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Sweden: Carnegie Investment Bank Ab Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008, Sophia Alden, Jack French

Journal of Financial Crises

In October 2008, Carnegie Investment Bank AB (Carnegie) had trouble obtaining financing amid concerns about its financial health. However, Sweden’s central bank, the Sveriges Riksbank (Riksbank), and the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) still viewed Carnegie as solvent. Between October 27 and 28, the Riksbank lent Carnegie 2.4 billion Swedish kronor (SEK). As collateral for the loan, Carnegie and its holding company, D. Carnegie & Co. AB (D. Carnegie), provided all shares and subsidiaries in Carnegie as well as all shares in a sister subsidiary under D. Carnegie, Max Matthiessen Holding AB (Max Matthiessen). On November 10, 2008, the FSA …

Switzerland: Credit Suisse Emergency Liquidity Program, 2023, Jack French, Owen Heaphy, Steven Kelly

Journal of Financial Crises

Credit Suisse (CS) faced multiple challenges leading up to March 2023 including a significant outflow of client funds in the fourth quarter of 2022 and reputational loss resulting from a number of scandals in the preceding years. On Wednesday, March 15, 2023, shortly after two high-profile bank failures in the United States, a high-ranking official of the Saudi National Bank, a major shareholder, publicly said it would not provide any more capital for the company. Despite a joint statement from the Swiss National Bank (SNB) and the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) that CS was in compliance with capital …

Spain: Caja De Ahorros Castilla–La Mancha Emergency Liquidity Assistance, 2009, Vincient Arnold, Lakshimi Swaminathan

Journal of Financial Crises

Following years of rapid credit expansion in the real estate sector and reliance on wholesale funding between 2000 and 2008, Caja de Ahorros de Castilla–La Mancha (CCM) found itself on the brink of insolvency in early 2009. Normally, a Eurosystem bank in CCM’s position would turn to the European Central Bank (ECB) to obtain liquidity through its standing financing facilities, but CCM lacked eligible collateral to tap them. Consequently, in February 2009, the Bank of Spain (BoS) provided emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) of EUR 900 million to CCM, secured against CCM assets, to help meet its liquidity needs. In March, …

Russia: Otkritie Emergency Liquidity Program, 2017, Benjamin Hoffner

Journal of Financial Crises

In July and August 2017, Otkritie Bank, Russia’s largest privately owned bank, experienced deposit runs related to concerns over Otkritie’s recent acquisitions, including a large, troubled bank and insurance company. The runs prompted Otkritie to heavily rely on the Central Bank of Russia’s (CBR’s) standing fixed-rate repurchase agreement (repo) facility to meet the outflow. By July, Otkritie had RUB 338.1 billion in outstanding repo loans from the CBR. As depositors continued to withdraw funds in August, the CBR provided Otkritie with an unsecured emergency loan of RUB 330 billion while Otkritie continued to borrow from the repo facility. On August …

Moldova: Consortium Of Banks Emergency Liquidity Program, 2014, Vincient Arnold

Journal of Financial Crises

In the fall of 2014, a bank fraud involving illegal loans and transfers resulted in USD 1 billion being stolen from the government of Moldova, which amounted to more than an eighth of Moldova’s GDP. In September 2014, it became clear to the National Bank of Moldova (NBM) that the banks involved in the fraud—Banca de Economii, Banca Sociala, and Unibank—were deeply insolvent and had been hiding that fact from regulators. In late November, the NBM issued 9.4 billion Moldovan lei (MDL; USD 640 million) in emergency credit to the banks at an interest rate of 10 basis points against …

Latvia: Parex Bank Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008, Bailey Decker

Journal of Financial Crises

Heading into the Global Financial Crisis, JSC Parex banka was Latvia’s second-largest bank in terms of assets, comprising 13.8% of total assets in the Latvian banking sector. In autumn 2008, Parex faced a capital shortfall owing to massive credit and market losses in addition to liquidity problems and deposit runs of 240 million Latvian lats (LVL; USD 428.6 million). Parex had two senior syndicated loans maturing in February and June 2009, totaling EUR 775 million (USD 992 million). Latvian authorities said they doubted that Parex would be able to pay back, extend, or replace these loans. Authorities intervened at the …

Ireland: Anglo Irish Bank Emergency Liquidity Assistance, 2009, Salil Gupta, Mahdi Khairallah, Nik Adlina Nik Moktar

