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Articles 661 - 690 of 1618
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Naval Warfare In The Age Of Sail: The Evolution Of Fighting Tactics, 1650-1815, John B. Hattendorf
Naval Warfare In The Age Of Sail: The Evolution Of Fighting Tactics, 1650-1815, John B. Hattendorf
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
From Archidamus To Alexander: The Revolution In Greek Warfare, Charles D. Hamilton
From Archidamus To Alexander: The Revolution In Greek Warfare, Charles D. Hamilton
Naval War College Review
Then Alexander The Great crossed the Hellespont to launch his invasion of the Persian Empire in 334 D.C., he commanded an army of some forty thousand troops of mixed type. Herelied upon the Macedonian phalanx of heavy infantry, which his father had perfected, but he also employed both light and heavy cavalry, peltasts (light-armed infantry), skirmishers, archers and slingers, and other specialized troops. The soldier. themselves consisted of Macedonian citizens, allied Greek troops, and Greek mercenaries. By contrast, the army that the Spartan king Archidamus commanded in his invasion of Attica almost a century earlier, during the Peloponnesian War, consisted …
Set And Drift—"Warfare Theory", Joseph A. Gattuso Jr.
Set And Drift—"Warfare Theory", Joseph A. Gattuso Jr.
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
The Changing Nature Of Warfare?, Colin S. Gray
The Changing Nature Of Warfare?, Colin S. Gray
Naval War College Review
If this were a sermon, I would take as my text these remarkably accurate words of Alfred Thayer Mahan: "From time to time the superstructure of tactics has to be altered or wholly torn down; but the old foundations of strategy so far remain, as though laid upon a rock."
Sea Soliders In The Cold War: Amphibious Warfare, 1945-1991, Walter J. Johanson
Sea Soliders In The Cold War: Amphibious Warfare, 1945-1991, Walter J. Johanson
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
Captain James Cook : A Biography,, Y.H Aboul-Enein
Captain James Cook : A Biography,, Y.H Aboul-Enein
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
Nelson's Battles: The Art Of Victory In The Age Of Sail, Peter K.H Mispelkamp
Nelson's Battles: The Art Of Victory In The Age Of Sail, Peter K.H Mispelkamp
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
The Coast Guard Expands, 1865-1915: New Roles, New Frontiers, Alan C. Brown
The Coast Guard Expands, 1865-1915: New Roles, New Frontiers, Alan C. Brown
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
Slow Dance To Pearl Harbor: A Tin Can Ensign In Prewar America, C.R Calhoun
Slow Dance To Pearl Harbor: A Tin Can Ensign In Prewar America, C.R Calhoun
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
The Dragon's Breath: Hurricane At Sea, Joseph R. Brenner
The Dragon's Breath: Hurricane At Sea, Joseph R. Brenner
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
Masters Of War: Military Dissent And Politics In The Vietnam Era, Douglas Kinnard
Masters Of War: Military Dissent And Politics In The Vietnam Era, Douglas Kinnard
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
Tonkin Gulf And The Escalation Of The Vietnam War, Patrick J. Haney
Tonkin Gulf And The Escalation Of The Vietnam War, Patrick J. Haney
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
Gray Steel And Black Oil: Fast Tankers And Replenishment At Sea In Theu.S. Navy, 1912-1992, Frank C. Mahncke
Gray Steel And Black Oil: Fast Tankers And Replenishment At Sea In Theu.S. Navy, 1912-1992, Frank C. Mahncke
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
Tanker Wars: The Assault On Merchant Shipping During The Iran-Iraq Conflict, 1980-1988, Frank Uhlig Jr.
Tanker Wars: The Assault On Merchant Shipping During The Iran-Iraq Conflict, 1980-1988, Frank Uhlig Jr.
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
The New Military In Russia: Ten Myths That Shape The Image, Brenda J. Vallance
The New Military In Russia: Ten Myths That Shape The Image, Brenda J. Vallance
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
The Cambridge Illustrated History Of Warfare: The Triumph Of The West, Cole C. Kingseed
The Cambridge Illustrated History Of Warfare: The Triumph Of The West, Cole C. Kingseed
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
Law On The Battlefield, Leslie C. Green
Law On The Battlefield, Leslie C. Green
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
The Laws Of War: Constraints On Warfare In The Western World, Michael N. Schmitt
The Laws Of War: Constraints On Warfare In The Western World, Michael N. Schmitt
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
Military Innovation In The Lnterwar Period, F.G. Hoffman
Military Innovation In The Lnterwar Period, F.G. Hoffman
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
Book Reviews, The U.S Naval War College
Book Reviews, The U.S Naval War College
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
Naval Maneuver Warfare, Wayne P. Hughes Jr.
