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Articles 811 - 840 of 5140
Full-Text Articles in Entire DC Network
Sharing Emotions Builds Bridges Between Individuals And Between Species, Elisabetta Palagi
Sharing Emotions Builds Bridges Between Individuals And Between Species, Elisabetta Palagi
Animal Sentience
Many animal species express, perceive and share emotions. These abilities have been favoured by natural selection because they allow subjects to respond to various situations in an appropriate way, thus facilitating survival and increasing fitness. The same-face/same-emotion phenomenon is at the basis of sharing feelings and emotions. Recent studies show that this capacity is not unique to humans and that it plays an important role in creating cohesive societies in many different species.
Human And Nonhuman Animals: Towards Equality, Catherine Price
Human And Nonhuman Animals: Towards Equality, Catherine Price
Animal Sentience
Chapman & Huffman argue that we should not consider humans as unique and superior to nonhuman animals. Ecofeminism advocates the respectful treatment of humans, nonhuman animals, and the environment.
Phenotypic Similarity And Moral Consideration, S. Brian Hood, Sophia Giddens
Phenotypic Similarity And Moral Consideration, S. Brian Hood, Sophia Giddens
Animal Sentience
Identifying specific traits to justify according differential moral status to humans and non-human animals may be more challenging than Chapman & Huffman suggest. The reasons for this also go against their recommendation that we ought to attend to how humans and non-humans are similar. The problem lies in identifying the moral relevance of biological characteristics. There are, however, other reasons for treating non-human animals as worthy of moral consideration, such as the Precautionary Principle.
Human Superiority Is Obvious But Does Not Justify Cruelty, Yew-Kwang Ng
Human Superiority Is Obvious But Does Not Justify Cruelty, Yew-Kwang Ng
Animal Sentience
Humans are obviously superior, in general, to other animals. This is also supported by evolution and Jerison’s encephalization quotient. However, superiority does not justify cruelty towards other animals. Rather, it suggests higher responsibility. Just as adults are more capable than 2-year-olds, they also have a much higher responsibility in helping others in need, including other animals.
Anthropocentrism: Practical Remedies Needed, Helen Kopnina
Anthropocentrism: Practical Remedies Needed, Helen Kopnina
Animal Sentience
It is true that one of the harmful consequences of creating categories where one group is unique and superior to others is that it justifies discriminating against the inferior groups. And outright abuse of nonhuman animals is indeed morally unjustifiable. But what is to be done about it?
Mobilizing Heads And Hearts For Wildlife Conservation, Valérie A. M. Schoof, Simon L'Allier
Mobilizing Heads And Hearts For Wildlife Conservation, Valérie A. M. Schoof, Simon L'Allier
Animal Sentience
Highlighting the shared evolutionary relationships between humans and animals — and recognizing that all species, including humans, are unique in their own way — may facilitate caring for and conserving animals by tapping into a human emotion: empathy.
Moral Relevance Of Cognitive Complexity, Empathy And Species Differences In Suffering, John Lazarus
Moral Relevance Of Cognitive Complexity, Empathy And Species Differences In Suffering, John Lazarus
Animal Sentience
I qualify two criticisms made by commentators on Chapman & Huffman’s target article. Responding to the view that differences between humans and other animals are irrelevant to deciding how we should treat other species, I point out that differences between any species in their capacity to suffer are morally relevant. And in response to the claim that suffering is the sole criterion for the moral treatment of animals, I argue that cognitive complexity and a capacity for empathy also have moral relevance to the extent that they influence suffering.
Animal Cognition: Quantity Has A Quality Of Its Own, Ivaylo Borislavov Iotchev, Kauê Machado Costa
Animal Cognition: Quantity Has A Quality Of Its Own, Ivaylo Borislavov Iotchev, Kauê Machado Costa
Animal Sentience
Chapman & Huffman’s moral analysis fails to prove that the exploitation of animals or the environment is causally connected to beliefs about human capacities. Their exposition of the philosophical interpretations of animal cognition ignores historical context and confounds different levels of analysis. Their analysis of the scientific literature, from which they conclude that humans should not be considered as different from other animals, does not take into account many recent psychological and neuroscientific developments and rests upon a flawed understanding of the relationship between gradual and categorical differences, misrepresenting the two as mutually exclusive concepts.
