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Series

Moral hazard

Discipline
Institution
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Publication

Articles 1 - 30 of 44

Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Suggested Versus Extended Gifts: How Alternative Market Institutions Mitigate Moral Hazard, Daniel Houser, Jason Shachat, Weiwei Zheng Oct 2023

Suggested Versus Extended Gifts: How Alternative Market Institutions Mitigate Moral Hazard, Daniel Houser, Jason Shachat, Weiwei Zheng

ESI Working Papers

Gift exchange can partially mitigate supply-side moral hazard, even in anonymous market interactions. In a market where quality is not fully contractable, the amount that a price exceeds the market-clearing price for the lowest quality is a gift from the buyer. We show that the gift formation process, inextricably linked with a market institution’s price formation process, greatly influences the size and effectiveness of the gift. When the market institution dictates that prices are formed by bids posted by buyers, the gift is extended to the seller. When the market institution dictates that prices are formed by offers posted by …

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Consumer Bankruptcy, Mortgage Default And Labor Supply, Wenli Li, Costas Meghir, Florian Oswald Mar 2022

Consumer Bankruptcy, Mortgage Default And Labor Supply, Wenli Li, Costas Meghir, Florian Oswald

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We specify and estimate a lifecycle model of consumption, housing demand and labor supply in an environment where individuals may file for bankruptcy or default on their mortgage. Uncertainty in the model is driven by house price shocks, education specific productivity shocks, and catastrophic consumption events, while bankruptcy is governed by the basic institutional framework in the US as implied by Chapter 7 and Chapter 13. The model is estimated using micro data on credit reports and mortgages combined with data from the American Community Survey. We use the model to understand the relative importance of the two chapters (7 …

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The Conservatism Principle And Asymmetric Preferences Over Reporting Errors, Jivas Chakravarthy, Timothy W. Shields Dec 2020

The Conservatism Principle And Asymmetric Preferences Over Reporting Errors, Jivas Chakravarthy, Timothy W. Shields

ESI Working Papers

At present, accounting conservatism is generally viewed from a measurement or reporting perspective. In contrast, we consider whether it relates to a moral rule of conduct. Conservatism has been described as deriving from a preference for reporting errors to be in the direction of understatement rather than overstatement. We experimentally pair Reporters who provide information with Users who rely on the information. We posit that under misaligned incentives that motivate aggressive reporting, Users view an aggressive report as reflecting Reporters’ exploitative intent and expect that a social norm prohibiting aggressive reporting applies. We predict that Users use noisy reporting errors …

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An Experimental Investigation Of Health Insurance Policy And Behavior, J. Dustin Tracy, Hillard Kaplan, Kevin A. James, Stephen Rassenti Sep 2020

An Experimental Investigation Of Health Insurance Policy And Behavior, J. Dustin Tracy, Hillard Kaplan, Kevin A. James, Stephen Rassenti

ESI Working Papers

We introduce a new experimental approach to measuring the effects of health insurance policy alternatives on behavior and health outcomes over the life course. Cash-motivated subjects are placed in a virtual environment where they earn income and allocate it across multi-period lives. We compare behavior across age, income and insurance plans—one priced according to an individual’s expected cost and the other uniformly priced through employer-implemented cost sharing. We find that 1) subjects in the employer-implemented plan purchased insurance at higher rates; 2) the employer-based plan reduced differences due to income and age; 3) subjects in the actuarial plan engaged in …

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Trust And Trustworthiness In Procurement Contracts With Retainage, Matthew J. Walker, Elena Katok, Jason Shachat Aug 2020

Trust And Trustworthiness In Procurement Contracts With Retainage, Matthew J. Walker, Elena Katok, Jason Shachat

ESI Working Papers

In complex procurement projects, it is difficult to write enforceable contracts that condition price upon quality. Supplier non-performance becomes an acute risk, particularly when there is intense competition for the contract. An established incentive mechanism used to mitigate the problem of supplier non-performance is retainage, in which the buyer sets aside a portion of the purchase price. After project completion, the buyer determines the amount of retainage that is released to the seller, considering any defects that arise. While generally a feasible contract form to implement, the practical difficulties in assessing completion introduce a moral hazard for the buyer. We …

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Estimating The Benefits And Costs Of Forming Business Partnerships, Jungho Lee Jun 2020

Estimating The Benefits And Costs Of Forming Business Partnerships, Jungho Lee

Research Collection School Of Economics

I estimate a matching model of business‐partnership formation to quantify the relative importance of productivity gains, financing gains, and the coordination failure of effort provision (moral hazard) among partners. Productivity gains account for 61% of the gain from the observed partnerships. For partners in the first quartile of the wealth distribution, however, financing accounts for 93% of the gain. The cost of moral hazard corresponds to 42% of the entire gain from partnerships. A loan policy specifically targeting partnerships is less effective in improving welfare than a conventional loan policy that provides loans to individual entrepreneurs.

