Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Keyword
-
- The U.S. Naval War College (899)
- Book Review (217)
- Book review (162)
- History (162)
- Book reviews (128)
-
- The u.s naval war college review (85)
- Full Issue (74)
- China (71)
- Warfare (62)
- Review (57)
- Strategy (57)
- From The Editors (40)
- Russia (38)
- Nuclear (36)
- Military (33)
- War (33)
- World War II (33)
- Future (32)
- Japan (32)
- President's Forum (30)
- WWII (30)
- The u.s. naval war college review (27)
- Sea power (26)
- Winter 1990 review (26)
- 1991 (25)
- Aggression (25)
- Air defense (25)
- Air warfare (25)
- Artificial intelligence (25)
- Defense technology (25)
Articles 1381 - 1410 of 1618
Full-Text Articles in Entire DC Network
Race To The North: China’S Arctic Strategy And Its Implications, Shiloh Rainwater
Race To The North: China’S Arctic Strategy And Its Implications, Shiloh Rainwater
Naval War College Review
The effects of the emerging and prospective economic and strategic opportunities in the Arctic are being felt far beyond the circumpolar states. China, for one, has begun to promulgate the notion that it is a “near-Arctic state” and a stakeholder in the affairs of the High North.
The “Consequent Interest” Of Japan’S Southwestern Islands: A Mahanian Appraisal Of The Ryukyu Archipelago, Eric Sayers
The “Consequent Interest” Of Japan’S Southwestern Islands: A Mahanian Appraisal Of The Ryukyu Archipelago, Eric Sayers
Naval War College Review
The now little-known Ryukyu Archipelago may be—for reasons adduced by Alfred Thayer Mahan in another century, for other islands—of much significance today for protection of Japanese and U.S. maritime interests in the Northwest Pacific.
Naval Operations In Peacetime: Not Just “Warfare Lite”, Ivan T. Luke
Naval Operations In Peacetime: Not Just “Warfare Lite”, Ivan T. Luke
Naval War College Review
Naval strategists and practitioners will need to be smart about how they approach peacetime missions, yet existing naval theory fails to support the necessary full understanding. It needs to catch up.
Every Ambitious Naval Officer Should Want To Be A Graduate Of Newport., John N. Christenson
Every Ambitious Naval Officer Should Want To Be A Graduate Of Newport., John N. Christenson
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
From The Editors, Carnes Lord
Spring 2013 Full Issue, The U.S. Naval War College
Spring 2013 Full Issue, The U.S. Naval War College
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
In The Hour Of Victory: The Royal Navy At War In The Age Of Nelson, Jeremy Snellen, Sam Willis
In The Hour Of Victory: The Royal Navy At War In The Age Of Nelson, Jeremy Snellen, Sam Willis
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
The Triumph Of Improvisation: Gorbachev’S Adaptability, Reagan’S Engagement, And The End Of The Cold War, Andrew Stigler, James Graham Wilson
The Triumph Of Improvisation: Gorbachev’S Adaptability, Reagan’S Engagement, And The End Of The Cold War, Andrew Stigler, James Graham Wilson
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
Treasury’S War: The Unleashing Of A New Era Of Financial Warfare, David Burbach, Juan Zarate
Treasury’S War: The Unleashing Of A New Era Of Financial Warfare, David Burbach, Juan Zarate
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
Keep A Weather Eye On The Horizon: A Navy Officer Retention Study, Guy M. Snodgrass
Keep A Weather Eye On The Horizon: A Navy Officer Retention Study, Guy M. Snodgrass
Naval War College Review
The U.S. Navy is about to face its most challenging officer retention problem in more than two decades. How are we to outrun the approaching storm? A serving officer takes an in-depth look at factors impacting retention, compares them to historical retention downturns, evaluates Fortune 500 approaches for retaining talent, and offers actionable recommendations.
Consequences, Nicholas Rostow
Consequences, Nicholas Rostow
Naval War College Review
As has been the case since 1945, the ultimate nightmare is general war among the great powers resulting in widespread use of nuclear weapons. A breakdown in minimum public order may make that bad dream become reality.
Amphibious Operations And The Evolution Of Australian Defense Policy, Peter J. Dean
Amphibious Operations And The Evolution Of Australian Defense Policy, Peter J. Dean
Naval War College Review
“The tyranny of dissonance” among Australia’s geography, history, values, and political interests has begun to recede, and amphibious capability, long marginal in the nation’s defense strategy, will be playing a critical role.
Navy Nexus, Walter E. Carter Jr., John E. Jackson
Navy Nexus, Walter E. Carter Jr., John E. Jackson
Naval War College Review
As it celebrates its 130th anniversary, the Naval War College continues to refine its educational and research programs to meet the demands of the Navy and the national security community.
Intellectual Awakenings, P. Gardner Howe Iii
Intellectual Awakenings, P. Gardner Howe Iii
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
Autumn 2014 Full Issue, The U.S. Naval War College
Autumn 2014 Full Issue, The U.S. Naval War College
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
Winter 2013 Review, The U.S Naval War College
Winter 2013 Review, The U.S Naval War College
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
Reflections On Reading, John E. Jackson
Reflections On Reading, John E. Jackson
Naval War College Review
Nearly two centuries ago, Samuel Southard, the Secretary of the Navy, ordered that every ship in the fledgling U.S. Navy be provided with a professional library of thirty-seven books on topics including mathematics, history, and phi- losophy. It was recognized in the earliest days of our Navy that a robust reading program could greatly improve the quality of the force. This is no less true to- day. In October 2012, in conjunction with the Navy’s 237th birthday, the Navy launched the new Chief of Naval Operations’ Professional Reading Program (CNO-PRP).
