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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons™
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Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
The Underutilized Foreign Investor, Griffin Weaver
The Underutilized Foreign Investor, Griffin Weaver
Griffin Weaver
For most states, if not all, the push for economic advancement is at the front of every administration’s agenda. This is especially true for developing countries in the Middle East whose standard of living and international power is largely tied to its economic condition. An important indicator, if not condition, of a state’s economic health is the level of foreign direct investment (FDI) received by the state. This inflow of money is essential for the growth and stability of a state’s economy. As one U.S. official once noted, the United States “need[s] a net inflow of capital of $3 billion …
The Underutilized Foreign Investor, Griffin Weaver
The Underutilized Foreign Investor, Griffin Weaver
Griffin Weaver
No abstract provided.
How To Create American Manufacturing Jobs, John D. Gleissner Esquire
How To Create American Manufacturing Jobs, John D. Gleissner Esquire
John D Gleissner Esquire
No abstract provided.
Transaction Cost-Benefit Analysis, With Applications To Financial Regulation, D. Bruce Johnsen
Transaction Cost-Benefit Analysis, With Applications To Financial Regulation, D. Bruce Johnsen
D. Bruce Johnsen
As Coase convincingly showed, transaction costs inhibit the ability of market participants to achieve first-best outcomes. This paper proposes a novel and relatively simple alternative to traditional cost-benefit analysis when regulated parties face sufficiently low transaction costs that they can bargain directly or rely on competitive markets to set efficient terms of trade. In these settings, the only informational burdens financial market regulators need bear to assess corrective rules is to identify the relevant parties, the “good” they hope to exchange, and the transaction costs that inhibit them from maximizing joint gains from trade. A rule is justified only if …