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Articles 1441 - 1470 of 5140
Full-Text Articles in Entire DC Network
The Object Of Grief, Clark Glymour
The Object Of Grief, Clark Glymour
Animal Sentience
King’s new book is a wonderful collection of diverse anecdotes illustrating the variety of animal practices that are convincing illustrations of grief. Those who want scientific arguments for that conclusion should, however, read elsewhere.
Love’S Claim On Grief, Fiona Probyn-Rapsey
Love’S Claim On Grief, Fiona Probyn-Rapsey
Animal Sentience
Our very words for grief are borrowed, in the first place, from animals: a howling, a wailing, a keening. We could wallow with these words that we borrow, but we can also put them to work for others.
Monkey Say, Monkey Do, Monkey Grieve?, Helen Proctor
Monkey Say, Monkey Do, Monkey Grieve?, Helen Proctor
Animal Sentience
In this commentary, I have focused on King’s chapter “Do monkeys mourn?” and discussed the complexity that this question unearths. Attempting to answer this question, King has scoured the literature and talked to many primatologists to try to unravel the complex reactions seen in monkeys. From ignorance to denial, and everything in between, monkeys appear to react to death in countless ways. This commentary discusses some of the key cases for and against monkey grief, and concludes by noting the dearth of conclusive literature on one of the most studied groups of animals.
Evidence For Animal Grief?, Carolyn Ristau
Evidence For Animal Grief?, Carolyn Ristau
Animal Sentience
The nature of evidence appropriate to the study of animal emotion (and cognition) is discussed in this review with reference to Barbara King’s book. How Animals Grieve is beautifully written, but it intermixes examples meeting King’s criteria for evidence of grief with other poignant but far less convincing examples. Yet, as noted earlier by Griffin (1958/1974), “Excessive caution can sometimes lead one as far astray as rash enthusiasm.” King cites strong evidence from long-term scientific field studies, often involving known individuals; from videotapes; from convergent evidence in neurophysiological studies; and, notwithstanding possible emotional bias, from animals living closely with humans. …
Understanding Emotional Suffering, Barbara J. King
Understanding Emotional Suffering, Barbara J. King
Animal Sentience
In responding to insightful commentaries from 7 scholars, for which I am grateful, I offer new thoughts on whether animals can conceptualize and express signs of grief. I also discuss why I included both weak and strong examples of animal mourning, and how this work may help us think about enhanced welfare for animals, including freedom from emotional suffering.
Veterinarians Need Support To Break The Silence, Anne Fawcett
Veterinarians Need Support To Break The Silence, Anne Fawcett
Animal Sentience
The question of whether reporting animal abuse should be mandatory for veterinarians is an important one. Veterinarians have dual obligations, both to their animal patients and to their human clients. Mandatory reporting can only be supported in a context in which veterinary professionals are (a) trained to recognise the signs of animal abuse; (b) trained to elicit a history sensitively from clients who may themselves be victims of abuse or supported in doing so; (c) supported by appropriate, responsive authorities; (d) reasonably protected from legal recriminations.
Animal Suffering Calls For More Than A Bigger Cage, Simon R. B. Leadbeater
Animal Suffering Calls For More Than A Bigger Cage, Simon R. B. Leadbeater
Animal Sentience
Ng (2016) argues for incremental welfare biology partly because it would be impossible to demonstrate conclusively that animals are sentient. He argues that low cost changes in industrial practices and working collaboratively may be more effective in advancing animal welfare than more adversarial approaches. There is merit in some of Ng’s recommendations but a number of his arguments are, in my view, misdirected. The fact that nonhuman animals feel has already been adequately demonstrated. Cruelty to animals is intrinsic to some industries, so the only way to oppose it is to oppose the industry.
Sentience And Animal Welfare: Affirming The Science And Addressing The Skepticism, Nancy Clarke
Sentience And Animal Welfare: Affirming The Science And Addressing The Skepticism, Nancy Clarke
Animal Sentience
Broom’s (2014) book is a well-researched and thoroughly written exploration and evaluation of the journey from the origins of animal welfare science to what we can say we now know and need to consider in relation to animal sentience and welfare. This book will help to counter any skepticism among academics and policy makers.
