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Articles 31 - 60 of 94
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Reflections On The Authority Of Personal Experience, Trudy Govier
Reflections On The Authority Of Personal Experience, Trudy Govier
OSSA Conference Archive
The authority of first person claims may be understood from an epistemic perspective or as a matter of social practice. Building on accounts of Hume, Nagel, and several more recent authors, it is argued that this authority should be understood as limited. To extend it beyond notions of what it is like to experience something, we shift from what should be a narrow subjective edge to a territory of objective claims, thereby reasoning incorrectly. A relevant application is the supposed authority of victims.
Commentary On: Benjamin Hamby's "Willingness To Inquire: The Cardinal Critical Thinking Virtue", Frank Fair
Commentary On: Benjamin Hamby's "Willingness To Inquire: The Cardinal Critical Thinking Virtue", Frank Fair
OSSA Conference Archive
N/A
Is Critical Thinking Across The Curriculum A Plausible Goal?, Donald L. Hatcher
Is Critical Thinking Across The Curriculum A Plausible Goal?, Donald L. Hatcher
OSSA Conference Archive
Critical thinking (CT) is considered an essential educational goal. As a result, many philosophers dreamed their departments would offer multiple sections of CT, hence justifying hiring additional staff. Unfortunately, this dream did not materialize. So, similar to a current theory about teaching writing, “critical thinking across the curriculum” has become a popular idea. While the idea has appeal and unquestionable merit, I will argue that the likelihood the skills necessary for effective CT will actually be taught is minimal.
Commentary On: Don Hatcher's "Is Critical Thinking Across Curriculum A Plausible Goal?", Michael Scriven
Commentary On: Don Hatcher's "Is Critical Thinking Across Curriculum A Plausible Goal?", Michael Scriven
OSSA Conference Archive
N/A
Material Consequences And Counter-Factuals, David Hitchcock
Material Consequences And Counter-Factuals, David Hitchcock
OSSA Conference Archive
A conclusion is a “material consequence” of reasons if it follows necessarily from them in accordance with a valid form of argument with content. The corresponding universal generalization of the argument’s associated conditional must be true, must be a covering generalization, and must be true of counter-factual instances. But it need not be law-like. Pearl’s structural model semantics is easier to apply to such counter-factual instances than Lewis’s closest-worlds semantics, and gives intuitively correct results.
Preciseness Is A Virtue: What Are Critical Questions?, Michael J. Hoppmann
Preciseness Is A Virtue: What Are Critical Questions?, Michael J. Hoppmann
OSSA Conference Archive
The paper compares the uses of “critical question” in recent publications on the topic, contrasting explicit definitions where they exist and reconstructing implicit definitions where possible, and suggests a taxonomy of different “critical questions” as they are used in argumentative evaluation and criticism. In distinguishing different meanings of “critical question” horizontally between authors and vertically within the analysis, it strives to make a contribution to the ongoing work on the systematization of argumentative criticism.
Does Happiness Increase The Objectivity Of Arguers?, Moira Howes
Does Happiness Increase The Objectivity Of Arguers?, Moira Howes
OSSA Conference Archive
At first glance, happiness and objectivity seem to have little in common. I claim, however, that subjective and eudaimonic happiness promotes arguer objectivity. To support my claim, I focus on connections between happiness, social intelligence, and intellectual virtue. After addressing objections concerning unhappy objective and happy unobjective arguers, I conclude that communities should value happiness in argumentative contexts and use happiness as an indicator of their capacity for objective argumentation.
Rhetoric, Dialectic And Logic: The Triad De-Compartmentalized, Charlotte Jørgensen
Rhetoric, Dialectic And Logic: The Triad De-Compartmentalized, Charlotte Jørgensen
OSSA Conference Archive
Taking Blair’s recent contribution to the debate about the triad as its starting point, the paper discusses and challenges the effort to reduce the intricate relationship between rhetoric, dialectic, and logic to a single criterion or watertight trichotomy. I argue that such efforts obscure the complexities within the fields, their differences being partly due to disciplinary traditions. They neglect the intermingling properties of the fields as well as the possibilities for theoretical bridging between them.
Manipulation As Breach Of Arguer Responsibility In 'Welcome To Obamaville', Scott Jacobs
Manipulation As Breach Of Arguer Responsibility In 'Welcome To Obamaville', Scott Jacobs
OSSA Conference Archive
Argumentation should encourage autonomous decision-making. Rick Santorum’s political campaign ad Welcome to Obamaville violates this requirement by deploying a flood of subliminal images. Santorum’s ad involves a fallacy by virtue of clear intent to manipulate. Arguers are responsible for the foreseeable consequences of their action. Santorum acts in bad faith even if subliminal messages are in fact ineffective and he is wrong about the consequences foreseen.
