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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Rationalizable Implementation, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Rationalizable Implementation, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
This note studies (full) implementation of social choice functions under complete information in (correlated) rationalizable strategies. The monotonicity condition shown by Maskin (1999) to be necessary for Nash implementation is also necessary under the more stringent solution concept. We show that it is also sufficient under a mild “no worst alternative” condition. In particular, no economic condition is required.
Rationalizable Implementation, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris, Olivier Tercieux
Rationalizable Implementation, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris, Olivier Tercieux
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We consider the implementation of social choice functions under complete information in rationalizable strategies. A strict (and thus stronger) version of the monotonicity condition introduced by Maskin (1999) is necessary under the solution concept of rationalizability. Assuming the social choice function is responsive (i.e., it never selects the same outcome in two distinct states), we show that it is also sufficient under a mild “no worst alternative” condition. In particular, no economic condition is required. We also discuss how our results extend when the social choice function is not responsive.