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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons™
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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Naked Exclusion, Eric Bennett Rasmusen, J. Mark Ramseyer, John Wiley
Naked Exclusion, Eric Bennett Rasmusen, J. Mark Ramseyer, John Wiley
Eric Bennett Rasmusen
Ordinarily, a monopoly cannot increase its profits by asking customers to sign agreements not to deal with potential competitors. If, however, there are 100 customers and the minimum efficient scale requires serving 15, the monopoly need only lock up 86 customers to forestall entry. If each customer believes that the others will sign, each also believes that no rival seller will enter. Hence, an individual customer loses nothing by signing the exclusionary agreement and will indeed sign. Thus, naked exclusion can be profitable.
Extending The Economic Theory Of Regulation: The Form Of Policy, Eric Bennett Rasmusen, Mark Zupan
Extending The Economic Theory Of Regulation: The Form Of Policy, Eric Bennett Rasmusen, Mark Zupan
Eric Bennett Rasmusen
The mutually beneficial connection between industries and the governments that regulate them is the subject of a large literature led by Stigler (1971). What has not been studied is how firms choose their desired policies from the set including entry barriers, price floors, subsidies, and demand stimulation. We take as given that government and incumbents form the supply and demand for regulation and explore the choice of political product.
Recent Developments In The Economics Of Exclusionary Contracts, Eric Bennett Rasmusen
Recent Developments In The Economics Of Exclusionary Contracts, Eric Bennett Rasmusen
Eric Bennett Rasmusen
A short survey of ideas on exclusive-dealing contracts.