Commentary, John F. O’Connell
Commentary, John F. O’Connell
Naval War College Review
This essay describes an incident of some thirty years ago that involved relations between the United States and Japan. It stemmed from a chance encounter at sea in international waters, between a U.S. warship and a Japanese commercial vessel. If there are lessons to be learned from this event, it is that small things matter; they are like grains of sand that gum up the machinery of smooth international relations. At the time, I was defense and naval attaché to the American embassy at Tokyo, where I became involved in the situation after the fact. To my knowledge, this is …
Sea Control Through The Eyes Of The Person Who Does It, Christofer Waldenström
Sea Control Through The Eyes Of The Person Who Does It, Christofer Waldenström
Naval War College Review
This article suggests a new perspective on the old problem of protecting ships at sea, for two reasons. First, although screen tactics and other defensive measures have been developed and used for many years, this new perspective will be useful in addressing two developments since the late nineteenth century: attackers are no longer just other ships but also aircraft, submarines, and, recently, missiles with very long ranges launched from the land; also, torpedo boats, coastal submarines, and mines have complicated operations in congested and archipelagic waters.
Replacing Battleships With Aircraft Carriers In The Pacific In World War Ii, Thomas C. Hone
Replacing Battleships With Aircraft Carriers In The Pacific In World War Ii, Thomas C. Hone
Naval War College Review
This is a case study of operational and tactical innovation in the U.S. Navy during World War II. Its purpose is to erase a myth—the myth that Navy tactical and operational doctrine existing at the time of Pearl Harbor facilitated a straightforward substitution of carriers for the battleship force that had been severely damaged by Japanese carrier aviation on 7 December 1941. That is not what happened.
Globalization, Security, And Economic Well-Being, Stephen M. Carmel
Globalization, Security, And Economic Well-Being, Stephen M. Carmel
Naval War College Review
Globalization and interconnected economies are topics of keen interest to me, both from my academic background and also from my position in interna- tional shipping. The container and advances in information technology, coevolv- ing with advances in business organization, are perhaps more than any other combination of factors responsible for trade as we know it today—characterized by disaggregated supply chains and trade focused on tasks, not goods—a topic explored in detail later.
The Hattendorf Prize Lecture: The Perils Of History, N.A.M Rodger
The Hattendorf Prize Lecture: The Perils Of History, N.A.M Rodger
Naval War College Review
According to Hegel, we learn from history that we do not learn from history.* We also learn that historians are deeply unreliable, and never more so than when they are foolish enough to predict the future. Historians, in fact, would certainly be the worst possible guides to the policy maker, were it not for the alternative. But the alternative is not other people with better information but other people with no information, for it is the past that makes the present and the future. All of us, as individuals, as organizations, and as societies, have per- sonalities that are made …
President’S Forum, John N. Christenson
President’S Forum, John N. Christenson
Naval War College Review
Medal of Honor award recipient Vice Admiral James Bond Stockdale was the fortieth President of the Naval War College. I recently had the great honor of delivering the sixteenth annual Stockdale Lecture at the University of San Diego, with Mrs. Sybil Stockdale in the audience. I learned afterward in feedback about the lecture that during the “Q&A” I had provided a most unexpected answer to a midshipman’s question concerning leadership.
From The Editors, Pelham G. Boyer
From The Editors, Pelham G. Boyer
Naval War College Review
There is a powerful undercurrent of thought throughout our defense establish- ment that doubts the value of the study of history for addressing today’s security challenges. It is sometimes said—and more commonly assumed—that the pace of technological development in this new age of networked communications and precision targeting is rapidly rendering obsolete the lessons of past international conflicts. In remarks delivered to the Naval War College’s Twentieth International Seapower Symposium on 20 October 2011 as the inaugural Hattendorf Prize Lecture, the distinguished British naval historian N. A. M. Rodger defends the study of history by military professionals and contemporary statesmen.
Maritime Border Diplomacy, Richard Norton, Myron H. Nordquist, John Norton Moore
Maritime Border Diplomacy, Richard Norton, Myron H. Nordquist, John Norton Moore
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (Asbm) Development: Drivers, Trajectories, And Strategic Implications, Bernard D. Cole, Andrew S. Erickson
Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (Asbm) Development: Drivers, Trajectories, And Strategic Implications, Bernard D. Cole, Andrew S. Erickson
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
War From The Ground Up: Twenty-First-Century Combat As Politics, Jeffrey Shaw, Emile Simpson
War From The Ground Up: Twenty-First-Century Combat As Politics, Jeffrey Shaw, Emile Simpson
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
Strategic Thinking In 3d: A Guide For National Security, Foreign Policy, And Business Professionals, Alexander B. Gray, Ross Harrison
Strategic Thinking In 3d: A Guide For National Security, Foreign Policy, And Business Professionals, Alexander B. Gray, Ross Harrison
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
Conflict Analysis: Understanding Causes, Unlocking Solutions, Lawrence Modisett, Matthew Levinger
Conflict Analysis: Understanding Causes, Unlocking Solutions, Lawrence Modisett, Matthew Levinger
Naval War College Review
No abstract provided.
Innovation For Its Own Sake: The Type Xxi U-Boat, Marcus O. Jones
Innovation For Its Own Sake: The Type Xxi U-Boat, Marcus O. Jones
Naval War College Review
The World War II German navy’s Type XXI submarine is sometimes derided as a wishful “wonder weapon.” But in context of a decision to impose ruthless and innovative technocratic priorities, it appears more rational. It may also serve as a cautionary example of the extent to which social explanations of technological adaptation must include appreciation of constraints on military effectiveness.