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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons™
Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 9 of 9
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Wars Of Attrition In Experimental Duopoly Markets, Owen R. Phillips, Charles F. Mason
Wars Of Attrition In Experimental Duopoly Markets, Owen R. Phillips, Charles F. Mason
Owen R Phillips
Wars of Attrition in Experimental Duopoly Markets
Information And Cost Asymmetry In Experimental Duopoly Markets, Charles Mason, Owen Phillips
Information And Cost Asymmetry In Experimental Duopoly Markets, Charles Mason, Owen Phillips
Owen R Phillips
Information and Cost Asymmetry in Experimental Duopoly Markets
Duopoly Behavior In Asymmetric Markets : An Experimental Evaluation, Charles F. Mason, Owen R. Phillips, C. Nowell
Duopoly Behavior In Asymmetric Markets : An Experimental Evaluation, Charles F. Mason, Owen R. Phillips, C. Nowell
Owen R Phillips
Duopoly Behavior in Asymmetric Markets : An Experimental Evaluation
Vertical Restrictions And The Number Of Franchises, Owen R. Phillips
Vertical Restrictions And The Number Of Franchises, Owen R. Phillips
Owen R Phillips
Vertical Restrictions and the Number of Franchises
A Bayesian Examination Of Information And Uncertainty In Contingent Valuation, David Aadland, Arthur Caplan, Owen Phillips
A Bayesian Examination Of Information And Uncertainty In Contingent Valuation, David Aadland, Arthur Caplan, Owen Phillips
Owen R Phillips
A theoretical framework is presented to explain how agents respond to information under uncertainty in contingent valuation surveys. Agents are provided with information signals and referendum prices as part of the elicitation process. Agents use Bayesian updating to revise prior distributions. An information prompt is presented to reduce hypothetical bias. However, we show the interaction between anchoring and the information prompt creates a systematic bias in willingness to pay. We test our hypotheses in an experimental setting where agents are asked to make a hypothetical, voluntary contribution to a public good. Experimental results are consistent with the model.
Endogenous Choice Of Institution Under Supply And Demand Risks In Laboratory Forward And Spot Markets, D. J. Menkhaus, C. T. Bastian, Owen R. Phillips, P. D. O'Neill
Endogenous Choice Of Institution Under Supply And Demand Risks In Laboratory Forward And Spot Markets, D. J. Menkhaus, C. T. Bastian, Owen R. Phillips, P. D. O'Neill
Owen R Phillips
Endogenous Choice of Institution Under Supply and Demand Risks in Laboratory Forward and Spot Markets
Sunk And Opportunity Costs In Valuation And Bidding, Owen Phillips, R. Battalio, C. Kogut
Sunk And Opportunity Costs In Valuation And Bidding, Owen Phillips, R. Battalio, C. Kogut
Owen R Phillips
Sunk and Opportunity Costs in Valuation and Bidding
Maintaining Tacit Collusion In Repeated Ascending Auctions, Owen R. Phillips, D. J. Menkhaus
Maintaining Tacit Collusion In Repeated Ascending Auctions, Owen R. Phillips, D. J. Menkhaus
Owen R Phillips
Maintaining Tacit Collusion in Repeated Ascending Auctions
Negative Option Contracts And Consumer Switching Costs, Owen R. Phillips
Negative Option Contracts And Consumer Switching Costs, Owen R. Phillips
Owen R Phillips
Negative Option Contracts and Consumer Switching Costs