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Review Essay: Grand Strategy And World Order, Karl Walling
Review Essay: Grand Strategy And World Order, Karl Walling
Naval War College Review
From the end of the Cold War in 1989–91 and with increasing urgency in the immediate aftermath of 11 September 2001, perhaps few subjects seemed more important to those who frame and study strategy than developing a new American grand strategy for the twenty-first century. Who would play the role of George Washington in his Farewell Address advising Americans to steer clear of permanent alliances (he did not say “entangling alliances”—that was Thomas Jefferson’s phrase in his first inaugural message; Washington’s brilliant speech- writer, Alexander Hamilton, accepted that temporary alliances might be neces- sary or advisable from time to time, …
Frogmen Against A Fleet: The Italian Attack On Alexandria 18/19 December 1941, Vincent P. O’Hara, Enrico Cernuschi
Frogmen Against A Fleet: The Italian Attack On Alexandria 18/19 December 1941, Vincent P. O’Hara, Enrico Cernuschi
Naval War College Review
In March 1939 Italy’s Regia Marina established a specialized and secret naval warfare unit called Decima Flottiglia MAS (Motoscafo Anti Sommergibili), generally known as the 10th Light Flotilla or X MAS. This unit was innovative, in that it employed selected, highly trained personnel using special weapons and delivery systems to conduct sneak attacks. On the night of 18 December 1941, six members of this unit penetrated the main British naval base in the eastern Mediterranean at Alexandria, Egypt, and disabled the Mediterranean Fleet’s two battleships, a tanker, and a destroyer. In few military endeavors has so little been risked to …
“The Navy’S Success Speaks For Itself”?: The German Navy’S Independent Energy Security Strategy, 1932–1940, Anand Toprani
“The Navy’S Success Speaks For Itself”?: The German Navy’S Independent Energy Security Strategy, 1932–1940, Anand Toprani
Naval War College Review
The National Socialists’ primary foreign policy objective after taking office was to rearm Germany so that it might reverse the verdict of the First World War and acquire the “living space” necessary to becoming a world power on par with Britain or the United States. For the German armed services, the Third Reich’s ambitious plans meant that they were compelled to broaden their missions and operational capabilities.
Mentoring In The U.S. Navy: Experiences And Attitudes Of Senior Navy Personnel, W. Brad Johnson, Gene R. Andersen
Mentoring In The U.S. Navy: Experiences And Attitudes Of Senior Navy Personnel, W. Brad Johnson, Gene R. Andersen
Naval War College Review
The first operational definition of mentoring in organizations—offered by Kathy Kram in 1985—proposed that mentoring relationships facilitate an individual’s professional development through two distinct categories of “mentoring functions.” Career functions included sponsorship, exposure and visibility, coaching, protection, and provision of challenging assignments. Psychosocial functions included role modeling, acceptance and confirmation, counseling, and friendship.
The Jmsdf’S Resilient Power For Civil Society: Lessons From The Great East Japan Earthquake, Takuya Shimodaira
The Jmsdf’S Resilient Power For Civil Society: Lessons From The Great East Japan Earthquake, Takuya Shimodaira
Naval War College Review
The Asia-Pacific is a disaster-prone region. In humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) operations, it is crucial to save lives at the outset .Success in the initial phase will produce trustful relationships among civil and military actors and will influence subsequent relief operations. Soon after Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) struck the central Philippines on 8 November 2013, the United States dispatched an aircraft carrier and conducted Operation DAMAYAN. Dr. Patrick Cronin, senior director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, wrote, “The response to Haiyan could be a turning point for the United States in …
Implications Of Xi Jinping’S “True Maritime Power”: Its Context, Significance, And Impact On The Region, Sukjoon Yoon
Implications Of Xi Jinping’S “True Maritime Power”: Its Context, Significance, And Impact On The Region, Sukjoon Yoon
Naval War College Review
Xi Jinping’s declaration that China should strive to become a “true maritime power” (海洋强國) has been much discussed in the context of China’s “peaceful rise” (和平崛起) and the pursuit of the “Chinese dream” (中国夢). 1 Although there is, at face value, nothing quite new about Xi’s exhortation to the Chinese leadership, his remarks need to be understood against a rather complex background of situations, policies, and aspirations if their full significance is to be appreciated. Xi’s policy is not just about geographic dispositions but needs to be seen in terms of U.S. Navy captain Alfred Thayer Mahan’s sea-power theory—the “neo- …