Scepticism About Moral Superiority, Derek Ball, Benjamin Sachs
Scepticism About Moral Superiority, Derek Ball, Benjamin Sachs
Animal Sentience
Chapman & Huffman suggest that we might change people’s behavior toward animals by resisting an argument that because humans are intellectually superior to animals, they are also morally superior to animals. C & H try to show that the premise is false: Humans are not intellectually superior. Several commentators have resisted this response. We suggest that there are other ways of attacking the argument: The notion of moral superiority on which the argument relies is dubious, and the obvious ways of reformulating the argument are instances of the “naturalistic fallacy.”
Refining Thoughts About Human/Nonhuman Differences, Colin A. Chapman, Michael A. Huffman
Refining Thoughts About Human/Nonhuman Differences, Colin A. Chapman, Michael A. Huffman
Animal Sentience
Our commentators come from many fields and disciplines and express highly divergent views, illustrating broad interest in the question. From the breadth of comments, we have identified two recurring themes, which we focus on here. The first is a preponderance of cautionary remarks about evaluating the differences between humans and nonhuman animals. The second concerns whether considering animals as worthy of moral consideration is one of many useful tools for conservationists trying to prevent extinction, habitat destruction, and climate change.
Why Cod Don't Like To Sunbathe: Quantity And Quality In The Animal Kingdom, Christoph Jung
Why Cod Don't Like To Sunbathe: Quantity And Quality In The Animal Kingdom, Christoph Jung
Animal Sentience
The difference between a cod and a lizard is not just a quantitative one. The recognition of qualitative differences between species does not imply a moral ranking. Our species’ special abilities to shape the earth mean we have a special responsibility for ensuring a liveable future for all organisms, human and non-human.
Superior Or Inferior, Human Uniqueness Is Manifold, Scott Atran
Superior Or Inferior, Human Uniqueness Is Manifold, Scott Atran
Animal Sentience
Chapman & Huffman (C & H) contend that, as with all biological traits, there is evolutionary continuity underlying cognitive and social traits previously thought to be unique to humans. Yet C & H, like Darwin, appeal to a seemingly unique moral aptitude that enables humans to be kind to conspecific strangers and other species.
Diversity On Human Difference: Unanimity On Human Responsibility, Colin A. Chapman, Michael A. Huffman
Diversity On Human Difference: Unanimity On Human Responsibility, Colin A. Chapman, Michael A. Huffman
Animal Sentience
Further commentaries on our original target article add important new points and expand our understanding of the differences between animals, particularly between non-human and human primates. But whether they affirm or deny that humans are unique, all commentators agree that our special abilities mean we should be taking responsibility for the care of nature and the plants and animals it supports. We ask: is humankind doing this?
Pulling The Wool From Our Eyes, Jennifer Vonk
Pulling The Wool From Our Eyes, Jennifer Vonk
Animal Sentience
Marino & Merskin review evidence of the complexity of sheep cognition, concluding that researchers ought to feel sheepish about misrepresenting ovine cognitive capacities. However, the failure to situate the data in critical context risks pulling the wool over readers’ eyes.