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Lessons From The American Federal-State Unemployment Insurance System For A European Unemployment Benefits System, Christopher J. O'Leary, Burt S. Barnow, Karolien Lenaerts Feb 2020

Lessons From The American Federal-State Unemployment Insurance System For A European Unemployment Benefits System, Christopher J. O'Leary, Burt S. Barnow, Karolien Lenaerts

Upjohn Institute Working Papers

The federal-state system of unemployment insurance (UI) in the United States was established by the Social Security Act of 1935 during the Great Depression. Under the program, states provide temporary partial wage replacement to involuntarily unemployed workers with significant labor force attachment. The federal government induced states to establish UI programs through two means: 1) a uniform federal tax imposed on employer payrolls, with a 90 percent reduction granted in states operating approved UI programs, and 2) grants to states to administer their programs. The system has evolved into a collection of separate state programs adapted to different regional, economic, …

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A Structural Model Of A Multitasking Salesforce: Multidimensional Incentives And Plan Design, Minkyung Kim, K. Sudhir, Kosuke Uetake Sep 2019

A Structural Model Of A Multitasking Salesforce: Multidimensional Incentives And Plan Design, Minkyung Kim, K. Sudhir, Kosuke Uetake

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We develop the first structural model of a multitasking salesforce to address questions of job design and incentive compensation design. The model incorporates three novel features: (i) multitasking effort choice given a multidimensional incentive plan; (ii) salesperson’s private information about customers and (iii) dynamic intertemporal tradeoffs in effort choice across the tasks. The empirical application uses data from a micro nance bank where loan officers are jointly responsible and incentivized for both loan acquisition repayment but has broad relevance for salesforce management in CRM settings involving customer acquisition and retention. We extend two-step estimation methods used for unidimensional compensation plans …

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Antecedents To The Crisis: Mandeville, Smith, And Keynes, Jonathan B. Wight Jan 2019

Antecedents To The Crisis: Mandeville, Smith, And Keynes, Jonathan B. Wight

Economics Faculty Publications

The purpose of this paper is to present the methods of teaching about the global financial crisis (GFC) from a social economic perspective. Using primary texts from the history of economic thought, the moral underpinnings for collective social action are examined in times of economic depression. The deregulation of financial markets raises two questions: to what extent is deregulation the result of a misunderstanding about human nature and the behavioral lessons of social economics; and to what extend does deregulation ignore the moral lessons of Adam Smith’s invisible hand?

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How Liability Insurers Protect Patients And Improve Safety, Tom Baker, Charles Silver Jan 2019

How Liability Insurers Protect Patients And Improve Safety, Tom Baker, Charles Silver

All Faculty Scholarship

Forty years after the publication of the first systematic study of adverse medical events, there is greater access to information about adverse medical events and increasingly widespread acceptance of the view that patient safety requires more than vigilance by well-intentioned medical professionals. In this essay, we describe some of the ways that medical liability insurance organizations contributed to this transformation, and we catalog the roles that those organizations play in promoting patient safety today. Whether liability insurance in fact discourages providers from improving safety or encourages them to protect patients from avoidable harms is an empirical question that a survey …

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When Salespeople Manage Customer Relationships: Multidimensional Incentives And Private Information, Minkyung Kim, K. Sudhir, Kosuke Uetake, Rodrigo Canales Mar 2018

When Salespeople Manage Customer Relationships: Multidimensional Incentives And Private Information, Minkyung Kim, K. Sudhir, Kosuke Uetake, Rodrigo Canales

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

At many firms, incentivized salespeople with private information about customers are responsible for CRM. While incentives motivate sales performance, private information can induce moral hazard by salespeople to gain compensation at the expense of the firm. We investigate the sales performance–moral hazard tradeoff in response to multidimensional performance (acquisition and maintenance) incentives in the presence of private information. Using unique panel data on customer loan acquisition and repayments linked to salespeople from a microfinance bank, we detect evidence of salesperson private information. Acquisition incentives induce salesperson moral hazard leading to adverse customer selection, but maintenance incentives moderate it as salespeople …

