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Articles 901 - 930 of 1618
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Racing For The Bomb: General Leslie Groves, The Manhattan Project’Sindispensable Man, Frank C. Mahncke
Racing For The Bomb: General Leslie Groves, The Manhattan Project’Sindispensable Man, Frank C. Mahncke
Naval War College Review
Today, when a major weapons system commonly takes decades or more to de- velop, it is hard to imagine that the greatest weapon system of them all, the Manhattan Project, took just three years from start to detonation over Ja- pan. Those three years were the stuff of high technical and engineering drama: vast new industrial facilities were con- structed in secret across the United States, two billion dollars were spent without congressional oversight, new scientific laboratories were secluded in the high desert, and a unique U.S.
Terrors And Marvels: How Science And Technology Changed Thecharacter And Outcome Of World War Ii, Alan R. Millett
Terrors And Marvels: How Science And Technology Changed Thecharacter And Outcome Of World War Ii, Alan R. Millett
Naval War College Review
Tom Schachtman’s brief history of the influence of science and technology on World War II needs less “gee whiz” and more John McPhee. As in the war itself, the author’s strategic decisions are criti- cal to the book’s successes and failures. The successes can be quickly acknowl- edged. The book is well written. Shachtman shows a good familiarity with the oral histories and memoirs of the most prominent scientists. He is in- teresting when identifying personalities and providing biographical material to enliven the narrative.
Victory On The Potomac, William Turcotte
Victory On The Potomac, William Turcotte
Naval War College Review
Jim Locher describes the history of the intense bureaucratic struggle to rede- sign relationships between the Joint Chiefs of Staff, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, secretary of defense, the presi- dent, and Congress. The prolonged struggle culminated in the Goldwater- Nichols Act of 1986. This document is thought by many to be the most sweep- ing military reform of the last forty years. Senators Barry Goldwater and Sam Nunn believed the system was bro- ken and consequently was providing low-quality military advice to the secretary of defense.
Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, And Leadershipin Wartime, Jan Van Tol
Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, And Leadershipin Wartime, Jan Van Tol
Naval War College Review
This is an extraordinarily timely work, published when the United States may be about to conduct large-scale combat operations in the Middle East. It exam- ines the relationship in a democracy be- tween military and political leadership, “or more precisely, . . . the tension be- tween two kinds of leadership, civil and military,” especially in time of war.
Defense Policy Choices For The Bush Administration, Cynthia Perrotti
Defense Policy Choices For The Bush Administration, Cynthia Perrotti
Naval War College Review
O’Hanlon presents his blueprint for how U.S. resources should be spent based on thorough strategic and mili- tary assessments. He recommends that the Bush administration set priorities and make the difficult choices. However, the terrorist attacks of “9/11” and the completion of the 2001 Quadren- nial Defense Review (QDR) have changed fiscal conditions and defense strategy.
Assessing The Threats, Myron A. Greenberg
Assessing The Threats, Myron A. Greenberg
Naval War College Review
It is no cliché to argue that the terrorist attack that befell the United States in September 2001 was a climacteric event, a watershed in the post–Cold War world. Henceforth, all analyses of American na- tional security policy will demarcate events as having occurred either before or after the horrendous events of that day.
Book Reviews, The U.S Naval War College
Book Reviews, The U.S Naval War College
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
Eisenhower: From Abilene To The Elbe, Douglas Kinnard
Eisenhower: From Abilene To The Elbe, Douglas Kinnard
Naval War College Review
Dwight D. Eisenhower, affectionately known as Ike, was in the center of major world events for two decades in the mid-twentieth century. As a soldier in World War II, he commanded the Allied armies that defeated the Axis powers in the Mediterranean and Europe, and in the following decade he served two terms as a very popular president. With this long and interesting volume that ends on VE Day, 8 May 1945, Carlo D’Este, a military historian, joins a distinguished list of Eisenhower biographers that includes Stephen Ambrose, Peter Lyon, grandson David Eisenhower, and, most recently, Geoffrey Perret.