Journal of Financial Crises

At the height of the Global Financial Crisis in September 2008, Anglo Irish Bank (Anglo), one of Ireland’s six core banks, specializing in commercial and residential real estate with EUR 101.3 billion in assets, faced severe losses. Irish authorities announced a blanket deposit and liability guarantee for the six banks including Anglo. At the same time, Anglo was offered standby liquidity facilities of EUR 3 billion from the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) and EUR 10 billion from the two largest Irish commercial banks, which were not drawn on at the time. Anglo was nationalized in January 2009, as deposit …

Italy: Banco Ambrosiano Emergency Liquidity Program, 1982, Kopal Ardimento

Journal of Financial Crises

On June 14, 1982, prompted by the disappearance of Banco Ambrosiano (BA) CEO Roberto Calvi, the Bank of Italy opened an investigation into BA, which revealed to the market BA’s 1.9 trillion–2.2 trillion Italian lire (ITL; USD 1.4 billion–USD 1.6 billion) in questionable foreign loans. The Treasury Ministry deemed intervention necessary because BA’s collapse would compromise the credibility of the Italian banking system abroad. Attempts to appeal to the Vatican Bank to honor guarantees it had made against these foreign loans failed. The Bank of Italy worried that runs on deposits would further impair BA while authorities explored alternatives to …

Indonesia: Bank Century Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008, Vincient Arnold

Journal of Financial Crises

By the autumn of 2008, the effects of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 had struck Indonesia, as liquidity in interbank markets dried up, capital flows reversed, and economic growth slowed. On October 30, 2008, Bank Indonesia—the central bank of Indonesia—passed Regulation No. 10/26/PBI/2008, establishing a Short-Term Funding Facility for Commercial Banks (SFF). On October 31, 2008, the capital adequacy ratio of Bank Century, a relatively small Indonesian bank, was –3.35%. On November 14, 2008, after Bank Century failed to conduct payment clearing the day before, Bank Indonesia approved Bank Century for access to the SFF and began disbursements of …

Iceland: Kaupthing Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008, Sophia Alden, Léo Brougher

Journal of Financial Crises

Following the privatization of Iceland’s state-owned banks between 1998 and 2003, the three largest banks in Iceland—Glitnir, Landsbanki, and Kaupthing—grew rapidly, with consolidated assets increasing from 100% of Iceland’s GDP in 2004 to nearly 900% by the end of 2007. Initially, this growth was funded by debt issuances in the European medium-term note market; however, as cracks in the international financial system appeared in 2006, the banks turned to offering high-interest savings accounts through their foreign subsidiaries. Beginning in October 2006, Kaupthing launched “Kaupthing Edge,” an online savings and deposit platform operating in markets outside Iceland. When the United States …

Germany: Ikb Deutsche Industriebank Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008, Ayodeji George, Sophia Alden

Journal of Financial Crises

In the summer of 2007, IKB Deutsche Industriebank (IKB) faced heavy losses owing to the liquidity support it had provided on commercial paper issued by Rhineland Funding Capital Corporation, its off-balance-sheet vehicle, which held distressed collateralized debt obligations backed by US subprime mortgages. In July 2007, authorities became aware that IKB itself had lost access to liquidity from Deutsche Bank and other funding partners. Publicly owned development bank Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) held a 38% stake in IKB, exposing it to potentially heavy losses in the event of an IKB failure. KfW, German financial authorities, and German banks pursued a …

Cyprus: Laiki Bank Ad Hoc Emergency Liquidity Assistance, 2011, Stella Schaefer-Brown

Journal of Financial Crises

Following the European Union’s decision to restructure Greek debt in October 2011, Laiki Bank’s depositors began to withdraw their funds from the bank in growing numbers after it reported that its portfolio of Greek government bonds had lost EUR 2.3 billion in value. Beginning October 2011 and lasting until the bank’s resolution in 2013, Laiki Bank requested and received emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) from the Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC) so that the bank could continue to fund itself as depositors withdrew their funds. In June 2012, Cypriot authorities recapitalized Laiki Bank, and the government became an 84% shareholder. From …

Denmark: Roskilde Bank Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008, Bailey Decker

Journal of Financial Crises

Roskilde Bank A/S (Roskilde) was the eighth-largest bank in Denmark at the time of the Global Financial Crisis, with approximately 43 billion Danish kroner (DKK; USD 9.1 billion) in consolidated assets as of March 2008. Roskilde had considerable exposure to real estate and construction firms, prompting ratings downgrades and larger write-downs than expected in July 2008. On July 10, 2008, Roskilde asked for liquidity assistance from the Danish central bank, Danmarks Nationalbank (DNB). Later that day, DNB and the banking sector’s self-insurance group, the Private Contingency Association (PCA), announced emergency liquidity assistance to Roskilde in the form of an unlimited …