Defeasibility From The Perspective Of Informal Logic, Ralph H. Johnson
Defeasibility From The Perspective Of Informal Logic, Ralph H. Johnson
OSSA Conference Archive
The notions of defeasibility and defeasible reasoning have generated a great deal of interest in various research communities. Here I want to focus on their use in logic and argumentation studies. I will approach these topics from the perspective of an informal logician who finds himself struggling with some issues that surround the idea of and the deployment of the concept of defeasibility. My intention is to make those struggles as clear as I can.
Virtues Of Visual Argumentation: How Pictures Make The Importance And Strength Of An Argument Salient, Jens E. Kjeldsen
Virtues Of Visual Argumentation: How Pictures Make The Importance And Strength Of An Argument Salient, Jens E. Kjeldsen
OSSA Conference Archive
Some forms of argumentation are best performed through words. However, there are also some forms of argumentation that benefit most from being presented visually. Thus, in this paper I will examine the virtues of visual argumentation. What makes visual argumentation distinct from verbal argumentation? What can be considered especially beneficial of visual argumentation, in relation to both effect and ethics?
The Virtue Of Restraint: Rebalancing Power In Arguments, Moira Kloster
The Virtue Of Restraint: Rebalancing Power In Arguments, Moira Kloster
OSSA Conference Archive
Is argument a game everyone should be able to play? If it is, current argument practices do not yet level the playing field enough for a fair game. We may build in subtle imbalances that work against people who cannot easily adapt to the most common patterns of argumentative interaction. We need better ways to build trust, to create safety, and adapt goals in order to bring everyone into the game.
Commentary On: Marcin Koszowy's "Polish Logical Studies From An Informal Logic Perspective", Nicholas Griffin
Commentary On: Marcin Koszowy's "Polish Logical Studies From An Informal Logic Perspective", Nicholas Griffin
OSSA Conference Archive
N/A
Polish Logical Studies From An Informal Logic Perspective, Marcin Koszowy
Polish Logical Studies From An Informal Logic Perspective, Marcin Koszowy
OSSA Conference Archive
The paper emphasizes significant resemblances between the Informal Logic Initiative and the Lvov-Warsaw School (LWS) – the Polish philosophical movement (1895-1939), the rise of which is associated with “the Golden Age of Science and Letters”. The correspondence between informal logic and the logical studies of the LWS will be explored by discussing their subject-matter, goals, and methods. The project focused on applying logical studies of the LWS in analyzing and assessing arguments will be proposed.
Evidence-Based Practice (Ebp), Means-End Reasoning And Goal Directed Theories, Tone Kvernbekk
Evidence-Based Practice (Ebp), Means-End Reasoning And Goal Directed Theories, Tone Kvernbekk
OSSA Conference Archive
Means-end reasoning – deliberations concerning what to do to attain a goal – is at the heart of EBP and practical pedagogy in general, but beset by many misunderstandings. In this paper I discuss the form of means-end reasoning involved in EBP. I bring out its basic features by first comparing it to David Hitchcock’s complex means-end scheme and then to the notion of goal-directed theories. Which approach, if any, best accommodates the means-end reasoning of EBP?
Criticism In Need Of Clarification, Jan Albert Van Laar
Criticism In Need Of Clarification, Jan Albert Van Laar
OSSA Conference Archive
A critic often conveys what underlies her criticism, but imprecisely, leaving it unclear to the arguer what argumentative strategy to adopt. I elaborate on the opponent's “burden of criticism” by using argumentation schemes. For example, the critic may challenge a thesis by saying “Why? Says who?,” without conveying whether she could be convinced with an argument from expert opinion, or from position to know, or from popularity. What are fair dialogue rules for dealing with unspecific criticism?
Polylogical Fallacies: Are There Any?, Marcin Lewiński
Polylogical Fallacies: Are There Any?, Marcin Lewiński
OSSA Conference Archive
Dialectical fallacies are typically defined as breaches of the rules of a regulated discussion between two participants (di-logue). What if discussions become more complex and involve multiple parties with distinct positions to argue for (poly-logues)? Are there distinct argumentation norms of polylogues? If so, can their violations be conceptualized as polylogical fallacies? I will argue for such an approach and analyze two candidates for argumentative breaches of multi-party rationality: false dilemma and collateral straw man.
Commentary On: Christoph Lumer's "Practical Arguments For Prudential Justifications Of Actions", Menashe Schwed
Commentary On: Christoph Lumer's "Practical Arguments For Prudential Justifications Of Actions", Menashe Schwed
OSSA Conference Archive
N/A
Practical Arguments For Prudential Justifications Of Actions, Christoph Lumer
Practical Arguments For Prudential Justifications Of Actions, Christoph Lumer
OSSA Conference Archive
Practical arguments for actions are arguments which, besides their epistemic function, shall motivate an addressee to execute the justified action. First, a strategy is developed how this motivational and other requirements can be met. Part of this strategy is to identify a thesis for which holds that believing it motivates in the required manner. Second, relying on empirical decision theory, such a thesis is identified. Finally, precise validity criteria for the respective arguments are developed.