Thinking Ahead Intelligently, Francis G. Hoffman
Thinking Ahead Intelligently, Francis G. Hoffman
Naval War College Review
The significance of this slim book to today’s nascent military transformation is entirely out of proportion to its size. Thomas Mahnken, professor of strategy at the Naval War College, has produced a compact and highly relevant work of scholarship that warrants attention from serious students of military innova- tion. Mahnken deftly corrects the orthodox view, expressed best by Stephen Rosen, about the limited role of intelligence in spurring military adaptation.1
The Joint Forces Air Command Problem, William A. Woodcock
The Joint Forces Air Command Problem, William A. Woodcock
Naval War College Review
The marriage of network-centric warfare and the joint forces air component commander concept represents a “military-technical revolution” in aero- space command and control.1 The current system is cumbersome, and it is falling behind in its ability to deal with the fast-paced warfare of today. By its nature, network-centric warfare (NCW) could address many of the shortfalls of the cur- rent joint air component system. It will not, however, change the fundamental nature of war, nor can it solve all of the current problems of the joint forces air component commander (JFACC).
Clausewitz’S Center Of Gravity, Antulio J. Echevarria Ii
Clausewitz’S Center Of Gravity, Antulio J. Echevarria Ii
Naval War College Review
Over the last two decades, the U.S. military has struggled to understand the center of gravity concept as developed by Carl von Clausewitz and to find practical ways to apply it. In the process, however, each of the services—shaped as they are by different roles, histories, and traditions—has brought individual perspectives to Clausewitz’s expression and redefined it in its respective image. Thus, the U.S. Marine Corps, a relatively small force designed more for win- ning battles than fighting campaigns or wars, prefers to strike at enemy weak- nesses. Accordingly, it initially equated enemy centers of gravity (CoGs) with key vulnerabilities.
“Alongside The Best”?, Andrew C. Richter
“Alongside The Best”?, Andrew C. Richter
Naval War College Review
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Canadian Forces face a range of challenges. Reduced defense spending, uncertainty regarding missions and tasks, and the lingering effects of recent scandal have resulted in a signifi- cantly diminished military. In the midst of a rapidly emerging “revolution in military affairs” (RMA), the Canadian Forces (CF) are poorly positioned to in- troduce next-generation weapon systems.1 At the same time, Canada’s allies, in particular the United States, have undertaken dramatic defense modernization programs. It is this divergence—Canada’s reduced military capability at a time of swiftly advancing technology—that will be the focus of this …
Our Special Correspondent: Letter From France, Geoffrey Wawro
Our Special Correspondent: Letter From France, Geoffrey Wawro
Naval War College Review
The most popular television show in France these days must be Les Guignols de l’Info—“the evening news puppets”—who do a ten-minute turn every night on the cable channel “Canal Plus.” Their humor is excoriating, and they are as hard on Princess Caroline of Monaco or businessman Bernard Tapié as they are on President Jacques Chirac—who is never re- ferred to as “Chirac” or “the president” but as supermenteur, “super liar.” Increasingly, how- ever, America is the target of these pitiless pup- pets. There is a George W. Bush guignol, a perfect copy, who stumbles rhetorically and shouts the gaseous platitudes …
Nato’S European Members, Richard L. Russell
Nato’S European Members, Richard L. Russell
Naval War College Review
The transatlantic relationship is fraying at the edges. The Europeans are increasingly uneasy over the George W. Bush administration’s national secu- rity policy, judging by the pronouncements coming from government officials. While the tragedies of 11 September 2001 garnered Americans broad sympathy in Europe, emotional support since has steadily eroded. What had been European sympathy on a personal level to American pain and suffering is gradually giving way to anxiety about this nation’s preponderance of global power, mixed with an awareness—if in many instances only subconsciously—of Europe’s own shortcomings, particularly in the realm of international security.
President’S Forum, Rodney P. Rempt
President’S Forum, Rodney P. Rempt
Naval War College Review
In many ways the ongoing terror war caught us by surprise. The warning signs were clear, but we simply failed to take adequate notice and ac- tion; we didn’t understand. We treated events such as the Pan Am Flight 103 crash over Lockerbie, Scotland, the attack on the Marine barracks in Lebanon, the destruction of U.S. embassies in Africa, and the bombing of USS Cole in Yemen as discrete events rather than a series of battles in a new kind of war. Now, in responding to a war we did not choose, we must apply serious military power together with …
Research And Debate, Eric J. Labs
Research And Debate, Eric J. Labs
Naval War College Review
Since 11 September 2001, the U.S. defense budget has risen by about 25 percent, after factoring out inflation. The reasons for such an increase are numerous: si- multaneously fighting wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq, increases in military pay and benefits, and more money for some major weapons programs. In this same time period, money devoted to building the Navy’s ships has only bounced around. In fiscal year 2001, the Navy spent $12 billion on ships. The Presi- dent’s request for ships in 2005 is $11 billion. Why might this be the case?