Mentality And Animal Welfare, Mark Rowlands
Mentality And Animal Welfare, Mark Rowlands
Animal Sentience
In this commentary I discuss the concept of sentience as used in Broom’s book Sentience and Animal Welfare (2014). Broom’s understanding of sentience is, I suggest, both misleading and revealing. Appreciating why this is so is important for understanding the connection between the mental life of animals and their moral status.
Fish Sentience And The Precautionary Principle, Robert C. Jones
Fish Sentience And The Precautionary Principle, Robert C. Jones
Animal Sentience
Key (2016) argues that fish do not feel pain based on neuroanatomical evidence. I argue that Key makes a number of conceptual, philosophical, and empirical errors that undermine his claim.
Why Fish Do Not Feel Pain, Brian Key
Why Fish Do Not Feel Pain, Brian Key
Animal Sentience
Only humans can report feeling pain. In contrast, pain in animals is typically inferred on the basis of nonverbal behaviour. Unfortunately, these behavioural data can be problematic when the reliability and validity of the behavioural tests are questionable. The thesis proposed here is based on the bioengineering principle that structure determines function. Basic functional homologies can be mapped to structural homologies across a broad spectrum of vertebrate species. For example, olfaction depends on olfactory glomeruli in the olfactory bulbs of the forebrain, visual orientation responses depend on the laminated optic tectum in the midbrain, and locomotion depends on pattern generators …
Cognitive Evidence Of Fish Sentience, Jonathan Balcombe
Cognitive Evidence Of Fish Sentience, Jonathan Balcombe
Animal Sentience
I present a little-known example of flexible, opportunistic behavior by a species of fish to undermine Key’s (2016) thesis that fish are unconscious and unable to feel. Lack of a cortex is flimsy grounds for denying pain to fish, for on that criterion we must also then deny it to all non-mammals, including birds, which goes against scientific consensus. Notwithstanding science’s fundamental inability to prove anything, the precautionary principal dictates that we should give the benefit of the doubt to fish, and the state of the oceans dictates that we act on it now.
Fish Brains And Behaviour Indicate Capacity For Feeling Pain, Donald M. Broom
Fish Brains And Behaviour Indicate Capacity For Feeling Pain, Donald M. Broom
Animal Sentience
Abstract: Studies of behaviour are of major importance in understanding human pain and pain in other animals such as fish. Almost all of the characteristics of the mammalian pain system are also described for fish. Emotions, feelings and learning from these are controlled in the fish brain in areas anatomically different but functionally very similar to those in mammals. The evidence of pain and fear system function in fish is so similar to that in humans and other mammals that it is logical to conclude that fish feel fear and pain. Fish are sentient beings.
Comparative Evolutionary Approach To Pain Perception In Fishes, Culum Brown
Comparative Evolutionary Approach To Pain Perception In Fishes, Culum Brown
Animal Sentience
Arguments against the fact that fish feel pain repeatedly appear even in the face of growing evidence that they do. The standards used to judge pain perception keep moving as the hurdles are repeatedly cleared by novel research findings. There is undoubtedly a vested commercial interest in proving that fish do not feel pain, so the topic has a half-life well past its due date. Key (2016) reiterates previous perspectives on this topic characterised by a black-or-white view that is based on the proposed role of the human cortex in pain perception. I argue that this is incongruent with our …
Robot Fish Do Not Need Sentience, Antonio Chella
Robot Fish Do Not Need Sentience, Antonio Chella
Animal Sentience
The target article by Key (2016) discusses the thesis that fish cannot feel pain because of the lack of the necessary neural structure. This commentary suggests the possibility that fish do not need conscious neural processing by taking into account recent results from biomimetic robotics. State-of-the-art biomimetic robot fish are based on a tight interaction between the body and the environment and are typically controlled by behavior-based architectures. Therefore, it can be hypothesized that cognitive architectures are not needed to control a robot fish. This is in line with the thesis proposed by Key: what biomimetic robot fish show is …
No Cortex, No Cry, Vladimir Dinets
No Cortex, No Cry, Vladimir Dinets
Animal Sentience
In his target article, Key (2016) argues that since fish don’t have a frontal cortex (part of the brain known to be important for feeling of pain in humans and rodents), they cannot feel pain or other noxious stimuli. I comment on the logic used in this extrapolation and other arguments presented in the paper.