Naval Maneuver Warfare, Wayne P. Hughes Jr.
Naval War College Review
To approach teh sea side of maneuver warfare, one ought first to understand its nature and content in general. Contemporary American military reformers seem to claim that maneuver warfare is everything good: outwitting the enemy, creating and exploiting an information advantage, moving faster and more adroitly, and shooting more precisely and effectively. In the rhetoric, maneuver warfare is "rapid, violent, coordinated attack." But who would espouse the opposite, a "slow, feeble, disorganized attack"? If maneuver warfare is nothing more than fighting intelligently, then its antithesis is "stupid" warfare.
Revolution In Warfare? Air Power In The Persian Gulf, Phillip S. Meilinger, Eliot A. Cohen, Thomas A. Keaney
Revolution In Warfare? Air Power In The Persian Gulf, Phillip S. Meilinger, Eliot A. Cohen, Thomas A. Keaney
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
The Navy Rma War Game Series: April 1995-November 1996, Edward A. Smith Jr.
The Navy Rma War Game Series: April 1995-November 1996, Edward A. Smith Jr.
Naval War College Review
In the wake of DESERT STORM and the phenomenal success of the coalition forces, it appeared to a considerable number of of observers that the United States was experiencing a "revolution in military affairs" or "RMA," a sharp discontinuity in warfare like that represented by the blitzkrieg of 1940.
Information, Technology, And The Center Of Gravity, Jeffrey A. Harley
Information, Technology, And The Center Of Gravity, Jeffrey A. Harley
Naval War College Review
The American way of war is characterized by the use of overwhelming force and a search for technological advantage.t This appears to be a logical approach, given a political need to limit the duration of a conflict and minimize casualties. This style of warfare, however, is not applicable to every type of con flict. Although technology has certainly enhanced the conduct of war in many ways, it remains only a tool, useful in certain applications. In addition, the United States cannot be assured of overwhelming strength or technological advantage at the commencement of hostilities. Therefore, U.S. military officers must reflect …
President's Notes, J.R. Stark
President's Notes, J.R. Stark
Naval War College Review
Luce and Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote within the pages of the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings that a place was needed in which naval officers could study the higher aspects of their profession. The need for such study was being driven by the increasingly complex nature of naval warfare as the service embraced such technologies as steam power, long-range weapons, and wireless communications. Luce and Mahan advocated the establishment of a "college of naval war," and in 1884 their dream was realized when our institution first opened its doors on the shores of Narragansett Bay.
Defensive Information Warfare, Lillian A. Burke
Defensive Information Warfare, Lillian A. Burke
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
The Dardanelles Campaign, E.Michael Golda
The Dardanelles Campaign, E.Michael Golda
Naval War College Review
Effectiveness in five warfare elements is necessary for the United States Navy to achieve the maritime dominance discussed in the strategic vision of littopral warfare, "Forward…from the Sea": surface warfare, undersea warfare, amphibious warfare, combat logistics, and mine warfare. The fifth element , mine warfare, has been elevated from its traditional, often neglected, supporting role.
The Constants Of Naval Warfare, Frank Uhlig Jr.
The Constants Of Naval Warfare, Frank Uhlig Jr.
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
"This Is Your Ticket To Compete", James D. Watkins
"This Is Your Ticket To Compete", James D. Watkins
Naval War College Review
Thirty-five years ago, right after World War II, the Naval Wat College went through one of those soul searching examinations, the kind that people and institutions go through after cataclysmic events. Before World War II the War College's purpose was to teach naval warfare to senior naval officers. Evidently it succeeded in its task. When considering graduates, names like Nimitz, Halsey, King, Spruance, and Fletcher come to mind. One of its greatest contributions to naval warfare was the wargaming strategy taught to the students in 1922.
Missions Of The U.S. Navy, Stansfield Turner
Missions Of The U.S. Navy, Stansfield Turner
Naval War College Review
Observers of military affairs will have noted a changed naval lexicon over the past several years. To those accustomed to phrases such as"sea power," "command" of the seas," "commerce warfare," and "amphibious warfare," the new terms "strategic deterrence," "sea control," and "presence" may seem to be just new jargon. Not so. Since 1970 there has been a redefinition of traditional U.S. naval roles and missions. The primary purpose of this redefinition is to force the navy to think in terms of output rather than input.