issues, both centered on criticisms of the Kantian conception of duty. The solutions to her chosen questions lie rather deeply hidden, and the procedures by which Baron digs deep to find solutions are exemplary in their presentation of careful interpretation of texts by Kant, of writers on Kant, and of conceptual analysis and criticism. This book is not like a commentary, which would consider a broader range of questions and issues; it is rather a narrower, closer analysis of a few more specific issues. These few narrow issues have broad ramifications for our …

Comments On Hill: “Punishment, Conscience, And Moral Worth”, Nelson T. Potter Jr.

Department of Philosophy: Faculty Publications

This is an interesting paper to me, among other reasons, because it deals with both halves of Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals; that fact alone also makes it somewhat unusual. It proposes in particular that there is a kind of analogy between conscience as an inner voice of morality and punishment as a provider of incentives against antisocial actions through punishment as deterrence.

As Hill points out, there has been quite a lot of discussion of Kant’s views on punishment, but not much about his views of conscience. Nevertheless, there remain scholarly puzzles about Kant’s views on punishment, and there …

Maxims In Kant's Moral Philosophy, Nelson T. Potter Jr.

Department of Philosophy: Faculty Publications

It has been noticed in the English-language literature concerning Kant's ethics, at least since Marcus Singer's extended discussion in later chapters of Generalization in Ethics! that the concept of a maxim plays a central role in the application of the categorical imperative, and that it is, for that reason, if not for others, worth detailed attention. In the present essay I wish to consider the Kantian concept of maxim in a broader context.

Kant On Obligation And Motivation In Law And Ethics, Nelson T. Potter Jr.

Department of Philosophy: Faculty Publications

It is quite clear that a positive law must have some motivation connected with it, as specified in a penalty, at least a criminal law must, as opposed to a law appropriating funds or a law authorizing persons to make use of certain legal possibilities, such as a will, a limited liability corporation, or marriage. Some ten years ago Nebraska's state legislature passed a law requiring the wearing of a motorcycle helmet while riding a motorcycle on the state's roads, and the Governor signed it into law. Only some time after this process had been completed was the defect of …

Reply To Allison, Nelson T. Potter Jr.

Department of Philosophy: Faculty Publications

In "Kant's Doctrine of Obligatory Ends," Henry Allison offers an interpretation of this central doctrine of the Tugendlehre portion of Kant's Metaphysics of Morals that partly agrees with and partly takes issue with an earlier article of mine on the same topic. The disagreement between us might seem to be on a small point, and yet I think it will tum out that this point has considerable significance for interpreting and understanding Kant's ethical theory. I wish here to explain the issues, and defend my own earlier account.

What Is Wrong With Kant’S Four Examples, Nelson T. Potter Jr.

Department of Philosophy: Faculty Publications

Kant gives four examples to illustrate the application of the categorical imperative immediately after introducing its “universal law” formulation in Chapter Two his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. These examples have been much discussed to gain an understanding of how the categorical imperative applies to derive specific duties. It is argued that the discussions found in these examples do not accord well with Kant’s fuller account of that application in his later work The Metaphysics of Morals. That [later] work has quite different, sometimes better, arguments for the same moral conclusions, and never mentions the argument against …

Introduction From Morality And Universality: Essays On Ethical Universalizability, Nelson T. Potter, Mark Timmons

Department of Philosophy: Faculty Publications

CONCLUSION

The aim of the present volume is to show that recent philosophical thought on universalizability is multifaceted and alive, and is making advances. This has been done by presenting a wide variety of work by authors who are among the best of those currently working on these issues. This introduction has aimed to present the main points of our authors in summary form, exhibiting some of their relationships to each other.

Now that we have briefly discussed the papers included here it can be seen that they each have an important role to play in further discussions of this …

How To Apply The Categorical Imperative, Nelson T. Potter Jr.

Department of Philosophy: Faculty Publications

The aim of the present paper is to give a new positive interpretation of how the categorical imperative is to be applied. There have been critiques of Kant's applications and defenses of Kant against such criticism, but it is surprisingly seldom that a positive interpretation of how the categorical imperative is to be applied has been offered.

The Social And The Causal Concepts Of Responsibility, Nelson T. Potter Jr.

Department of Philosophy: Faculty Publications

The causal and the social concepts of responsibility share the notions of (a) a causal agent, and (b) some effect for which the agent is a cause. But William L. Blizek argues that the social concept has an additional element not shared by the causal concept: that of an adjudicator, someone who imputes responsibility. Thus he writes, “social responsibility is not a relationship between cause and effect, but a relationship between an agent and some consequence, as prescribed by an adjudicator.” He points out that our judgments of the different kind of social responsibility may change, as the society changes; …