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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
“But My Lease Isn’T Up Yet!”: Finding Fault With “No-Fault” Evictions, Eloisa Rodriguez-Dod
“But My Lease Isn’T Up Yet!”: Finding Fault With “No-Fault” Evictions, Eloisa Rodriguez-Dod
Eloisa C Rodríguez-Dod
Historically, tenants could be evicted when their actions put them “at-fault.” Grounds for “at-fault” eviction (i.e., evictions for cause) include a tenant’s failure to pay rent, a tenant’s holding over after termination of the lease, a tenant’s material noncompliance with the lease agreement, and a tenant’s failure to maintain the premises materially affecting health and safety. Recently, some landlords have been evicting tenants for no fault of their own. This article focuses on three reasons for attempted “no-fault” evictions: foreclosure of the premises, proposed sale of the premises, or intended re-occupancy by the landlord. Part II of this article provides …
Sharing Financial Risk Through Flexible Farm Lease Agreements, William M. Edwards, Chad E. Hart
Sharing Financial Risk Through Flexible Farm Lease Agreements, William M. Edwards, Chad E. Hart
William Edwards
A simulation model representing a north central U.S. corn and soybean farm was used to estimate the degree of financial risk borne by the tenant and the landlord under 10 different types of flexible cash leases. Probability distributions for yields, prices and production costs were incorporated. Measures of risk included standard deviation of profits, probability of loss, and 10th percentile value at risk. A profit sharing lease that included rent adjustments for all three variables shifted the most risk from the tenant to the landowner, and reduced the tenant's probability of incurring an economic loss from 51 percent to 37 …
Sharing Financial Risk Through Flexible Farm Lease Agreements, William M. Edwards, Chad E. Hart
Sharing Financial Risk Through Flexible Farm Lease Agreements, William M. Edwards, Chad E. Hart
William Edwards
A simulation model representing a north central U.S. corn and soybean farm was used to estimate the degree of financial risk borne by the tenant and the landlord under 10 different types of flexible cash leases. Probability distributions for yields, prices and production costs were incorporated. Measures of risk included standard deviation of profits, probability of loss, and 10th percentile value at risk. A profit sharing lease that included rent adjustments for all three variables shifted the most risk from the tenant to the landowner, and reduced the tenant's probability of incurring an economic loss from 51 percent to 37 …
Sharing Financial Risk Through Flexible Farm Lease Agreements, William M. Edwards, Chad E. Hart
Sharing Financial Risk Through Flexible Farm Lease Agreements, William M. Edwards, Chad E. Hart
William Edwards
A simulation model representing a north central U.S. corn and soybean farm was used to estimate the degree of financial risk borne by the tenant and the landlord under 10 different types of flexible cash leases. Probability distributions for yields, prices and production costs were incorporated. Measures of risk included standard deviation of profits, probability of loss, and 10th percentile value at risk. A profit sharing lease that included rent adjustments for all three variables shifted the most risk from the tenant to the landowner, and reduced the tenant's probability of incurring an economic loss from 51 percent to 37 …
Sharing Financial Risk Through Flexible Farm Lease Agreements, William M. Edwards, Chad E. Hart
Sharing Financial Risk Through Flexible Farm Lease Agreements, William M. Edwards, Chad E. Hart
William Edwards
A simulation model representing a north central U.S. corn and soybean farm was used to estimate the degree of financial risk borne by the tenant and the landlord under 10 different types of flexible cash leases. Probability distributions for yields, prices and production costs were incorporated. Measures of risk included standard deviation of profits, probability of loss, and 10th percentile value at risk. A profit sharing lease that included rent adjustments for all three variables shifted the most risk from the tenant to the landowner, and reduced the tenant's probability of incurring an economic loss from 51 percent to 37 …
Sharing Financial Risk Through Flexible Farm Lease Agreements, William M. Edwards, Chad E. Hart
Sharing Financial Risk Through Flexible Farm Lease Agreements, William M. Edwards, Chad E. Hart
William Edwards
A simulation model representing a north central U.S. corn and soybean farm was used to estimate the degree of financial risk borne by the tenant and the landlord under 10 different types of flexible cash leases. Probability distributions for yields, prices and production costs were incorporated. Measures of risk included standard deviation of profits, probability of loss, and 10th percentile value at risk. A profit sharing lease that included rent adjustments for all three variables shifted the most risk from the tenant to the landowner, and reduced the tenant's probability of incurring an economic loss from 51 percent to 37 …