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U.S. Naval War College

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Strategic Features Of The South China Sea: A Tough Neighborhood For Hegemons, James R. Holmes Mar 2018

Strategic Features Of The South China Sea: A Tough Neighborhood For Hegemons, James R. Holmes

Naval War College Review

Alfred Thayer Mahan’s analysis of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea offers present-day students and practitioners of maritime strategy a framework to think through the challenges of the South China Sea.


Creating The 1980s Maritime Strategy And Implications For Today, John T. Hanley Jr. Mar 2018

Creating The 1980s Maritime Strategy And Implications For Today, John T. Hanley Jr.

Naval War College Review

The approaches that allowed the Chief of Naval Operations’ Strategic Studies Group to contribute so vitally to the U.S. Navy’s 1986 maritime strategy might be effective as well in confronting the challenges that the Navy faces today.


Education That Matters, Walter E. Carter Jr. Mar 2018

Education That Matters, Walter E. Carter Jr.

Naval War College Review

No abstract provided.


From The Editors, Carnes Lord Mar 2018

From The Editors, Carnes Lord

Naval War College Review

No abstract provided.


Spring 2014 Full Issue, The U.S. Naval War College Mar 2018

Spring 2014 Full Issue, The U.S. Naval War College

Naval War College Review

No abstract provided.


Summer 2014 Review, The U.S . Naval War College Mar 2018

Summer 2014 Review, The U.S . Naval War College

Naval War College Review

No abstract provided.


Silent Killers: Submarines And Underwater Warfare, William Murray Mar 2018

Silent Killers: Submarines And Underwater Warfare, William Murray

Naval War College Review

Given the book’s title and the cover photo of the Los Angeles–class fast attack submarine USS City of Corpus Christi, readers might reasonably assume that James P. Delgado’s Silent Killers: Submarines and Underwater Warfare is focused on modern submarines and undersea warfare. However, this is not the case. Instead, it is a small coffee-table book on the overall history of subma- rines, with pronounced emphases on early (pre–World War I) development and on the archaeology of submarine wrecks. A few minutes on the Internet readily explains this.


National Security Through A Cockeyed Lens: How Cognitive Bias Impactsu.S. Foreign Policy, Richard Norton Mar 2018

National Security Through A Cockeyed Lens: How Cognitive Bias Impactsu.S. Foreign Policy, Richard Norton

Naval War College Review

There’s an old saying, usually attributed to Mark Twain, that the Missouri River is “too thick to drink and too thin to plow.” At first glance, the same might be said for this book, in that Steve Yetiv seeks to appeal to the scholar, to the practitioner, and to the lay reader, serv- ing the lay reader best but not without utility to the practitioner and scholar.


Book Reviews, The U.S . Navy War College Mar 2018

Book Reviews, The U.S . Navy War College

Naval War College Review

No abstract provided.


Future Mine Countermeasures, Martin Schwarz Mar 2018

Future Mine Countermeasures, Martin Schwarz

Naval War College Review

Admiral Smith’s point might be as valid today as it was sixty-four years ago. It refers to mines that he faced off the coast of Korea. Naval (or sea) mines are, by themselves or in combination with other weapons, a promising choice to parties pursuing antiaccess/area-denial objectives. The number of mines in the stocks of countries around the world and the ease of laying them mean that sea control is very likely to be lost again in future tension and conflict. This article is an attempt to describe the means, and to some extent the methods, under con- sideration to …


A Prophet For Our Times, Wayne P. Hughes Jr Mar 2018

A Prophet For Our Times, Wayne P. Hughes Jr

Naval War College Review

It is appropriate for the Naval War College Review to reprint the superb essay by Admiral Ya’ari, because the things he foresaw nearly twenty years ago are all coming to pass—an analytical performance worthy of any Old Testament prophet. The growing hazards and deadliness of the littoral seas are something all navies must take into account, but particularly the U.S. Navy, because it is only just beginning to grasp the uniqueness of the littoral environment, the need for new tactics, and the value of warships better suited to fight in its clutter.


Reinventing The Drone, Reinventing The Navy1919–1939, Angelina Long Callahan Mar 2018

Reinventing The Drone, Reinventing The Navy1919–1939, Angelina Long Callahan

Naval War College Review

Invention is often perceived as an isolated event, attributable to a momentous “first” or to a single, patent-holding inventor. However, rather than questioning what qualified as the first drone aircraft or to whom the title as its “inventor” belongs, this article maps out the winding uncertainties of technical evolution— exploring how seemingly failed projects laid groundwork for the U.S. Navy’s first successful radio-controlled drone aircraft.