Fighting The Naval Hegemon: Evolution In French, Soviet, And Chinese Naval Thought, Martin N. Murphy, Toshi Yoshihara
Fighting The Naval Hegemon: Evolution In French, Soviet, And Chinese Naval Thought, Martin N. Murphy, Toshi Yoshihara
Naval War College Review
Geography gives strategy its context. Secure from land invasion, Great Brit- ain and later the United States employed a distinctive form of sea power to defeat their adversaries. Both used their navies to control sea-lanes and vital choke points and to apply direct pressure along enemy coastlines. Through their dominance of the oceans they were able to shape the political and economic order of the world. It is fair to say that what amounts to the Anglo-American school of naval power has demonstrated its efficacy time after time: over the past 250 years these two powers have, singly or together, …
From The Editors, The U.S Naval War College Press
From The Editors, The U.S Naval War College Press
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
The Death Of Money: The Coming Collapse Of The International Monetary System, Robert C. Whitten, James Rickards
The Death Of Money: The Coming Collapse Of The International Monetary System, Robert C. Whitten, James Rickards
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
Power, Law, And The End Of Privateering, John B. Hattendorf, Jan Martin Lemnitzer
Power, Law, And The End Of Privateering, John B. Hattendorf, Jan Martin Lemnitzer
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
Presidents & Their Generals: An American History Of Command In War, Richard Norton, Matthew Moten
Presidents & Their Generals: An American History Of Command In War, Richard Norton, Matthew Moten
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
Small Navies: Strategy And Policy For Small Navies In War And Peace, Sean Sullivan, Michael Mulqueen, Deborah Sanders, Ian Speller
Small Navies: Strategy And Policy For Small Navies In War And Peace, Sean Sullivan, Michael Mulqueen, Deborah Sanders, Ian Speller
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
The Relevance Of History To Current Military Challenges: Anti-Access Warfare: Countering A2/Ad Strategies, Peter Dombrowski, Sam J. Tangredi
The Relevance Of History To Current Military Challenges: Anti-Access Warfare: Countering A2/Ad Strategies, Peter Dombrowski, Sam J. Tangredi
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
Wanted: U.S. Navy Mine Warfare Champion, Scott C. Truver
Wanted: U.S. Navy Mine Warfare Champion, Scott C. Truver
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
Revisiting The Navy’S Moral Compass: Has Commanding Officer Conduct Improved?, Jason A. Vogt Captain
Revisiting The Navy’S Moral Compass: Has Commanding Officer Conduct Improved?, Jason A. Vogt Captain
Naval War College Review
Since the 2012 publication here of Captain Mark F. Light’s “The Navy’s Moral Compass,” the service has taken effective measures to address reliefs of commanding officers for personal misconduct, but the poor decisions of some have continued to trouble Navy leadership. What are the next steps?
On Littoral Warfare, Milan Vego
On Littoral Warfare, Milan Vego
Naval War College Review
The lack of adequate capabilities for littoral warfare could cost a blue-water force like the U.S. Navy dearly in a high-intensity conventional war. So might the lack of a sound theory of littoral warfare, operational concepts, and doctrine; these require much effort and time and cannot be produced in a hurry after hostilities start.
The Law Of Cyber Targeting, Michael N. Schmitt
The Law Of Cyber Targeting, Michael N. Schmitt
Naval War College Review
Cyber technology on the battlefield has outpaced the law, or at least full understanding of how extant law governs emerging capabilities—a strategically perilous state of affairs.
From The Editors, Carnes Lord
Spring 2015 Full Issue, The U.S. Naval War College
Spring 2015 Full Issue, The U.S. Naval War College
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
Winter 2015 Review, The U.S. Naval War College
Winter 2015 Review, The U.S. Naval War College
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
Bleeding Talent: How The U.S. Military Mismanages Great Leadersand Why It’S Time For A Revolution, By Tim Kane, Thomas Gibbons
Bleeding Talent: How The U.S. Military Mismanages Great Leadersand Why It’S Time For A Revolution, By Tim Kane, Thomas Gibbons
Naval War College Review
This book provides a critical analysis and highlights a dysfunctional U.S. Army officer personnel management system. The author explains why the best and brightest young officers depart early for civilian careers and what can be done to encourage them to remain on active duty. Kane also outlines why the military’s leadership training is so successful and admired by civilian industry.