What We Hide In Words: Value-Based Reasoning And Emotive Language, Fabrizio Macagno
What We Hide In Words: Value-Based Reasoning And Emotive Language, Fabrizio Macagno
OSSA Conference Archive
There are emotively powerful words that can modify our judgment, arouse our emotions and influence our decisions. This paper shows how the use of emotive meaning in argumentation can be explained by showing how their logical dimension, which can be analysed using argumentation schemes, combines with heuristic processes triggered by emotions. Arguing with emotive words is shown to use value-based practical reasoning grounded on hierarchies of values and maxims of experience for evaluative classification.
Commentary On: Fabrizio Macagno's "What We Hide In Words: Value-Based Reasoning And Emotive Language", Manfred Kraus
Commentary On: Fabrizio Macagno's "What We Hide In Words: Value-Based Reasoning And Emotive Language", Manfred Kraus
OSSA Conference Archive
N/A
Trust, Distrust, And Trustworthiness In Argumentation: Virtues And Fallacies, Suzanne Mcmurphy
Trust, Distrust, And Trustworthiness In Argumentation: Virtues And Fallacies, Suzanne Mcmurphy
OSSA Conference Archive
What is trust? How does it function as a primary virtue for persuasive arguments? How does its presumption contribute to the effectiveness of an argument’s persuasiveness? This presentation will explore these questions and the controversy among scholars regarding how trust is generated and under what conditions it is lost. We will also discuss whether inauthentic trustworthiness is a manipulation used for gaining a fallacious advantage in argumentation.
Commentary On: Suzanne Mcmurphy's "Trust, Distrust, And Trustworthiness In Argumentation: Virtues And Fallacies, Moira Kloster
Commentary On: Suzanne Mcmurphy's "Trust, Distrust, And Trustworthiness In Argumentation: Virtues And Fallacies, Moira Kloster
OSSA Conference Archive
N/A
Rationality Of Argumentation Aimed At Multiple Goals, Dima Mohammed
Rationality Of Argumentation Aimed At Multiple Goals, Dima Mohammed
OSSA Conference Archive
In this paper, I critically examine the main accounts of goals in argumentative discourse, aiming to formulate an account that is suitable for the examination of public political arguments, where typically multiple legitimate goals are pursued simultaneously. Such arguments are viewed as contributions to what can be dialectically reconstructed as multiple simultaneous discussions, and are analysed as strategic manoeuvres that can under certain conditions be reasonable but may, if such conditions are violated, become fallacious.
Narrative, Intersectionality And Argumentative Discourse, Justin Ross Morris
Narrative, Intersectionality And Argumentative Discourse, Justin Ross Morris
OSSA Conference Archive
In this paper I argue that a “use-based” approach to narrative and narrative arguments provides the kind of conceptual architecture necessary for developing a much-needed intersectional analysis of arguers’ identities, their arguments, and the contexts that inform their positions. Without such an approach, we risk coming away with an understanding of narrative argument that, at best, fails to capture its dynamism, or, worse yet, risks being conditioned on methodologically ethnocentric grounds.
Commentary On: Justin Ross Morris' "Narrative, Intersectionality And Argumentative Discourse", Paula Olmos
Commentary On: Justin Ross Morris' "Narrative, Intersectionality And Argumentative Discourse", Paula Olmos
OSSA Conference Archive
N/A
Narration As Argument, Paula Olmos
Narration As Argument, Paula Olmos
OSSA Conference Archive
In this paper I explore the possibilities of acknowledging the argumentative character of (at least some cases of) narration. Two basic models will be revised: 1) primary (core) narratives, regarding issues and facts under discussion, which may work as implicit arguments about the coincidence between discourse and reality via their own internal plausibility and 2) secondary narratives, imaginatively inserted in discourse, and serving as evidence for diverse lines of (either stated or unstated) analogical or exemplary argumentation.
Commentary On: Steve Oswald And Christopher Hart's "Trust Based On Bias: Cognitive Constraints On Source-Related Fallacies", Pierre J. Boulos
Commentary On: Steve Oswald And Christopher Hart's "Trust Based On Bias: Cognitive Constraints On Source-Related Fallacies", Pierre J. Boulos
OSSA Conference Archive
N/A
Trust Based On Bias: Cognitive Constraints On Source-Related Fallacies, Steve Oswald, Christopher Hart
Trust Based On Bias: Cognitive Constraints On Source-Related Fallacies, Steve Oswald, Christopher Hart
OSSA Conference Archive
This paper advances a cognitive account of the rhetorical effectiveness of fallacious arguments and takes the example of source-related fallacies. Drawing on cognitive psychology and evolutionary linguistics, we claim that a fallacy enforces accessibility and epistemic cognitive constraints on argument processing targeted at preventing the addressee from spotting its fallaciousness, by managing to prevent or circumvent critical reactions. We address the evolutionary bases of biases and the way that these are exploited in fallacious argumentation.
Commentary On: Fabio Paglieri's "Argumentation, Decision And Rationality", Steven W. Patterson
Commentary On: Fabio Paglieri's "Argumentation, Decision And Rationality", Steven W. Patterson
OSSA Conference Archive
N/A