The Littoral Arena, Yedidia Ya’Ari Mar 2018

The Littoral Arena, Yedidia Ya’Ari

Naval War College Review

The shift of naval focus toward the littoral arena that has resulted from the dramatic changes in the geostrategic environment reflects a major rethink- ing of the role and objectives of sea power in the foreseeable future. Clearly these fundamental changes will result in an adjustment of the relative weight of “green water” and “brown water” missions on one hand and the high seas, which have been dominant in naval strategic thinking throughout this century, on the other. This article raises the question, however, of whether the process of transforma- tion is taking fully into account the scope of the …


A Theory Of Naval Airpower, Robert C. Rubel Mar 2018

A Theory Of Naval Airpower, Robert C. Rubel

Naval War College Review

The U.S. Navy has never been comfortable with theory or doctrine at what is now known as the operational level of war. The Navy has always pos- sessed robust ship- and formation-level doctrine—tactics—and of course has embraced the high-level sea-power theories of both Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett. The gap in the middle either has not been needed—as has been essentially the case for most of the Navy’s history except for World War II—or has been filled by adaptive practice in the form of specific campaign or opera- tions plans. For the Navy, the old framework of strategy and …


The History Of The Twenty-First-Century Chinese Navy, Bernard D. Cole Mar 2018

The History Of The Twenty-First-Century Chinese Navy, Bernard D. Cole

Naval War College Review

China historically has been a continental rather than a maritime power, de- spite its more than eleven thousand miles of coastline and more than six thousand islands. It has more often viewed the sea as a potential invasion route for foreign aggressors rather than as a medium for achieving national goals, a tendency that has contributed to the weakness of the Chinese maritime tradi- tion. This attitude had changed by the beginning of the twenty-first century.


Averting The Great War?, John H. Maurer Mar 2018

Averting The Great War?, John H. Maurer

Naval War College Review

Winston Churchill is best remembered as a valiant leader in times of war. He should also be remembered, however, for his efforts to prevent the catastrophic great wars that would scar the history of the twentieth century. While it is largely forgotten today, on the eve of the First World War Churchill made a remarkable attempt to halt the head-to-head competition in naval armaments that was setting Great Britain and Germany against one another as adversaries.


President’S Forum, Walter E. Carter Jr Mar 2018

President’S Forum, Walter E. Carter Jr

Naval War College Review

Since 1884, the Naval War College has existed as a place to study and understand the complexity of conflict. As it prepares to celebrate its 130th anniversary, the College continues to refine its educational and research programs to meet the demands of the Navy and the national security community. The Naval War College is helping to prepare and shape the Navy of Tomorrow; and we are significantly supporting the Navy of Today.


China’S Maritime Disputes In The East And South China Seas, Peter A. Dutton Mar 2018

China’S Maritime Disputes In The East And South China Seas, Peter A. Dutton

Naval War College Review

China pursues its security through interior strategies that involve the develop- ment of rings of security around central areas of national interest. The Chi- nese have long felt vulnerable from the sea, and their current maritime strategy seeks to reduce that vulnerability by extending a ring of maritime control around China’s periphery. China pursues this control through a combination of force- structure development and legal assertions.


From The Editors, The U.S . Naval War College Mar 2018

From The Editors, The U.S . Naval War College

Naval War College Review

In recent testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Peter A. Dutton of the Naval War College offered a timely and incisive analysis of the aims and tactics of China in its ongoing maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas. We take the liberty (with his permission, of course) of reproducing that tes- timony here. Professor Dutton emphasizes the sophisticated—indeed, sophistical —strategy the Chinese have pursued in the international legal arena, so far with some apparent success. He believes that our allies in the region are anxious to see the United States take a greater leadership role on …


Winter 2014 Review, The U.S. Naval War College Mar 2018

Winter 2014 Review, The U.S. Naval War College

Naval War College Review

No abstract provided.


Turning The Tide: The Battles Of Coral Sea And Midway, Jon Scott Logel Mar 2018

Turning The Tide: The Battles Of Coral Sea And Midway, Jon Scott Logel

Naval War College Review

The latest volume of the Britannia Naval Histories of World War II revisits the Royal Navy’s official histories of two pivotal naval battles. Taken from the previously classified battle sum- maries, numbers 45 and 46, this newly printed edition is a valuable aid to the study of two groundbreak- ing carrier battles in the Pacific War.


George F. Kennan: An American Life, John B. Hattendorf Mar 2018

George F. Kennan: An American Life, John B. Hattendorf

Naval War College Review

Winner of the Pulitzer Prize for Biography in 2012, as well as a number of other awards, John Lewis Gaddis’s study of George F. Kennan (1904–2005) has already firmly established itself as the fundamental scholarly biography for the Cold War period in American history. Gaddis began work on this biography in 1981, not long after he had spent a two- year period as visiting professor of strat- egy and policy at the Naval War College. At Newport in those days, he was already admired for his first book, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947 (Columbia …


Book Reviews, The U.S. Naval War College Mar 2018

Book Reviews, The U.S. Naval War College

Naval War College Review

No abstract provided.


