Digital Commons Network^™

Entry And Vertical Differentiation, Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Välimäki

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

This paper analyzes the entry of new products into vertically differentiated markets where an entrant and an incumbent compete in quantities. The value of the new product is initially uncertain and new information is generated through purchases in the market. We derive the (unique) Markov perfect equilibrium of the infinite horizon game under the strong long run average payoff criterion. The qualitative features of the optimal entry strategy are shown to depend exclusively on the relative ranking of established and new products based on current beliefs. Superior products are launched relatively slowly and at high initial prices whereas substitutes for …

Default And Punishment In General Equilibrium, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment. The equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our model encompasses a broad range of adverse selection, and signalling phenomena (including the Akerlof lemons model and Rothschild-Stiglitz insurance model) and some moral hazard problems in a general equilibrium framework. Despite earlier claims about the nonexistence of equilibrium with adverse selection, we show that equilibrium always exists. We show that more lenient punishment which encourages default may be Pareto improving because it …

Default And Punishment In General Equilibrium, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment by thinking of assets as pools. The equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our model encompasses a broad range of adverse selection and signalling phenomena in a perfectly competitive, general equilibrium framework. Perfect competition eliminates the need for lenders to compute how the size of their loan or the price they quote might affect default rates. It also makes for a simple equilibrium refinement, which we propose in order to …

Fiscal Policy: Its Macroeconomics In Perspective, James Tobin

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

President George W. Bush is preparing a drastic permanent reduction in federal income and estate taxes. He cites as precedents tax cuts by Kennedy-Johnson 1962-64 and Reagan 1981. In those cases, however, the economy was operating well below full employment and needed a “demand-side” stimulus (even though Reagan advertised his tax reduction as “supply-side”). In 2001, however, the economy is very close to full employment, and if it needs a stimulus at all, it is a quick modest temporary one instead of the large permanent one proposed. And why can’t monetary policy do the job of stabilization, as it did …

Bubbles, Human Judgment, And Expert Opinion, Robert J. Shiller

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

Research in psychology and behavioral finance is surveyed for evidence to what extent experts such as professional investment managers or endowment trustees may behave in such a way as to help perpetuate speculative bubbles in financial markets. This paper discusses scholarly psychological literature on the representativeness heuristic, overconfidence, attentional anomalies, self-esteem, conformity pressures, salience and justification for insights into weaknesses in expert opinion. The role of the prudent person standard and the news media in influencing experts is considered. The relevance of the literature on testing of the efficient markets theory is discussed.

Default And Punishment In General Equilibrium, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment. The equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our model encompasses a broad range of moral hazard, adverse selection, and signalling phenomena (including the Akerlof lemons model and Rothschild-Stiglitz insurance model) in a general equilibrium framework. We impose a condition on the expected delivery rates for untraded assets that is similar to the trembling hand refinements used in game theory. Despite earlier claims about the nonexistence of equilibrium with adverse selection, …

Default And Punishment In General Equilibrium, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment. The equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our model encompasses a broad range of adverse selection and signalling phenomena (including the Akerlof lemons model and the Rothschild-Stiglitz insurance model) in a general equilibrium framework. Despite earlier claims about the nonexistence of equilibrium with adverse selection, we show that equilibrium always exists. We show that more lenient punishment which encourages default may be Pareto improving because it increases the dimension of …

Default And Punishment In General Equilibrium, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment by thinking of assets as pools. The equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our model encompasses a broad range of adverse selection and signalling phenomena (including the Rothschild-Stiglitz insurance model) in a general equilibrium framework. In contrast to game-theoretic models of adverse selection, our perfectly competitive framework eliminates the need for lenders to compute how the size of their loan or the price they quote might affect default rates. The …

Default And Punishment In General Equilibrium, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos, Martin Shubik

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment by thinking of assets as pools. The equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our model encompasses a broad range of adverse selection and signalling phenomena in a perfectly competitive, general equilibrium framework. Perfect competition eliminates the need for lenders to compute how the size of their loan or the price they quote might affect default rates. It also makes for a simple equilibrium refinement, which we propose in order to …

Signalling And Default: Rothschild-Stiglitz Reconsidered, Pradeep Dubey, John Geanakoplos

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

In our previous paper we built a general equilibrium model of default and punishment in which equilibrium always exists and endogenously determines asset promises, penalties, and sales constraints. In this paper we interpret the endogenous sales constraints as equilibrium signals. By specializing the default penalties and imposing an exclusivity constraint on asset sales, we obtain a perfectly competitive version of the Rothschild-Stiglitz model of insurance. In our model their separating equilibrium always exists even when they say it doesn’t.

