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President's Forum, Peter A. Garvin Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, President, Naval War College

Naval War College Review

No abstract provided.

Spring 2024 Full Issue, The U.S. Naval War College

Naval War College Review

No abstract provided.

Cmsi Note #10: China's Summer Of 2024: The Missing Chapter, Ryan Martinson

CMSI Notes

Key Takeaways:

• In the summer of 2024, two Chinese oceanographic survey ships—the Xiang Yang Hong 01 and Kexue—conducted marine scientific research activities in the Bering Sea. Their actions represented a significant expansion of PRC marine data collection in this region.
• The Bering Sea is a key segment in the sea lanes connecting China with the Arctic Ocean. Thus, the operations of these two vessels should be understood as part of the unprecedented ramp-up in Beijing’s Arctic endeavors that occurred in 2024.
• The main purposes of the two Bering Sea cruises are unknown. However, both ships were built to meet …

China Maritime Report No. 42: Invasion Plans: Operation Causeway And Taiwan's Defense In World War Ii, Ian Easton

CMSI China Maritime Reports

Main Findings

• During World War II, the United States and the Empire of Japan each developed plans and marshaled forces for a climactic battle over Taiwan. Both sides regarded the island as an area of strategic consequence.
• Code-named Operation CAUSEWAY, the American invasion of Taiwan would have been the largest amphibious campaign in the Pacific Theater and the largest sea-air-land engagement in world history.
• Strategists in Japan believed the attack was coming and designed a blueprint for the defense of Taiwan and the Ryukyu Islands called SHO-GO(捷 2 号作戦, or “Operation Victory No. 2”), which envisioned a bloody campaign of …

Cmsi Translations #8: U.S.-Philippine Military Cooperation In The South China Sea: Challenges And Responses, Zhang Yilong

CMSI Translations

With the new generation of Philippine government taking office, U.S.-Philippines relations have rapidly warmed, and the depth and breadth of their military cooperation have increased. This has brought new challenges and threats to China’s national security. How to deal with these challenges will be a difficult problem before us.

Maritime Autonomy And Liability: Navigating Uncharted Waters, Manal Cheema, Ariel Sarandinaki

International Law Studies

For centuries, people have voyaged the seas, structuring international and domestic law around the premise that people crew ships. However, that premise is no longer guaranteed as unmanned systems and vessels begin to embark on the waters. As the international community and U.S. legislators grapple with whether the law of the sea and domestic maritime law must adapt to accommodate the newest seafarers, it becomes evident that they need to be fully prepared to answer questions of liability and responsibility regarding unmanned vessels. This will become especially apparent when unmanned vessels collide with manned or other unmanned vessels. This article …

Cmsi Translations #7: Guarantee Of Strategic Security: Expert Discusses China’S Strategic Nuclear Submarines Achieving Continuous Duty, Chi Guocang

CMSI Translations

In April of this year, the U.S. Department of Defense released a China military power report, which stated that the Chinese Navy currently has at least six Type 094 ballistic missile nuclear submarines, and has the capability for at least one of them to be on continuous readiness duty. It also said that this is the first time it has been possible for the Chinese Navy to permanently maintain at least one strategic missile nuclear submarine at sea to perform strategic duty tasks. So, what is “continuous readiness duty” (quatianhou zhanbei zhiban), how can it be achieved, and why did …

Maritime Incidents In The South China Sea: Measures Of Law Enforcement Or Use Of Force?, Aurel Sari

International Law Studies

China has sought to extend its control over the South China Sea at the expense of neighboring countries. In pursuing its goals, Beijing adopts a “power and law” approach, claiming extensive territorial and maritime rights in contravention of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and asserting these rights through coercive action in disputed waters. A key element of China’s strategy involves the use of coast guard and maritime militia vessels in an effort to portray its operations as measures of law enforcement, rather than displays of coercive power.

This article argues that the Chinese narrative of law …

China Maritime Report No. 41: One Force, Two Force, Red Force, Blue Force: Pla Navy Blue Force Development For Realistic Combat Training, J. Michael Dahm

CMSI China Maritime Reports

Since the mid-2010s, there has been a concerted effort to professionalize a PLAN “blue force” as an opposition force, or OPFOR, in maritime exercises and training. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) routinely refers to its blue forces as metaphorical “whetstones” used to sharpen the PLA for a future fight against enemies of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Efforts to develop a PLAN blue force appear to have accelerated over the past several years in response to Chairman Xi Jinping’s decade-long demand for more realistic combat training.

This report examines recent developments in the PLAN’s blue force. It comprises four …

Exploring Our Maritime Strategies Ii - Red Sea/Persian Gulf, The U.S. Naval War College

CIWAG Events

This year’s symposium considers the two great maritime straits in the Middle East. The Bab el-Mandeb Strait in the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf are both under threat and have tremendous implications related not only to global shipping, but by extension, the entire global economy.