Strength In Numbers: The Remarkable Potential Of (Really) Small Combatants, Jimmy Drennan Mar 2018

Strength In Numbers: The Remarkable Potential Of (Really) Small Combatants, Jimmy Drennan

Naval War College Review

You are a tactical commander tasked with a mission to seek out and destroy one of the enemy’s premier capital ships in his home waters. You have two potential striking forces at your disposal: a world-class surface combatant of your own with a 99 percent probability of mission success (Ps = 0.99) or a squadron of eight in- dependently operating, missile-carrying small combatants, each with a chance of successfully completing the mission no better than a coin flip (Ps = 0.5). Do you go with the almost sure thing and choose to send in your large combatant?


“Winning” The Pacific War: The Masterful Strategy Of Commander Minoru Genda, Angelo N. Caravaggio Mar 2018

“Winning” The Pacific War: The Masterful Strategy Of Commander Minoru Genda, Angelo N. Caravaggio

Naval War College Review

Criticisms leveled at the Japanese for their “ill conceived” or “poorly planned” attack at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 have failed to consider the true depth of vision and professional intellect of its principal architect, Commander Minoru Genda.1 Charges of failure to execute follow-on attacks against the harbor facilities, if any such attacks were planned at all, or to exploit the immediate advantages created in the Central Pacific after the attack are commonly made by both academic and professional military scholars. Genda has suffered the brunt of this criticism. But in fact Genda’s plans were neither ill conceived nor …


Kamikazes: The Soviet Legacy, Maksim Y. Tokarev Mar 2018

Kamikazes: The Soviet Legacy, Maksim Y. Tokarev

Naval War College Review

Throughout history, despite the influence of Alfred Thayer Mahan’s concepts, continental European and Asian navies have had a simple choice to make either to create a balanced fleet to engage another balanced fleet at sea and defeat it in one or more “decisive battles” or to take an “asymmetrical approach,” creating an “unbalanced” navy, able to prevent the enemy from achieving sea control and to keep one’s own vital sea lines of communication (SLOCs), if one has any, untouched by the enemy’s naval forces.


The Idea Of A “Fleet In Being” In Historical Perspective, John B. Hattendorf Mar 2018

The Idea Of A “Fleet In Being” In Historical Perspective, John B. Hattendorf

Naval War College Review

The phrase “fleet in being” is one of those troublesome terms that naval historians and strategists have tended to use in a range of different meanings. The term first appeared in reference to the naval battle off Beachy Head in 1690, during the Nine Years’ War, as part of an excuse that Admiral Arthur Herbert, first Earl of Torrington, used to explain his reluctance to engage the French fleet in that battle.


Your Boss, Players, And Sponsor: The Three Witches Of War Gaming, Stephen Downes-Martin Mar 2018

Your Boss, Players, And Sponsor: The Three Witches Of War Gaming, Stephen Downes-Martin

Naval War College Review

In national-security war gaming there are three classes of senior stakeholders whom I call “the three witches”—critical to the success of a game but with the power to affect negatively its quality. These comprise, first, the war-game director’s superior and chain of command; second, the senior players within each game cell; and third, the sponsor of the game and that officer’s chain of command. Each of these three stakeholders frequently attempts to influence the design of the war game, even during play itself. For two reasons, such attempts amount to inappropriate interference.


Trends In Modern War Gaming: The Art Of Conversation, Hank J. Brightman, Melissa K. Dewey Mar 2018

Trends In Modern War Gaming: The Art Of Conversation, Hank J. Brightman, Melissa K. Dewey

Naval War College Review

Lieutenant William McCarty Little—a war-gaming visionary—was truly a man ahead of his time.1 Although physically sight impaired and medically retired from active naval service, he opted to use his ideational vision and keen mind to support the Naval War College, in Newport, Rhode Island, during its first few years of operation after its founding in 1884. Initially an unpaid volunteer, he was appointed in 1887 as a member of the faculty, where he developed two-sided war gaming at the College—a construct that is still in use at the state-of-the-art facility that today bears his name.


President’S Forum, Walter E. Carter Jr. Mar 2018

President’S Forum, Walter E. Carter Jr.

Naval War College Review

The Naval War College is a multifaceted joint military academic institution, in support of the naval profession, composed of resident education for U.S. and international officers and focused on maritime research, regional studies, distance education, war gaming, and education/ programs at the operational level of war. Each of these intricate areas has unique programs and initiatives, but their common underlying theme is their ability to educate our future leaders and to teach them to think strategically and operationally. Educating leaders is conducted not only at the War College but also at our off-site locations around the country, and the research …