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Input Use Under Crop Insurance: The Role Of Actual Production History, Taro Mieno, Cory Walters, Lilyan E. Fulginiti Jan 2018

Input Use Under Crop Insurance: The Role Of Actual Production History, Taro Mieno, Cory Walters, Lilyan E. Fulginiti

Department of Agricultural Economics: Faculty Publications


The impact of crop insurance on changes in input use has attracted much attention by economists. While there are a number of studies on this topic, they frame moral hazard in inputs use in a static model. However, when agricultural producers are forward-looking, they would make input allocation decisions realizing that their decisions would affect their future actual production history. This, in turn, affects the probability and size of future indemnity payments. Thus, moral hazard should be framed in a dynamic input use decision model. We first show theoretically that under certain feasible conditions, a static analysis always results in …

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The Effect Of Health Insurance On Workers' Compensation Filing: Evidence From The Affordable Care Act's Age-Based Threshold For Dependent Coverage, Marcus O. Dillender Jul 2015

The Effect Of Health Insurance On Workers' Compensation Filing: Evidence From The Affordable Care Act's Age-Based Threshold For Dependent Coverage, Marcus O. Dillender

Upjohn Institute Working Papers

This paper identifies the effect of health insurance on workers' compensation (WC) filing for young adults by implementing a regression discontinuity design using WC medical claims data from Texas. The results suggest health insurance factors into the decision to have WC pay for discretionary care. The implied instrumental variables estimates suggest a 10 percentage point decrease in health insurance coverage increases WC bills by 15.3 percent. Despite the large impact of health insurance on the number of WC bills, the additional cost to WC at age 26 appears to be small as most of the increase comes from small bills.

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International Debt Forgiveness: Who Getspicked And Its Effect On The Tax Effort Ofdeveloping Countries, Leanora Alecia Brown, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez Jun 2015

International Debt Forgiveness: Who Getspicked And Its Effect On The Tax Effort Ofdeveloping Countries, Leanora Alecia Brown, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez

ICEPP Working Papers

We explore whether the expectation of debt forgiveness discourages developing countries from attaining sustainable fiscal independence through improving their tax effort. While the international financial community advises poor countries to improve revenue mobilization, the same international community routinely bail-out poor countries that fail to meet their loan repayment obligations. The act of bailing-out creates an expectation about receiving debt forgiveness time and again in the future. The key prediction of our theoretical framework is that in the presence of debt forgiveness, countries’ tax efforts will decline and more so the higher the intensity of the bailouts. We test this using …

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Dynamic Moral Hazard Without Commitment, Johannes Hörner, Larry Samuelson Feb 2015

Dynamic Moral Hazard Without Commitment, Johannes Hörner, Larry Samuelson

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We study a discrete-time model of repeated moral hazard without commitment. In every period, a principal finances a project, choosing the scale of the project and a contingent payment plan for an agent, who has the opportunity to appropriate the returns of a successful project unbeknownst the principal. The absence of commitment is reflected both in the solution concept (perfect Bayesian equilibrium) and in the ability of the principal to freely revise the project’s scale from one period to the next. We show that removing commitment from the equilibrium concept is relatively innocuous — if the players are sufficiently patient, …

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Macroeconomic Fluctuations As Sources Of Luck In Ceo Compensation, Hsin-Hui Chiu, Lars Oxelheim, Clas Wihlborg, Jianhua Zhang Dec 2014

Macroeconomic Fluctuations As Sources Of Luck In Ceo Compensation, Hsin-Hui Chiu, Lars Oxelheim, Clas Wihlborg, Jianhua Zhang

Business Faculty Articles and Research

Macroeconomic fluctuations in interest rates, exchange rates, and inflation can be considered sources of good or bad “luck” for corporate performance if management is unable to adjust operations to these fluctuations. Based on a sample of 2,091 US firms, we decompose the impacts of macroeconomic fluctuations on three measures of CEO compensation. Our study provides empirical support for the importance of considering macroeconomic fluctuations in designing CEO incentive schemes. It adds to the managerial power literature on moral hazard and CEO compensation by pinpointing the obvious risk that the CEO in an asymmetric and non-linear reward system will be inclined …

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Crime And Moral Hazard: Does More Policing Necessarily Induce Private Negligence?, Brishti Guha, Ashok S. Guha Jun 2012

Crime And Moral Hazard: Does More Policing Necessarily Induce Private Negligence?, Brishti Guha, Ashok S. Guha

Research Collection School Of Economics

Even risk-neutral individuals can insure themselves against crimes by combining direct expenditure on security with costly diversification. In such cases — and even when one of these options is infeasible — greater policing often actually encourages private precautions.