On The Sentience Of Sheep And Other Useful Objects, Ila France Porcher
On The Sentience Of Sheep And Other Useful Objects, Ila France Porcher
Animal Sentience
The nature of sheep has been in plain view ever since the animals were domesticated about 10,000 years ago. Why their intelligence, individuality, and emotional complexity has been ignored is a question that goes well beyond Marino & Merskin’s timely target article. Not only has cognitive bias in favour of religious ideas in biology been involved, but the territorial nature of our own species is implicated as well. The tendency of Homo sapiens to see others in terms of “us” and “them” has resulted in a history of racism, speciesism, and general domination of any others that could be fitted …
Sheep Complexity Outside The Laboratory, Cheryl Abbate
Sheep Complexity Outside The Laboratory, Cheryl Abbate
Animal Sentience
Marino & Merskin’s review shows that sheep are intelligent and highly social but their methodology has some shortcomings. I describe five problems with reviewing only the academic and scientific literature and suggest how one might provide an even more compelling case for the complexity of sheep minds.
Domestication And Cognitive Complexity, David R. Brodbeck, Madeleine I. R. Brodbeck, Keeghan Rosso
Domestication And Cognitive Complexity, David R. Brodbeck, Madeleine I. R. Brodbeck, Keeghan Rosso
Animal Sentience
Marino and Merskin (2019) list a number of tasks that sheep can perform well. As comparative psychologists, we are not surprised by these results. Indeed, many domesticated animal species show similar abilities.
Science, Social Critique, And The Need For Ethics, Peter Woodford, Alecia Carter
Science, Social Critique, And The Need For Ethics, Peter Woodford, Alecia Carter
Animal Sentience
Marino & Merskin’s target article on the cognitive and psychological capacities of sheep commendably aims to use science to critique human practice. However, the article fails to make specific recommendations about how human-sheep relations should change going forward. We also underscore two problematic assumptions highlighted by other commentators: (1) that cognitive complexity is important to the case for the moral status of non-human animals and (2) that the way humans use and treat animals is caused by our conception of animals’ capacities. Scientists should engage more with philosophy and ethical theory to articulate the implications of animal capacities for human …
Our Ambivalent Stereotypes Of Sheep, Veronica Sevillano
Our Ambivalent Stereotypes Of Sheep, Veronica Sevillano
Animal Sentience
Marino & Merskin’s target article contrasts our ambivalent social ideas about sheep with the empirical evidence of their complex capacities, particularly cognitive ones. To extend our understanding of human-sheep relations, I discuss human social perception of animals and structural variables that predict our stereotypes.
Can A Mirror Capture The Self?, Cynthia Willett
Can A Mirror Capture The Self?, Cynthia Willett
Animal Sentience
Is the mirror a reliable indicator of self-awareness for any species, whether sheep or human? Taking a cue from feminist, phenomenological, and cross-cultural philosophy, a relational self rather than a reflective one might better capture what is at stake for the lives of social animals and for science.
Why Factual Appeals About The Abilities Of Sheep May Fail, Sarah Gradidge, Magdalena Zawisza
Why Factual Appeals About The Abilities Of Sheep May Fail, Sarah Gradidge, Magdalena Zawisza
Animal Sentience
Marino & Merskin (2019) express hope that providing people with positive information about the abilities of sheep (factual appeals) will improve perceptions of them and thus improve their welfare. However, these factual appeals can, and do, fail to change perceptions of animals. This commentary considers why and when factual appeals fail, and with whom they may be effective.
Are Octopuses Special? Mind, Sociality And Life History, Phyllis C. Lee
Are Octopuses Special? Mind, Sociality And Life History, Phyllis C. Lee
Animal Sentience
Understanding the Umwelt or being-ness of an octopus is a fascinating problem. Mather’s review provides us with significant insights into the ways of living of non-humans that exploit a perceptual and physical world we can only guess at. Octopus “distributed minds” call into question our primate-based understandings of the importance of sociality and the pace of life in the evolution of complex perceptual and behavioural abilities.
Cephalopod Molluscs, Causal Models, And Curious Minds, Andrew W. Corcoran
Cephalopod Molluscs, Causal Models, And Curious Minds, Andrew W. Corcoran
Animal Sentience
Mather (2019) presents a compelling case in favour of octopus mind. Surveying an impressive array of empirical literature, she identifies the creature’s playful, inquisitive behaviour as emblematic of a distinctively mental form of agency. I offer an alternative perspective in which curiosity and play are construed as constitutive processes in the emergence of the (predictive) mind.
