Digital Commons Network^™

Regulating Offshore Finance, William J. Moon

Faculty Scholarship

From the Panama Papers to the Paradise Papers, massive document leaks in recent years have exposed trillions of dollars hidden in small offshore jurisdictions. Attracting foreign capital with low tax rates and environments of secrecy, a growing number of offshore jurisdictions have emerged as major financial havens hosting thousands of hedge funds, trusts, banks, and insurance companies.

While the prevailing account has examined offshore financial havens as “tax havens” that facilitate the evasion or avoidance of domestic tax, this Article uncovers how offshore jurisdictions enable corporations to evade domestic regulatory law. Specifically, recent U.S. Supreme Court cases restricting the geographic …

Justice Kavanaugh, Lorenzo V. Sec, And The Post-Kennedy Supreme Court, Matthew C. Turk, Karen E. Woody

Scholarly Articles

This Article analyzes a recent Supreme Court case, Lorenzo v. Securities and Exchange Commission, and explains why it provides a valuable window into the Court's future now that Justice Kennedy has retired and his seat filled by Justice Brett Kavanaugh. Lorenzo is an important case that raises fundamental interpretative questions about the reach of federal securities statutes. But most significant is its unique procedural posture: when the Supreme Court issues its decision on Lorenzo in 2019, Justice Kavanaugh will be recused while the other eight Justices rule on a lower court opinion from the D.C. Circuit in which he wrote …

Unintentional Irony In Landmark Decisions Of The Delaware Supreme Court Regarding Corporate Law, Steven Cleveland

Faculty Articles

No abstract provided.

Regulating Offshore Finance, William J. Moon

Vanderbilt Law Review

From the Panama Papers to the Paradise Papers, massive document leaks in recent years have exposed trillions of dollars hidden in small offshore jurisdictions. Attracting foreign capital with low tax rates and environments of secrecy, a growing number of offshore jurisdictions have emerged as major financial havens hosting thousands of hedge funds, trusts, banks, and insurance companies. While the prevailing account has examined offshore financial havens as "tax havens" that facilitate the evasion or avoidance of domestic tax, this Article uncovers how offshore jurisdictions enable business entities to opt out of otherwise mandatory domestic regulatory laws. Specifically, recent U.S. Supreme …

Do Independent Directors Curb Financial Fraud? The Evidence And Proposals For Further Reform†, S. Burcu Avci, Cindy A. Schipani, Nejat Seyhun

Indiana Law Journal

In this Article, we argue that the U.S. corporate governance rules put too much faith in the independent board members and insufficient emphasis on the shareholders to control and monitor top management. Given the agency problem between the board of directors and the shareholders, outside directors can be captured by management, thereby leading to inadequate checks on management. The evidence presented in this Article shows that outside board members do not exercise sufficient controls on management even when management has gone awry. To solve this agency problem, we propose increasing the power of the principals: make shareholder resolutions binding on …

Whistling In The Wind: Why Federal Whistleblower Protections Fall Short Of Their Corporate Governance Goals, Meera Khan

University of Miami Business Law Review

Teetering on the line between hero and villain, whistleblowers have a remarkably unusual role in contemporary American society. Those who blow the whistle on public sector activities, like Edward Snowden and the Watergate Scandal’s “Deep Throat”, are often vilified in history as treasonous and unprincipled rogues. In the private sector, however, whistleblowers are seen as moral compasses for corporate behavior, and are even afforded federal protections for speaking out against internal malfeasance. The piecemeal evolution of whistleblower legislation including the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 and the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 created regulatory and enforcement …

Regulating The “Too Big To Jail” Financial Institutions, Jerry W. Markham

Brooklyn Law Review

This article addresses the “too big to jail” regulatory model in which large banks pay hundreds of billions of dollars to settle multiple and duplicative regulatory charges brought by a horde of state, federal, and even foreign regulators. The banks pay those massive settlements in order to keep their banking charters and to obtain immunity from prosecution for senior executives. In turn, regulators benefit from the headlines these fines generate. Much criticism has been directed at these settlements because the banks are allowed to continue business as usual and no senior executives are jailed. Other critics contend that these settlements …

Getting To Guilty: The Necessary Shift To Individual Accountability For Corporate Wrongdoing, Paige Wheeler

The Business, Entrepreneurship & Tax Law Review

In September of 2015, Deputy Attorney General, Sally Yates, declared that the Department of Justice would shift its focus to pursuing individual accountability for cases of corporate wrongdoing, This shift reflects a change in directives, as the Department of Justice commonly resolved cases of corporate wrongdoing through the companies themselves prior to what is now commonly known as the Yates Memorandum. The Yates Memorandum centers on the conclusion that one of the most successful ways to tackle corporate misconduct is by making sure that the individuals who are committing the wrongdoing are held accountable for their actions. The Yates Memorandum …

Reconceptualizing The Whistleblower's Dilemma, Miriam Baer

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Continuing Conundrum Of Mistakes: Where The Dodd-Frank Act Went Wrong, Shipra Mehta