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Crime And Moral Hazard: Does More Policing Necessarily Induce Private Negligence?, Brishti Guha, Ashok S. Guha Jun 2012

Crime And Moral Hazard: Does More Policing Necessarily Induce Private Negligence?, Brishti Guha, Ashok S. Guha

Research Collection School Of Economics

Even risk-neutral individuals can insure themselves against crimes by combining direct expenditure on security with costly diversification. In such cases — and even when one of these options is infeasible — greater policing often actually encourages private precautions.

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What Is The Optimal Subsidy For Exercise? Informing Health Insurance Companies' Fitness Reimbursement Programs, Molly E. Frean May 2012

What Is The Optimal Subsidy For Exercise? Informing Health Insurance Companies' Fitness Reimbursement Programs, Molly E. Frean

Economics Honors Projects

Health care costs account for 17% of US GDP and many programs and policies seek to reduce these costs. This paper focuses on exercise as preventive care due to its immense physiological benefits. I model the profit-maximizing choice of health insurance companies to subsidize exercise and the utility-maximizing choice of individuals to engage in exercise using a traditional principal-agent framework. I then use principles from behavioral economics and psychology to critique these models and provide further insight into understanding our underconsumption of such preventive services. I end with an evaluation of current programs and suggestions for improvement using empirical findings.

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Risk Classification And Health Insurance, Georges Dionne, Casey G. Rothschild Nov 2011

Risk Classification And Health Insurance, Georges Dionne, Casey G. Rothschild

Economics Faculty Scholarship

Risk classification refers to the use of observable characteristics by insurers to group individuals with similar expected claims, compute the corresponding premiums, and thereby reduce asymmetric information. An efficient risk classification system generates premiums that fully reflect the expected cost associated with each class of risk characteristics. This is known as financial equity. In the health sector, risk classification is also subject to concerns about social equity and potential discrimination. We present different theoretical frameworks that illustrate the potential trade-off between efficient insurance provision and social equity. We also review empirical studies on risk classification and residual asymmetric information.

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Optimally Empty Promises And Endogenous Supervision, David A. Miller, Kareen Rozen Oct 2011

Optimally Empty Promises And Endogenous Supervision, David A. Miller, Kareen Rozen

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We study optimal contracting in team settings, featuring stylized aspects of production environments with complex tasks. Agents have many opportunities to shirk, task-level monitoring is needed to provide useful incentives, and because it is difficult to write individual performance into formal contracts, incentives are provided informally, using wasteful sanctions like guilt and shame, or slowed promotion. These features give rise to optimal contracts with “empty promises” and endogenous supervision structures. Agents optimally make more promises than they intend to keep, leading to the concentration of supervisory responsibility in the hands of one or two agents.

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Pirates And Traders: Some Economics Of Pirate-Infested Seas, Brishti Guha, Ashok S. Guha May 2011

Pirates And Traders: Some Economics Of Pirate-Infested Seas, Brishti Guha, Ashok S. Guha

Research Collection School Of Economics

Even where all agents are risk-neutral, merchants can insure themselves against piracy. Such self-insurance is surprisingly invulnerable to moral hazard. Further, there exist a patrolling intensity and/or penalties for captured pirates which, along with mercantile self-insurance, could eliminate piracy.

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Effect Of Credit Ratings On Airport Financing And Management, Kazusei Kato, Koichiro Tezuka, Joyce M. W. Low Jul 2010

Effect Of Credit Ratings On Airport Financing And Management, Kazusei Kato, Koichiro Tezuka, Joyce M. W. Low

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

This paper analyzes the effect of airport ownership structure on management efficiency as reflected through their credit ratings. A game-theoretical model is proposed to examine the role of credit ratings in mitigating the moral hazard problem of public-owned airports. The analytical results derived from the model are then used to supplement a supporting case study. Notwithstanding the fact that the less competitive environment of a public-owned entity and its credit ratings might bring some welfare loss , this research concludes that public-owned airports have some advantages.