Cmsi Note #9: On The Plan's "Core Operational Capabilities", Ryan D. Martinson

CMSI Notes

Key Takeaways:

• The PLAN is prioritizing the development of what it calls “four core operational capabilities.” These capabilities include 1) integrated near seas operations, 2) far seas mobile operations, 3) strategic deterrence and counterstrike, and 4) amphibious warfare.
• Analysis of Chinese writings suggest the focus of these efforts is on prevailing in a high-end conflict involving the U.S. military.
• The PLAN seeks the ability to dominate the near seas, strike U.S. bases and sea lines of communication in waters east of the first island chain and in the Indian Ocean, achieve “reliable, credible, and effective” deterrence against the U.S. through …

Cmsi Translations #5: Strengthen National Defense Mobilization And Reserve Force Construction, Yu Yunxian, Zhang Pengxuan

CMSI Translations

The report of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party proposed "strengthening national defense mobilization and reserve force construction." In the face of the Era's requirements for strengthening the country and the military, the serious situation of national security, and the real existence of the risk of war, we must place the construction of national defense mobilization and reserve forces in a more important strategic position, and strive to promote the high-quality development of national defense mobilization and reserve force construction from a new starting point.

Cmsi Note #8: Recent Changes In The Pla Navy's Gulf Of Aden Deployment Pattern, Dennis J. Blasko

CMSI Notes

Key Takeaways:

• Since December 2008, the PLAN has deployed 46 counter-piracy escort task forces (TFs) to the Gulf of Aden on a UN-authorized mission.
• Most TFs have included two combatants—a combination of destroyers, frigates, and amphibious transport docks—and a supply ship. Starting with the 33^rd TF, which departed China in August 2019, every TF has comprised one Type 052D destroyer, one Type 054A frigate, and one supply ship.
• One TF generally is on station near the Horn of Africa at all times, while for less than half that time another TF is either on the way to relieve it …

Narrowing “The Gap”: Counter Gray Zone Operations, Raul (Pete) Pedrozo

International Law Studies

China is exploiting "The Gap" by conducting provocative Gray Zone operations to challenge its neighbors' sovereignty and sovereign rights, as well as their navigational rights and freedoms, in waters off their coast in the East China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and South China Sea. By engaging in malign activities that fall below the threshold of an "armed attack," China anticipates it can incrementally advance its interests without eliciting a military response from the targeted States. Diplomatic protests and third-party dispute settlement have not convinced China to halt its aggressive behavior. This article suggests States should use non-lethal counter-piracy tactics, techniques, and …

Cmsi Note #7: Pla Navy Reserve: Out Of The Shadows And Into The Forefront?, Tiffany A. Tat

CMSI Notes

As a part China’s goal to build a fully modernized military by 2035, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is improving its reserve forces through increased defense spending, critical policy changes, and organizational restructuring. Reserve forces (后备力量) encompass the PLA Reserve (预备役部队) and paramilitary forces, such as the militia, which fall under the leadership of the Central Military Commission and can be mobilized by the National Defense Mobilization Department to support combat. The many components that make up China’s fighting force such as active-duty PLA forces, China Coast Guard, and the militia have been studied in depth; however, the PLA Reserve …

Report No.2: Integrated Naval Deterrence In The Arctic Region—Strategic Options For Enhancing Regional Naval Cooperation, Rachael Gosnell, Lars Saunes

Newport Arctic Scholars Initiative

Despite recent advances to strengthen regional deterrence cooperation, questions remain on the evolving role and posture of naval forces in the Arctic region, and what further steps can be taken. At the NASI 2022 seminar in Copenhagen, the Heads of Navy of the Arctic-Seven nations and Arctic stakeholders such as France and the United Kingdom asked the NASI 2023 cohort to provide an independent assessment of naval force posture, the trans-Arctic dimensions of national security policies in the context of a more contested “Blue Arctic” and critical dilemmas that regional senior defense and naval leaders could face at the strategic …

Report No.1: Conflict Prevention And Security Cooperation In The Arctic Region—Frameworks Of The Future, Walter Berbrick, Lars Saunes

Newport Arctic Scholars Initiative

The Arctic region, defined in this report to include the Arctic Ocean and land masses north of the Arctic Circle (approximately 66 degrees’ north latitude), has certainly seen its share of conflict. Compared to other regions, inhospitable conditions and lack of maritime access has prevented large scale deployment of forces. In this vast space — stretching from Europe to the Pacific Island chains — the foundations of commerce and security are established through sea, air, and rail links. The region relies on secure supply chain connectivity and sustainable development that is implemented in a transparent and equitable way. As fears …

