Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons^™

Minority Vetoes In Consociational Legislatures: Ultimately Weaponized?, Devin Haymond

Indiana Journal of Constitutional Design

In societies emerging from or at risk for conflict, dividing power among rival groups—called power-sharing—can be an appropriate arrangement to maintaining peace. But how can groups, who are often emerging from violent conflict, trust sharing a government with rival groups that were just recently shooting at them?

A potential solution is the minority veto, which is allows minority groups to block the government from harming those groups’ vital interests. But what sorts of change blocking mechanisms constitute a minority veto? Who gets the veto power, and when can they be used? Do minority vetoes function as effective incentives for ensuring …

Taxonomy Of Powers And Roles Of Upper Chambers In Bicameral Legislatures, Carolyn Griffith

Indiana Journal of Constitutional Design

Bicameral legislatures exist around the world, with power divisions to create checks and balances on the constitutional order as a whole. In the context of constitutional design, this presents a variety of options of roles and rights given to each chamber at each step in both the legislative process and beyond. Taken as a whole, this taxonomy demonstrates there are nearly an infinite number of possibilities for separating powers between upper and lower chambers in bicameral legislatures. Often, these decisions are guided by the history of the country. For each federal legislature that places powers or votes in one chamber, …