Indonesia: Anatomy Of A Banking Crisis Two Years Of Living Dangerously, 1997-99, Charles Enoch, Barbara Baldwin, Olivier Frècaut, Arto Kovanen

Documents

https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/30/Indonesia-Anatomy-of-a-Banking-Crisis-Two-Years-of-Living-Dangerously-199799-4074

A Preliminary Risk Analysis Of Environmental Tobacco Smoke And Lung Cancer Using A Cohort Of Mormons In New Haven County, Albert Abdul-Barr Wang

Public Health Theses

Environmental tobacco smoke exposure has been recognized as an important source of lung cancer morbidity and mortality. Measuring environmental tobacco smoke exposure for risk analysis depends much on the methodologies for determining ETS levels of nicotine and RSP.

The author decided to measure the linear multistage dose-response curve relating the level of ETS exposure to the lung cancer incidence. The research was conducted using human time-activity patterns and microenvironmental ETS measurements through a self-designed questionnaire. A cohort of New Haven Mormons was selected for a low-dose group and the subjects from the NHAPS study were utilized for the high-dose group. …

Decreto 439/2001, Argentina: Congreso

Documents

No abstract provided.

Repayment Of Extended Foreign Liabilities, South Korea: Ministry Of Economy And Finance

Documents

No abstract provided.

Public Audit Act, New Zealand Parliament

Documents

No abstract provided.

New Century 2000 10-K, New Century Financial Corporation

Documents

No abstract provided.

Nota Bene; Volume Xv, Number Ii, Yale University Library

Nota Bene

No abstract provided.

175 Years Of Advancing Medicine 2000 Yale-New Haven Hospital Annual Report, Yale-New Haven Hospital

Yale New Haven Hospital Annual Reports

For the year 2000. Year ending September 30, 2000.

The title of this annual report is “175 Years of Advancing Medicine”. In honor of YNHH’s upcoming 175^th anniversary, the report includes an extensive historic timeline of the hospital from 1826 through 2001. For developments during the past year see the Year-End Message which discusses the following topics; Comprehensiveness and Accessibility, Cost Effectiveness and Price Competitiveness, Leadership in Education & Advancement of Clinical Practice, Clinical Service Quality, and Community Health Care Needs. Supplement including Leadership and Statistics, The Medical Staff, and the Hospital’s Friends inserted (scanned separately on elischolar). Many …

The Fertility Transition In Bavaria, John C. Brown, Timothy W. Guinnane

Discussion Papers

No abstract provided.

Correlation Analysis Of Financial Contagion: What One Should Know Before Running A Test, Giancarlo Corsetti, Marcello Pericoli, Massimo Sbracia

Discussion Papers

No abstract provided.

Government Puts Establishment Of Tamc On Fast Track, Thai News Service

Documents

No abstract provided.

Estimates Of The Effectiveness Of Monetary Policy, Ray C. Fair

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

This paper examines various interest rate rules, as well as policies derived by solving optimal control problems, for their ability to dampen economic fluctuations caused by random shocks. A tax rate rule is also considered. A multicountry econometric model is used for the experiments. The results differ sharply from those obtained using recent models in which the coefficient on inflation in the nominal interest rate rule must be greater than one in order for the economy to be stable.

On Modeling The Effects Of Inflation Shocks, Ray C. Fair

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

A popular model in the literature postulates an interest rate rule, a NAIRU price equation, and an aggregate demand equation in which aggregate demand depends on the real interest rate. In this model a positive inflation shock with the nominal interest rate held constant is explosive because it increases aggregate demand (because the real interest rate is lower), which increases inflation through the price equation, which further increases aggregate demand, and so on. In order for the model to be stable, the nominal interest rate must rise more than inflation, which means that the coefficient on inflation in the interest …

Middle Men Versus Market Makers: A Theory Of Competitive Exchange, John Rust, George J. Hall

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

What determines how trade in a commodity is divided between privately negotiated transactions via “middle men” (dealer/brokers) in a telephone or “dealer market” versus transactions via “market makers” (specialists) at publicly observable bid/ask prices? To address this question, we extend Spulber’s (1996a) search model with buyers, sellers, and price setting dealers to include a fourth type of agent, market makers . The result is a model where market microstructure — the division of trade between dealers and market makers — is determined endogenously. In Spulber’s model, dealers are the exclusive avenue of exchange, and prices are private in the sense …

Yale Nurse, Yale School Of Nursing

Yale School of Nursing Alumni Newsletters and Magazines

No abstract provided.

The Indonesian Financial Crisis: From Banking Crisis To Financial Sector Reforms, 1997-2000, Shalendra D. Sharma

Documents

No abstract provided.

2000 Yale-New Haven Hospital Annual Report (Supplemental Information To The 2000 Annual Report), Yale-New Haven Hospital

Yale New Haven Hospital Annual Reports

For the year 2000. Year ending September 30, 2000.

The Yale Political Quarterly 2001 April, The Politic, Inc.

The Politic

No abstract provided.

The Politic 2001 Spring, The Politic, Inc.

The Politic

No abstract provided.

Patient Knowledge Of Their Care Providers In A University Teaching Hospital, Ron E. Samet

Yale Medicine Thesis Digital Library

No abstract provided.