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State Finance In Times Of Crisis, Brian Galle, Jonathan Klick Sep 2009

State Finance In Times Of Crisis, Brian Galle, Jonathan Klick

All Faculty Scholarship

As recent events illustrate, state finances are pro-cyclical: during recessions, state revenues crash, worsening the effects of economic downturns. This problem is well-known, yet persistent. We argue here that, in light of predictable federalism and political economy dynamics, states will be unable to change this situation on their own. Additionally, we note that many possible federal remedies may result in worse problems, such as creating moral hazard that would induce states to take on excessively risky policy, both fiscal and otherwise. Thus, we argue that policy makers should consider so-called “automatic” stabilizers, such as are found in the federal tax …

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Monitoring With Collective Memory: Forgiveness For Optimally Empty Promises, David A. Miller, Kareen Rozen Jun 2009

Monitoring With Collective Memory: Forgiveness For Optimally Empty Promises, David A. Miller, Kareen Rozen

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We study optimal contracting in a team setting with moral hazard, where teammates promise to complete socially efficient but costly tasks. Teammates must monitor each other to provide incentives, but each team member has limited capacity to allocate between monitoring and productive tasks. Players incur contractual punishments for unfulfilled promises that are discovered. We show that optimal contracts are generally “forgiving” and players optimally make “empty promises” that they don’t necessarily intend to fulfill. As uncertainty in task completion increases, players optimally make more empty promises but fewer total promises. A principal who hires a team of agents optimally implements …

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Collaborating, Alessandro Bonatti, Johannes Hörner Apr 2009

Collaborating, Alessandro Bonatti, Johannes Hörner

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

This paper examines moral hazard in teams over time. Agents are collectively engaged in an uncertain project, and their individual efforts are unobserved. Free-riding leads not only to a reduction in effort, but also to procrastination. The collaboration dwindles over time, but never ceases as long as the project has not succeeded. In fact, the delay until the project succeeds, if it ever does, increases with the number of agents. We show why deadlines, but not necessarily better monitoring, help to mitigate moral hazard.

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The Truth About Moral Hazard And Adverse Selection., Mark V. Pauly Jan 2007

The Truth About Moral Hazard And Adverse Selection., Mark V. Pauly

Center for Policy Research

This brief is actually going to have two levels. One level will go with the advertised title, and I’ll tell you my current views on the truth about moral hazard and adverse selection. Adverse selection will serve as somewhat of a handmaid of moral hazard, as you will see. That’s one level. The other level, though, which continues to surprise me, is that these two topics—they’re two buzzwords from insurance theory—have generated an enormous amount of policy interest and, yes, passion. Some people passionately believe some things about moral hazard that others passionately disbelieve. And so as part of this …

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Strategy Meets Evolution: Games Suppliers And Producers Play, Brishti Guha Feb 2006

Strategy Meets Evolution: Games Suppliers And Producers Play, Brishti Guha

Research Collection School Of Economics

Final goods producers, who may be intrinsically honest (a behavioral type) or opportunistic (strategic), play a repeated game of imperfect information with suppliers of an input of variable (and non-verifiable) quality. Returns to cheating are increasing in the proportion of intrinsically honest producers. If producers compete for another scarce input, adverse selection reduces this proportion enough to enforce universal honesty, whether at a high or a low quality equilibrium. This mechanism limits the proportion of behavioral types in the population of producers over a wide range of parameters: despite their inability to compete with opportunists, they are not wholly wiped …

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The Case Of The Errant Executive: Management, Control And Firm Size In Corporate Cheating, Brishti Guha Sep 2005

The Case Of The Errant Executive: Management, Control And Firm Size In Corporate Cheating, Brishti Guha

Research Collection School Of Economics

Firm insiders – a manager and a board – face moral hazard in relation to their outside shareholders in a repeated game with asymmetric information and stochastic market outcomes. The manager determines whether or not outsiders are cheated; the board, whose objectives differ from those of outside shareholders, attempts to control the manager through compensation contracts and dismissal threats Since compensation determines the manager’s incentive to cheat, firms competing for outside capital publicly announce their managerial contracts. However, secret renegotiation between firm and manager is still possible: so outsiders guard against being cheated by limiting their total stake in any …

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The Auditor And The Firm: A Simple Model Of Corporate Cheating And Intermediation, Brishti Guha Sep 2005

The Auditor And The Firm: A Simple Model Of Corporate Cheating And Intermediation, Brishti Guha

Research Collection School Of Economics

We apply a game-theoretic model to the analysis of the recent spate of corporate scandals in which firms have cheated their investors, often with the aid of external auditors. We characterize the different types of equilibria that obtain for different parameter ranges in an auditor’s absence (the parameters we consider being early signal accuracy – a measure of transparency – and withdrawal costs – a measure of the liquidity of investments). We also analyze whether and under what conditions the presence of an informed auditor could lead to an improvement in the sense of honest behavior replacing cheating as the …

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