DePaul Business & Commercial Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Regulating Culture: Improving Corporate Governance With Anti-Arbitration Provisions For Whistleblowers, Nizan Geslevich Packin, Ben Edwards

William & Mary Law Review Online

A focus on corporate culture, especially at financial institutions, has emerged as a regulatory, public, and media priority in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. With Dodd-Frank, Congress embraced whistleblower statutes as a key instrument to improve corporate culture and governance, and to extirpate undesired and unethical business practices. Despite the clear policy goals, Dodd- Frank’s unclear statutory text has created interpretative controversies. Although Dodd-Frank adds anti-arbitration provisions to preexisting whistleblower statutes, it does not include a dedicated, standalone anti-arbitration provision for Dodd-Frank’s new whistleblower cause of action. This Article argues that courts should not allow employers to use …

Corporate Governance In An Era Of Compliance, Sean J. Griffith

William & Mary Law Review

Compliance is the new corporate governance. The compliance function is the means by which firms adapt behavior to legal, regulatory, and social norms. Formerly, this might have been conceived as a typical governance matter to be handled at the discretion of the board of directors. Compliance, however, does not fit traditional models of corporate governance. It does not come from the board of directors, state corporate law, or federal securities law. Compliance amounts instead to an internal governance structure imposed upon the firm from the outside by enforcement agents. This insight has important implications, both practical and theoretical, for corporate …

Skilling Reconsidered: The Legislative-Judicial Dynamic, Honest Services, Fraud, And The Ill-Conceived "Clean Up Government Act", J. Kelly Strader

Fordham Urban Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Introduction: Examining White Collar Crime With Trifocals, Ellen S. Podgor

Fordham Urban Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Skilling: More Blind Monks Examining The Elephant, Julie Rose O'Sullivan

Fordham Urban Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Yates V. United States: Floundering About In The Choppy Waters Of Statutory Interpretation, Lindsay Defrancesco

Maryland Law Review

No abstract provided.

Economic Ideology And The Rise Of The Firm As Criminal Enterprise, June Carbone, William K. Black

Faculty Works

No abstract provided.

Duties To Organizational Clients, William H. Simon

Faculty Scholarship

Loyalty to an organizational client means fidelity to the substantive legal structure that constitutes it. Although this principle is not controversial in the abstract, it is commonly ignored in professional discourse and doctrine. This article explains the basic notion of organizational loyalty and identifies some mistaken tendencies in discourse and doctrine, especially the "Managerialist Fallacy" that leads lawyers to conflate the client organization with its senior managers. The article then applies the basic notion to some hard cases, concluding with a critical appraisal of the rationale for confidentiality with organizational clients.

Caselaw Developments 2015, William O. Fisher

Law Faculty Publications

This report was prepared for the ABA Business Law Section’s Federal Regulation of Securities Committee, Subcommittee on Annual Review. The paper contains sections on relevant Supreme Court decisions, SEC rulemaking, SEC enforcement actions, proxy solicitation, forward-looking statements, insider trading, materiality, duty to disclose, Scienter and scienter pleading, and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act ("SLUSA").

Vulnerability And "Control Fraud" Economics, William K. Black

Faculty Works

"Control fraud" refers to frauds in which the person who controls a seemingly legitimate entity uses it as a "weapon" to defraud. Control frauds cause greater financial losses than all other forms of property crime - combined. We are now living in the era of recurrent epidemics of control fraud. The LIBOR and foreign exchange cartels, for example, are the largest cartels in history- by roughly three orders of magnitude. VW has just admitted that it committed over 11 million fraudulent sales. Our largest financial institutions have been revealed to be criminal enterprises - and recidivists.

This paper brings the …

A Study On Rule 145 Of The Securities Act Of 1933: How To Provide Clarity And Predictability In Rule 145 Transactions, Kab Lae Kim

Akron Law Review

Rule 145 is complex and incongruous with the general congressional intention of the 1933 Act. Thus, it involves the following theoretical and practical problems. First, Rule 145(a) fails to provide a clear standard for determining whether a certain recapitalization or reorganization involves a sale to trigger registration requirements...Second, Rule 145(c) and (d), as special resale provisions for “securities acquired in a Rule 145 transactions” (hereinafter Rule 145 securities), are inconsistent with general resale provisions under the 1933 Act. The SEC’s authority to establish Rule 145 was mandated by provisions of the 1933 Act. Accordingly, the resale provisions of Rule 145 …

The Myth Of The Unbiased Director, Regina F. Burch

Akron Law Review

This Article seeks to use social science research to better understand why these and other corporate governance problems persist. One reason may be that boards are biased as to how they respond to these issues. Social science research on risk perception informs us that individuals’ “preferences among different types of risk taking (or avoiding), correspond to cultural biases—that is, to worldviews or ideologies entailing deeply held values and beliefs defending different patterns of social relations.” Cultural theorists have identified four competing worldviews: communitarian, individualistic, hierarchical, and egalitarian. The communitarian and individualistic worldviews are at opposite ends of a spectrum measuring …

Deferred Prosecutions And Corporate Governance: An Integrated Approach To Investigation And Reform, Lawrence A. Cunningham