The Octopus Mind: Implications For Cognitive Science, Sidney Carls-Diamante
The Octopus Mind: Implications For Cognitive Science, Sidney Carls-Diamante
Animal Sentience
Mather consolidates the case for octopus mind and how it may be structured, shifting the starting point of inquiry from “If octopuses had minds, what would they be like?” to “What is the mind of an octopus like?”.
The Octopus Mind And The Argument Against Farming It, Jennifer Jacquet, Becca Franks, Peter Godfrey-Smith
The Octopus Mind And The Argument Against Farming It, Jennifer Jacquet, Becca Franks, Peter Godfrey-Smith
Animal Sentience
Mather is convincing about octopuses having ‘a controlling mind, motivated to gather information,’ but stops short of asking what having that mind means for octopus moral standing. One consequence of understanding the octopus mind should be a refusal to subject octopuses to mass production. Octopus farming is in an experimental phase and supported by various countries. We argue that it is unethical because of concerns about animal welfare as well as environmental impacts.
On Neglected Taxa: Protostomes And The Evolution Of Myelination, Michaella P. Andrade, Charles Morphy D. Santos
On Neglected Taxa: Protostomes And The Evolution Of Myelination, Michaella P. Andrade, Charles Morphy D. Santos
Animal Sentience
Understanding the evolution of nervous and sensory systems in animals is key to understanding the distribution of animal sentience. However, the use of model organisms – mostly vertebrates, and especially mammals – often biases comparative analyses. Sneddon et al. (2018a,b) point out that using nonhuman animals as models helps us better understand the multifaceted aspects of animal pain and sentience. Several concerns need to be considered in dealing with model organisms. Here we discuss how models that are unrepresentative phylogenetically influence hypotheses about the evolution of the myelination in animals. Greater effort is needed to escape “vertebrate-centrism” in evolutionary research.
Why Are Sheep Sheepish? How Perception Affects Animal Stereotyping, Robert G. Franklin Jr.
Why Are Sheep Sheepish? How Perception Affects Animal Stereotyping, Robert G. Franklin Jr.
Animal Sentience
Marino & Merskin present compelling evidence that many stereotypes of sheep are incorrect. One factor that may play an important role in animal stereotyping is the physical appearance of animals, which can directly lead to stereotyping through automatic mental processes. Sheep have a round and babyish appearance that directly evokes judgments of warmth and docility. Depictions of sheep in art, and especially cartoons, reinforce this stereotype.
Across The Great Divide, Debra Merskin
Across The Great Divide, Debra Merskin
Animal Sentience
Chapman & Huffman’s target article calls for a reevaluation of claims of human uniqueness and superiority. It also adds to the literature on how species differences, as Darwin noted, are more of degree than kind. The threats to environmental health and species survival are a consequence of excluding nonhuman animals from moral concern and consideration. The theory of intersectionality should include speciesism in the array of discriminatory practices.
“I Am Not An Animal”, Lori Marino
“I Am Not An Animal”, Lori Marino
Animal Sentience
The answer to Chapman & Huffman’s question — “Why do we want to think humans are different?” — lies in the work of Ernest Becker and the social psychology literature known as Terror Management Theory, according to which our deep anxiety about animality and death can drive our need to feel superior to the other animals.
Phooey On Comparisons, Gwen J. Broude
Phooey On Comparisons, Gwen J. Broude
Animal Sentience
Chapman & Huffman reject the notion that human beings are very different from other animals. The goal is to undermine the claim that human uniqueness and even superiority are reason enough to treat other animals badly. But evaluating human uniqueness for this purpose only plays into the hands of those who exploit invidious comparisons between us and other animals to justify mistreatment of the rest of the animal kingdom. What human uniqueness we may discover would still be no justification for how we behave toward other animals. We should also ask ourselves whether any human-centric criterion can be justification for …