The Shield And The Cloak: The Security Of The Commons, Richmond M. Lloyd, Gary Hart
The Shield And The Cloak: The Security Of The Commons, Richmond M. Lloyd, Gary Hart
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
Nuclear First Strike: Consequences Of A Broken Taboo; China’S Nuclear Future, Christopher Yeaw, George Quester, Paul J. Bolt, Albert S. Willner
Nuclear First Strike: Consequences Of A Broken Taboo; China’S Nuclear Future, Christopher Yeaw, George Quester, Paul J. Bolt, Albert S. Willner
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
Review Essay—Part And Parcel Of A Nation’S Totality, John B. Hattendorf, N.A. M. Rodger
Review Essay—Part And Parcel Of A Nation’S Totality, John B. Hattendorf, N.A. M. Rodger
Naval War College Review
The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649–1815
Review Essay—Technologies That May Yet Revolutionize Warfarefuture Wars Will Be Fought, William C. Martel, Doug Beason
Review Essay—Technologies That May Yet Revolutionize Warfarefuture Wars Will Be Fought, William C. Martel, Doug Beason
Naval War College Review
The E-Bomb: How America’s New Directed Energy Weapons Will Change the Way Future Wars Will Be Fought
Research & Debate—Is The Psi Really The Cornerstone Of A New International Norm?, Mark J. Valencia
Research & Debate—Is The Psi Really The Cornerstone Of A New International Norm?, Mark J. Valencia
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
Suez, 1956—A Successful Naval Operation Compromised By Inept Political Leadership, Michael H. Coles
Suez, 1956—A Successful Naval Operation Compromised By Inept Political Leadership, Michael H. Coles
Naval War College Review
The British and French forces that saw action during the abortive Suez invasion of 1956 produced a “copybook” performance in military terms. But flawed political decisions are likely to lead to flawed operational strategy, and today the entire episode is remembered as an embarrassing failure.
Fort Fisher—Amphibious Victory In The American Civil War, Gary J. Ohls
Fort Fisher—Amphibious Victory In The American Civil War, Gary J. Ohls
Naval War College Review
The first attack on Fort Fisher, during the American Civil War, failed utterly; the second succeeded magnificently. The commanders of the latter learned from the experience of the former; the lessons of both attempts were valuable for the great amphibious operations of the mid-twentieth century, and they remain instructive today.
Maritime Geostrategy And The Development Of The Chinese Navy In The Early Twenty-First Century, Xu Qi, Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein
Maritime Geostrategy And The Development Of The Chinese Navy In The Early Twenty-First Century, Xu Qi, Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein
Naval War College Review
A Senior Captain in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy, writing in 2004 in China’s most prestigious military journal, surveys the now favorable geostrategic environment for accelerated Chinese maritime development, thereby articulating a rationale for a PLA Navy that is prepared to “defend a larger scope.”
China’S Aircraft Carrier Dilemma, Andrew S. Erickson, Andrew R. Wilson
China’S Aircraft Carrier Dilemma, Andrew S. Erickson, Andrew R. Wilson
Naval War College Review
What even a modest aircraft carrier can do, in a variety of roles, has impressed itself upon the Chinese. They have avoided buying the wrong platform at the wrong time—conventional large-deck ships may no longer be their “gold standard”—but aircraft carriers of some kind may yet complement their submarine-centered navy.
President’S Forum—A New Maritime Strategy: Admiral Mullen’S Challenge, Jacob L. Shuford
President’S Forum—A New Maritime Strategy: Admiral Mullen’S Challenge, Jacob L. Shuford
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
From The Editors, Carnes Lord
Full Autumn 2006 Issue, The U.S. Naval War College
Full Autumn 2006 Issue, The U.S. Naval War College
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
Summer/Autumn 2004 Full Issue, The U.S. Naval War College
Summer/Autumn 2004 Full Issue, The U.S. Naval War College
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
From The Editors, The U.S. Naval War College Press
From The Editors, The U.S. Naval War College Press
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.