Canada: Canadian Commercial Bank Emergency Liquidity Program, 1985, Adam Keanie, Léo Brougher

Journal of Financial Crises

In March 1985, the Canadian Commercial Bank (CCB)—Canada’s 10th largest bank, with CAD 2.9 billion in assets—reported to the Office of the Inspector General of Banks (OIGB) and the Bank of Canada (BoC) that CCB would not survive owing to large losses on its United States energy loans portfolio. In response, the BoC assembled an emergency CAD 255 million rescue package, secured through contributions from a consortium composed of the federal government, the provincial government of Alberta, the Canadian Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Canada’s six largest banks. Despite the BoC’s reassurances, including a public announcement promising virtually unlimited liquidity support, …

Ad Hoc Emergency Liquidity Programs In The 21st Century, Steven Kelly, Vincient Arnold, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

This paper surveys 22 case studies of 21st century instances when financial crisis-fighters implemented ad hoc emergency liquidity (AHEL) interventions, interventions designed to provide liquidity to a troubled institution that the authorities believe is systemically important. While emergency liquidity support is often introduced with the real or communicated intention of preventing illiquidity from leading to insolvency, the liquidity crisis should instead be viewed as the manifestation of the market’s assessing the firm as nonviable as a going concern. For that reason, authorities should provide AHEL assistance only to institutions that they have deemed viable or that they have committed to …

Brazil: Banco Btg Pactual Emergency Liquidity Program, 2015, Vincient Arnold

Journal of Financial Crises

On November 25, 2015, André Esteves, then CEO of Banco BTG Pactual, a large Brazilian investment bank, was arrested by Brazilian authorities in connection with suspected involvement in a corruption scandal. Although the arrest did not involve BTG in any capacity and Esteves was later acquitted, the company’s stock quickly collapsed and depositors and other creditors rushed to reduce their exposures to the company. Depositors withdrew certificates of bank deposits, which BTG relied on to fund its daily operations. By November 27, BTG shares had fallen 26%. On December 2, the top seven shareholders of BTG took control of the …

Containing Runs On Solvent Banks: Prioritizing Recovery Over Resolution, Edoardo David Martino, Enrico C. Perotti

Journal of Financial Crises

The sudden banking defaults in the spring of 2023 proved current prudential norms insufficient to prevent bank distress. Capital and liquidity norms need to be adjusted. The experience also shows how a lack of credible supervisory tools led to forbearance and finally chaotic public bailouts. An intervention gap arises when viable but undercapitalized banks are at the mercy of runs. Once outflows start to escalate, all that is left is to prepare for resolution and assign losses. We call for new Pillar II – i.e. activated by the supervisor – stabilizing measures, as contingent capital and liquidity tools.

A timely …

Dental Board Of California, Isaiah Artis, Katie González

California Regulatory Law Reporter

No abstract provided.

Board Of Pharmacy, Ariana Hussing, Katie González

California Regulatory Law Reporter

No abstract provided.

Veterinary Medical Board, Isiah Artis, Katie González

California Regulatory Law Reporter

No abstract provided.

Department Of Financial Protection And Innovation, Maya Patel, Marcus Friedman

California Regulatory Law Reporter

No abstract provided.

State Bar Of California, Jamie Russo, Marcus Friedman

California Regulatory Law Reporter

No abstract provided.

Masthead

California Regulatory Law Reporter

No abstract provided.

A Research Process For The Entire World? Challenges In Foreign, Comparative, And International Law Instruction, Janet Kearney

Journal of Legal Education

No abstract provided.

Public Utilities Commission, Wyatt Page, Selena Sanchez, Steven Soldani, Marcus Friedman, Erol Kilic

California Regulatory Law Reporter

No abstract provided.

California Board Of Accountancy, Shun Lam, Erol Kilic

California Regulatory Law Reporter

No abstract provided.

Medical Board Of California, Byanca Hutchins, Katie González, Erol Kilic

California Regulatory Law Reporter

No abstract provided.

Bureau Of Private Postsecondary Education, Caitlin D. Barón, Katie González

California Regulatory Law Reporter

No abstract provided.

Department Of Insurance, Lisette Cruz, Erol Kilic

California Regulatory Law Reporter

No abstract provided.

Board Of Registered Nursing, Ariana Hussing, Katie González

California Regulatory Law Reporter

No abstract provided.