Florida Law Review

When evaluating how to proceed against a corporate investigative target, law enforcement authorities often ignore the target’s governance arrangements, while subsequently negotiating or imposing governance requirements, especially in deferred prosecution agreements. Ignoring governance structures and processes amid investigation can be hazardous, and implementing improvised reforms afterwards may have severe unintended consequences—particularly when prescribing standardized governance devices. Drawing, in part, on new lessons from three prominent cases—Arthur Andersen, AIG, and Bristol-Myers Squibb—this Article criticizes prevailing discord and urges prosecutors to contemplate corporate governance at the outset and to articulate rationales for prescribed changes. Integrating the role of corporate governance into prosecutions …

Excessive Corporate Risk-Taking And The Decline Of Personal Blame, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Government agencies and prosecutors are being criticized for seeking so few indictments against individuals in the wake of the 2008-09 financial crisis and its resulting banking failures. This article analyzes why — contrary to a longstanding historical trend — personal liability may be on the decline, and whether agencies and prosecutors should be doing more. The analysis confronts fundamental policy questions concerning changing corporate and social norms. The public and the media perceive the crisis’s harm as a “wrong” caused by excessive risk-taking. But that view can be too simplistic, ignoring the reality that firms must take greater risks to …

Policing Public Companies: An Empirical Examination Of The Enforcement Landscape And The Role Played By State Securities Regulators, Amanda M. Rose, Larry J. Leblanc

Florida Law Review

Multiple different securities law enforcers can pursue U.S. public companies for the same misconduct. These enforcers include a variety of federal agencies, class action attorneys, and derivative litigation attorneys, as well as fifty separate state regulators. Scholars and policy makers have increasingly questioned whether the benefits of this multi-enforcer approach are worth the costs, or whether a more coordinated and streamlined securities enforcement regime might lead to efficiency gains. How serious are these concerns? And what role do state regulators play in the enforcement mix? Whereas the enforcement efforts of the Securities and Exchange Commission and class action lawyers have …

Bad Company! The Assumptions Behind Proxy Advisors' Voting Recommendations, Bryce C. Tingle

Dalhousie Law Journal

The corporate governance challenge for Canada is to improve the quality of its corporate performance, which has been declining relative to its international peers for decades. This is quite different from the usual assumption that corporate governance is primarily a matter of controlling managerial self-dealing. While important, board monitoring of management is only one aspect of its role in a corporation; research suggests corporate governance arrangements have a significant impact on corporate outcomes, particularly in areas such as innovation where Canada lags. Third-party proxy advisory firms, which provide advice to institutional investors in Canada on corporate governance matters, have grown …

Negotiating Bribery: Toward Increased Transparency, Consistency, And Fairness In Pretrial Bargaining Under The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Peter Reilly

UC Law Business Journal

From business to individual, almost anyone can be the subject to investigation for possible violations of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. If a party is indicted, the case may be resolved through an ADR vehicle currently being employed by the DOJ: The Deferred Prosecution Agreement (“DPA”) or the Non-Prosecution Agreement (“NPA”).

The use of such agreements is not guaranteed as an alternative to trial; rather they are awarded to defendants through negotiations with the DOJ. But here is the problem: This negotiation between prosecutor and accused can sometimes be unfair to the point where any “bargaining” taking place is …

Killing Conscience: The Unintended Behavioral Consequences Of "Pay For Performance", Lynn A. Stout

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Contemporary lawmakers and reformers often argue that ex ante incentive contracts providing for large material rewards are the best and possibly only way to motivate corporate executives and other employees to serve their firms' interests. This Article offers a critique of the "pay for performance" approach. In particular, it explores why, for a variety of mutually reinforcing reasons, workplaces that rely on ex ante incentive contracts suppress unselfish prosocial behavior (conscience) and promote selfishness and opportunism. The end result may not be more efficient, but more uncooperative, unethical, and illegal employee behavior.

Culture Wars: Rate Manipulation, Institutional Corruption, And The Lost Normative Foundations Of Market Conduct Regulation, Justin O'Brien

Seattle University Law Review

The global investigations into the manipulation of the London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor) have raised significant questions about how conflicts of interest are managed for regulated entities contributing to benchmarks. An alternative framework, which brings the management of the rate process under direct regulatory supervision, is under consideration, coordinated by the International Organization of Securities Commissions taskforce. The articulation of global principles builds on a review commissioned by the British government that suggests rates calculated by submission can be reformed. This paper argues that this approach is predestined to fail, precisely because it ignores the lessons of history. In revisiting …

Unfinished Business: Dodd-Frank's Whistleblower Anti-Retaliation Protections Fall Short For Private Companies And Their Employees, Chelsea Hunt Overhuls

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) revolutionized the world of securities law whistleblowing. It encouraged employees to reveal corporate fraud by providing federal anti-retaliation protection to incentivize such reports. Securities law whistleblowing was transformed a second time in 2010 when Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”). Under Dodd-Frank, employees that report information to the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) are not only provided federal anti-retaliation protections but also are eligible for a hefty bounty. Two major differences separate these statutes: (1) SOX is limited to employees of companies who are subject to the reporting …