Analogous Response Redux: Vladimir Putin’S Aspirations For Altering The Maritime Balance, Jerome J. Burke

Newport Papers

Analogous Response was a term of analytical shorthand that American strategists and intelligence analysts developed in late 1983 and early 1984. The term characterized in two words a Soviet maritime strategy of deploying off the U.S. coast submarines armed with nuclear SLCMs. By making that deployment, the Soviet leadership could establish an endo-atmospheric nuclear threat to the continental United States (CONUS) that Marshal Nikolay V. Ogarkov, chief of the General Staff of the USSR, described as follows: “The Soviet systems to be deployed in the oceans and seas and relevant to the territory of the United States itself will be …

Cmsi Note #6: Sharpening The Sword: Chinese Navy Aircraft Carrier Battle Group Defense Zones, Daniel Clayton Rice

CMSI Notes

Perspectives and Key Takeaways:

• Chinese state media’s Channel 7 recently released a series of videos that described China’s aircraft carriers and the carrier battle groups, including their history, composition, and operational theory.
• The videos describe the carrier battle group (CVBG) “Outer Defense Zone” (外防区), also called the “Depth Defense Zone” (纵深防区), as 185 km to 400 km away from the aircraft carrier.
• The “Middle Defense Zone” (中防区), or the “Area Defense Zone” (区域防区) is described as 45 km to 185 km away from the aircraft carrier.
• The video details the “Inner Defense Zone” (内防区), otherwise called the “Point Defense Zone” …

China Maritime Report No. 39: A Hundred Men Wielding One Gun - Life, Duty, And Cultural Practices Aboard Plan Submarines, Conor M. Kennedy

CMSI China Maritime Reports

Submarine performance is not just measured in technical terms, but also in how crews operate over time. As the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) increasingly deploys its submarine force beyond the near seas on long-distance combat readiness and training missions, studying the force’s human components benefits a broader understanding its overall effectiveness. This report explores work and living conditions, crew endurance, service culture, political requirements, and approaches to resolving human issues in the submarine force. An inherently dangerous and challenging profession, the submarine force has gradually developed numerous solutions to address various challenges to prevent non-combat attrition among crews. Life …

When The Shooting Stopped: August 1945, Timothy J. Demy, Barrett Tillman

Naval War College Review

No abstract provided.

The One Ship Fleet: The Uss Boise—Wwii Naval Legend 1938–45, Scott Cauble, Phillip T. Parkerson

Naval War College Review

No abstract provided.

America, Sea Power, And The World, 2nd Ed., Michael Romero, James C. Bradford, John F. Bradford

Naval War College Review

No abstract provided.

China, Faits Accomplis And The Contest For East Asia: The Shadow Of Shifting Power, Kevin D. Stringer, Joshua Adam Hastey

Naval War College Review

No abstract provided.

Sighted Sub, Sank Same: The United States Navy’S Air Campaign Against The U-Boat, Richard Norton, Alan C. Carey

Naval War College Review

No abstract provided.

Questioning The Carrier: Opportunities In Fleet Design For The United States Navy, Jeffrey E. Kline, Jeff Vandenengel

Naval War College Review

No abstract provided.

Outsourcing Security At Sea—The Return Of Private Maritime-Security Companies And Their Role In Twenty-First-Century Maritime Security, Pieter W. G. Zhao

Naval War College Review

Tracing the historical, political, and economic dynamics behind the medieval emergence and eventual disappearance in the nineteenth century of mercenary naval forces illuminates the modern development of private maritime-security companies to address piracy.

Clausewitzian Friction And Twenty-First-Century War—The Paradox Of Technology, Nikolas Gardner

Naval War College Review

New and emerging technologies—especially affecting sensors, networks, autonomy, and computing—are changing Clausewitz’s concept of friction in warfare. While these technologies appear to reduce some aspects of friction, they amplify others and may introduce new ones altogether.

The Failure Of German Naval Force Design, 1928–39, Mark Stanovich

Naval War College Review

In the early years of World War II, Germany came perilously close to cutting off Great Britain’s vital sea-lanes. The ultimate failure can be traced to force-design mistakes in the decade prior to war, illuminating the political, industrial, and strategic challenges facing nations redesigning their force structures today.

Small Mobile Pieces Of National Sovereignty?—Uncrewed Vessels, Naval Diplomacy, And The Challenge Of Signaling, Richard Dunley

Naval War College Review

Naval employment of uncrewed platforms is expanding, but their status and perception among both operators and adversaries are still evolving, with key differences from crewed platforms that affect diplomacy, political signaling, and conflict escalation.