The Military Lens: Doctrinal Difference Anddeterrence Failure In Sino-American Relations, By Christopher P. Twomey, David Burbach
The Military Lens: Doctrinal Difference Anddeterrence Failure In Sino-American Relations, By Christopher P. Twomey, David Burbach
Naval War College Review
It has been said that “weapons speak to the wise—but in general they need interpreters.” The Military Lens, writ- ten by political scientist Christopher P. Twomey, associate professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, in Monterey, California, shows the difficulty of that quote. Twomey makes a strong case that differing military languages and doctrines explain otherwise puzzling examples of deterrence failure and escalation.
Book Reviews, The U.S Naval War College
Book Reviews, The U.S Naval War College
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
A Strategy Has To Be Able To Work To Be Masterful, Alan D. Zimm
A Strategy Has To Be Able To Work To Be Masterful, Alan D. Zimm
Naval War College Review
This essay was written in response to an article by Angelo N. Caravaggio, “‘Winning’ the Pacific War: The Masterful Strategy of Commander Minoru Genda,” which appeared in the Winter 2014 issue of the Naval War College Review (pages 85–118). Dr. Caravaggio takes to task “criticisms leveled at the Japanese for their ‘ill conceived’ or ‘poorly planned’ attack at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941.” Since his endnote supporting this comment listed only my Attack on Pearl Harbor: Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions as a source of this criticism, the finger appears to be pointed directly at me. Understandably, I was eager …
The Key To Midway: Coral Sea And A Culture Of Learning, Carl Cavanagh Hodge
The Key To Midway: Coral Sea And A Culture Of Learning, Carl Cavanagh Hodge
Naval War College Review
Was the battle of Midway won or lost? In a recent edition of the Naval War College Review, James Levy grappled with some of the recurrent issues found in the scholarship of the battle of Midway, all of them related to the question whether one or another aspect of the Japanese way of war led to a catastrophic defeat at the hands of the U.S. Navy. Levy observes that an assumption common to many works is “that the Japanese did as much to lose the battle as the Americans did to win it, or more.”
China’S Blue Soft Power, Andrew S. Erickson, Austin M. Strange
China’S Blue Soft Power, Andrew S. Erickson, Austin M. Strange
Naval War College Review
On 3 September 2014, almost six years since Chinese warships first entered the Gulf of Aden to fulfill antipiracy duties, China Central Television (CCTV)–8 aired the first episode of “In the Gulf of Aden” (舰在亚丁湾). The multidozen-episode program, designed to “ignite raging patriotism” (燃起熊 熊爱国心), given evening prime-time status, and attracting a popular audience with a star-studded cast, explores in dramatic fashion Beijing’s experience fighting modern piracy.
The American “Pivot” And The Indian Navy, Harsh V. Pant, Yogesh Joshi
The American “Pivot” And The Indian Navy, Harsh V. Pant, Yogesh Joshi
Naval War College Review
Just after addressing the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in June 2012, Leo Panetta, then the American secretary of defense, visited New Delhi, where he remarked that “defense cooperation with India is a lynchpin in this [pivot] strategy.” Since the thrust of the “pivot” has been on the maritime balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, both the Pacific and the Indian Oceans have gained tremendous traction in the new U.S. strategy. From the very initiation of the pivot, India has featured on the American radar as an important strategic partner.
Deconstructing Nimitz’S Principle Of Calculated Risk, Robert C. Rubel
Deconstructing Nimitz’S Principle Of Calculated Risk, Robert C. Rubel
Naval War College Review
All military operations are attended by various forms of risk. Risk permeates the fabric of war from the actions of individual soldiers, sailors, and airmen to the policies, strategies, and decisions of national leaders. Decisions and actions have both potential and real consequences, and intelligent decision making normally involves a calculation of the odds for success and failure, as well as consideration of the consequences of potential failure. When success is less than a sure thing but through analysis of the salient aspects of the problem, including costs and consequences of failure, a commander decides to proceed nonetheless, we can …
The Race To The Bottom, Jan Joel Andersson
The Race To The Bottom, Jan Joel Andersson
Naval War College Review
The growing need to protect global shipping routes and the intensification of maritime territorial conflicts have led to a naval arms buildup around the world. Perhaps the most-cited example of this new focus on naval power is the increasing number of countries building or planning new aircraft carriers, but many analysts are more concerned about the proliferation of modern attack submarines. Often considered the ultimate weapon of naval warfare, submarines are versatile platforms able to attack surface ships, conduct antisubmarine war- fare (ASW), deploy mines, and, as they are increasingly equipped with missiles, attack land targets.
From The Editors, Pelham G. Boyer