On The Sentience Of Fish, Pentti O. Haikonen
On The Sentience Of Fish, Pentti O. Haikonen
Animal Sentience
Key’s (2016) target article, “Why fish do not feel pain,” is based on a moralistic fallacy where conclusions about natural conditions are drawn not from research and experiments, but from subjective moral views on how things should be. Moreover, the neurobiological findings purporting to show that fish do not feel pain are insufficient for drawing this conclusion.
Fighting Forms Of Expression, Paul J.B. Hart
Fighting Forms Of Expression, Paul J.B. Hart
Animal Sentience
Even though Key (2016) has done a very thorough job of assembling evidence showing that fish are unlikely to have the neurological capacity to be conscious and feel pain, there will still be a significant number of behavioural biologists who want to continue maintaining that fish do have consciousness and suffer from pain. In this commentary the reasons for people resisting the conclusions of the evidence are discussed. The reasons revolve around three aspects of the debate: the overblown respect humans have for the powers of consciousness in our day-to-day behaviour, the often used assumption that the possession of complex …
No Evidence That Pain Is Painful Neural Process, Riccardo Manzotti
No Evidence That Pain Is Painful Neural Process, Riccardo Manzotti
Animal Sentience
Key (2016) claims that fish do not feel pain because they lack the neural structures that have a contingent causal role in generating and feeling pain in mammals. I counterargue that no conclusive evidence supports the sufficiency of any mammalian neural structure to produce pain. We cannot move from contingent necessity in mammals to necessity in every organism.
Lack Of Neocortex Does Not Imply Fish Cannot Feel Pain, Georg Striedter
Lack Of Neocortex Does Not Imply Fish Cannot Feel Pain, Georg Striedter
Animal Sentience
Some contemporary scientists are using comparative neurobiological data to argue that non-mammalian vertebrates have feelings, most notably of pain (e.g., Braithwaite, 2010; Mashour and Alkire, 2012), while Key (2016) uses the same general data to reach the opposite conclusion. In a nutshell, he argues that fish cannot feel pain because fish don’t have a neocortex, which humans need to consciously experience pain. I don’t know how these scientists can look at essentially the same data and reach such disparate conclusions, but I suspect that some of them have strong a priori beliefs and, therefore, view the data through differently tinted …
Should Fish Feel Pain? A Plant Perspective, František Baluška
Should Fish Feel Pain? A Plant Perspective, František Baluška
Animal Sentience
Key (2016) claims fish that fish do not feel pain because they lack the necessary neuronal architecture: their responses to noxious stimuli, according to Key, are executed automatically without any feelings. However, as pointed out by many of his commentators, this conclusion is not convincing. Plants might provide some clues. Plants are not usually thought to be very active behaviorally, but the evidence suggests otherwise. Moreover, in stressful situations, plants produce numerous chemicals that have painkilling and anesthetic properties. Finally, plants, when treated with anesthetics, cannot execute active behaviors such as touch-induced leaf movements or rapid trap closures after localizing …
Mediating Claims Through Critical Anthropomorphism, Gordon Burghardt
Mediating Claims Through Critical Anthropomorphism, Gordon Burghardt
Animal Sentience
Key’s (2016) discussion of his claim that fish do not feel pain ignores the history of attempts to study the attribution of mental states to other species. Although willing to accept that mammals feel pain, Key claims that fish lack the mammalian neural mechanisms underlying pain and are unconscious of their experiences. Consequently, we do not need to be overly concerned about fishing practices that would otherwise be viewed as painful. Key uses a flawed anthropomorphic lens. All attributions of mental events to organisms other than oneself involve inferences derived from anthropomorphic processes through which we process physiological and behavioral …
Fish Lack The Brains And The Psychology For Pain, Stuart W.G. Derbyshire
Fish Lack The Brains And The Psychology For Pain, Stuart W.G. Derbyshire
Animal Sentience
Debate about the possibility of fish pain focuses largely on the fish’s lack of the cortex considered necessary for generating pain. That view is appealing because it avoids relatively abstract debate about the nature of pain experience and subjectivity. Unfortunately, however, that debate cannot be entirely avoided. Subcortical circuits in the fish might support an immediate, raw, “pain” experience. The necessity of the cortex only becomes obvious when considering pain as an explicitly felt subjective experience. Attributing pain to fish only seems absurd when pain is considered as a state of explicit knowing.
