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Joint Ministerial Statement Of The Eighth Asean+3 Finance Ministers And Central Bank Governors Meeting, 4 May 2005, Istanbul, Asean Plus Three

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Istanbul, Turkey

Information Asymmetry And The Problem Of Transfers In Trade Negotiations And International Agencies, Koichi Hamada, Shyam Sunder

Discussion Papers

No abstract provided.

Observing Unobservables: Identifying Information Asymmetries With A Consumer Credit Field Experiment, Dean S. Karlan, Jonathan Zinman

Discussion Papers

No abstract provided.

Inter-Household Allocations Within Extended Family: Evidence From The Indonesia Family Life Survey, Firman Witoelar

Discussion Papers

No abstract provided.

Hud - Recent House Price Trends And Homeownership Affordability, United States: Department Of Housing And Urban Development: Office Of Policy Development And Research (Pd&R), David T. Rodda, Jack Goodman

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No abstract provided.

Overcoming Participation Constraints, Hanming Fang, Peter Norman

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

In incomplete information environments with transferable utility, efficient outcomes are generally implementable unless interim or ex post participation constraints are imposed on the problem. In this paper we show that linking a sufficiently large number of independent but possibly unrelated social decisions, a slightly perturbed Groves mechanism can implement an efficient outcome with probability arbitrarily close to one, while respecting all participation, incentive and balanced budget constraints.

Overcoming Participation Constraints, Hanming Fang, Peter Norman

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

This paper shows that linking a sufficiently large number of independent but unrelated social decisions can achieve approximate efficiency. We provide regularity conditions under which a Groves mechanism amended with a veto game implements an efficient outcome with probability arbitrarily close to one, and satisfies interim participation, incentive and resource constraints.

Intergenerational Justice And Sustainability Under The Leximin Ethic, John E. Roemer

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We model an intergenerational society, with a representative agent at each date, who must deplete a renewable resource, from which he derives utility, to produce consumption goods. We adopt the intergenerational lexicographic minimum as the social welfare function. Initially, technological progress is assumed to exist exogenously. We study the technological requirements for the leximin solution to support non-decreasing welfare over time, and a non-decreasing level of the natural resource. Three utility functions are studied. With a CES utility function, possessing less substitutability than the Cobb-Douglas, the leximin solution involves increasing utilities over time and an increasing size of the natural …

American International Group (Aig) 8-K, United States: Securities And Exchange Commission (Sec)

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No abstract provided.

Countrywide Mcmurray Email To Sambol, John Mcmurray

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No abstract provided.

The Rent-Price Ratio For The Aggregate Stock Of Owner-Occupied Housing, Morris A. Davis, Andreas Lehnert, Robert F. Martin, Federal Reserve System: Board Of Governors

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No abstract provided.

Abacus 2005-2 Cdo Offering Circular, Goldman Sachs

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This offering circular serves the interest of Abacus 2005-2 and Goldman Sachs.

Frb Draft Close-Out Report On Large Complex Banking Supervision, Lisa White, Michael Carroll, Cathie Bourke, Ray Bacon

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No abstract provided.

Frb Operations Review Report Federal Reserve Bank Of New York Banking Supervision Group, United States: Federal Reserve System: Operation Review Team

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The Operation review team is made up of Federal Reserve employees across the regional Federal Reserve Banks

Moodys Email From Jay Siegel Regarding Rating Feedback Discussion, Jay Siegel, Michael B. Kanef

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No abstract provided.

Surviving The Death Of God: Existentialism, God, And Man At Post-Wwii Yale, Robert Tice Lalka

Kaplan Senior Essay Prize for Use of Library Special Collections

“This is our world to build, adorn, or destroy, not God's or anyone else's.”

These were the words of Hugh McClean, a Yale student both before and after the Second World War. When the war ended, McClean and thousands of his peers returned from duty in Europe and the Pacific to complete their education at colleges across the United States. They saw the world differently than they had before; they certainly viewed the world differently than their parents and grandparents. They had heard leaders of the world’s warring nations invoke destiny to validate their warfare. Some of these teenagers had …

Operations Review Report, Federal Reserve System: Federal Reserve Bank Of New York

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No abstract provided.

Adirondack 2005-1 Cdo Pitchbook, Clinton Group

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No abstract provided.

Independence Vi Cdo Pitchbook, Declaration Management & Research Llc

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No abstract provided.

Kleros Preferred Funding Cdo Pitchbook, Strategos Capital Management, Llc

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No abstract provided.

U.S. Subprime Rmbs In Cdos (Hedi Katz, Fitch Special Report), Fitch Ratings

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No abstract provided.

Federal Home Loan Bank System: An Overview Of Changes And Current Issues Affecting The System, Thomas J. Mccool

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No abstract provided.

Memorandum Of Understanding Between The Ots And The Commission Bancaire, United States: Department Of The Treasury: Office Of Thrift Supervision, France/The French State: Commission Bancaire

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No abstract provided.

Joint Ministerial Statement Of The 9th Asean Finance Ministers' Meeting, Vientiane, Lao Pdr, 6 April 2005, Association Of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean)

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No abstract provided.

Letter From Homer Hill For The Frbny Summary Of Supervision For Citi 2004, Homer Hill Iii

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No abstract provided.

Nota Bene; Volume Xix, Number I, Yale University Library

Nota Bene

Nota Bene is published during the academic year to acquaint the Yale community and others with the resources of the Yale Library.

Using Experimental Economics To Measure Social Capital And Predict Financial Decisions, Dean S. Karlan

Discussion Papers

No abstract provided.

Ex Post Implementation, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We analyze the problem of fully implementing a social choice set in ex post equilibrium. We identify an ex post monotonicity condition that is necessary and — in economic environments — sufficient for full implementation in ex post equilibrium. We also identify an ex post monotonicity no veto condition that is sufficient. Ex post monotonicity is satisfied in all single crossing environments with strict ex post incentive constraints. In many economically significant environments, ex post implementation can be achieved in the direct mechanism. We show by means of two classic examples that ex post monotonicity does not imply nor is …

Flexibility As An Instrument In Digital Rights Management, Dirk Bergemann, Thomas Eisenbach, Joan Feigenbaum, Scott Shenker

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We consider the optimal design of flexible use in a digital-rights-management policy. The basic model considers a single distributor of digital goods and a continuum of consumers. Each consumer can acquire the digital good either as a licensed product or an unlicensed copy. The availability of (or access to) unlicensed copies is increasing both in the number of licensed copies and in the flexibility accorded to licensed copies. We thus analyze the optimal design of flexibility in the presence of unlicensed distribution channels (the “greynet”). We augment the basic model by introducing a “secure platform” that is required to use …

Aggregation Of Expert Opinions, Dino Gerardi, Richard P. Mclean, Andrew Postlewaite

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

Conflicts of interest arise between a decision maker and agents who have information pertinent to the problem because of differences in their preferences over outcomes. We show how the decision maker can extract the information by distorting the decisions that will be taken, and show that only slight distortions will be necessary when agents are “informationally small”. We further show that as the number of informed agents becomes large the necessary distortion goes to zero. We argue that the particular mechanisms analyzed are substantially less demanding informationally than those typically employed in implementation and virtual implementation. In particular, the equilibria …