Brain Processes For “Good” And “Bad” Feelings: How Far Back In Evolution?, Jaak Panksepp
Brain Processes For “Good” And “Bad” Feelings: How Far Back In Evolution?, Jaak Panksepp
Animal Sentience
The question of whether fish can experience pain or any other feelings can only be resolved by neurobiologically targeted experiments. This commentary summarizes why this is essential for resolving scientific debates about consciousness in other animals, and offers specific experiments that need to be done: (i) those that evaluate the rewarding and punishing effects of specific brain regions and systems (for instance, with deep-brain stimulation); (ii) those that evaluate the capacity of animals to regulate their affective states; and (iii) those that have direct implications for human affective feelings, with specific predictions — for instance, the development of new treatments …
Pain In Fish: Weighing The Evidence, James D. Rose
Pain In Fish: Weighing The Evidence, James D. Rose
Animal Sentience
The target article by Key (2016) examines whether fish have brain structures capable of mediating pain perception and consciousness, functions known to depend on the neocortex in humans. He concludes, as others have concluded (Rose 2002, 2007; Rose et al. 2014), that such functions are impossible for fish brains. This conclusion has been met with hypothetical assertions by others to the effect that functions of pain and consciousness may well be possible through unknown alternate neural processes. Key's argument would be bolstered by consideration of other neurological as well as behavioral evidence, which shows that sharks and ray are fishes …
Why Is Fish “Feeling” Pain Controversial?, E. Don Stevens
Why Is Fish “Feeling” Pain Controversial?, E. Don Stevens
Animal Sentience
In his excellent target article, Key (2016) develops a mechanistic argument in an attempt to show why it is unlikely that fish can “feel” pain or for that matter, “feel” anything. The topic is controversial and likely to achieve the goal of getting many hits for the inaugural issue of the new journal, Animal Sentience. In my view, the question is unlikely to be answered, for two reasons. First, because the proponents of the “fish feel pain” controversy are untrained and unskilled in the details and jargon of neurophysiology and/or neuroanatomy, and the opponents of the controversy, like Key, …
Fish Pain: An Inconvenient Truth, Culum Brown
Fish Pain: An Inconvenient Truth, Culum Brown
Animal Sentience
Whether fish feel pain is a hot political topic. The consequences of our denial are huge given the billions of fish that are slaughtered annually for human consumption. The economic costs of changing our commercial fishery harvest practices are also likely to be great. Key outlines a structure-function analogy of pain in humans, tries to force that template on the rest of the vertebrate kingdom, and fails. His target article has so far elicited 34 commentaries from scientific experts from a broad range of disciplines; only three of these support his position. The broad consensus from the scientific community is …
Pain And Other Feelings In Humans And Animals, Antonio Damasio, Hanna Damasio
Pain And Other Feelings In Humans And Animals, Antonio Damasio, Hanna Damasio
Animal Sentience
Evidence from neuroanatomy, neurophysiology, and neuropsychology suggests that the experience of feelings in humans does not depend exclusively on structures of the cerebral cortex. It does not seem warranted to deny the possibility of feeling in animals on the grounds that their cerebral cortices are not comparable to those of humans.
Where Is Pain In The Brain?, Marshall Devor
Where Is Pain In The Brain?, Marshall Devor
Animal Sentience
Key argues that fish cannot experience pain based on (1) brain imaging in humans, (2) consequences of lesions and (3) direct brain stimulation. Imaging indeed shows that pain-relevant signals reach the cortex, but not that they underlie the subjective experience of pain. Lesions and stimulation data are more to the point, but Key paints an idiosyncratic and misleading picture of their effects. S1 and S2 ablation does not eliminate evoked or spontaneous pain, although there may be up- or down-modulation. Likewise, stimulation of pain-associated cortical areas rarely induces pain, and pain almost never occurs at the onset of epileptic seizures. …
Fish Pain: Would It Change Current Best Practice In The Real World?, B. K. Diggles
Fish Pain: Would It Change Current Best Practice In The Real World?, B. K. Diggles
Animal Sentience
Much of the “fish pain debate” relates to how high the bar for pain should be set. The close phylogenetic affinities of teleosts with cartilaginous fishes which appear to lack nociceptors suggests caution should be applied by those who seek to lower the bar, especially given the equivocal and conflicting nature of the experimental data currently available for teleosts. Nevertheless, even if we assume fish “feel pain,” it is difficult to see how current best practice in aquaculture would change. This is because of the need to avoid stress at all stages of the rearing process to optimize health, growth …