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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

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Agricultural and Resource Economics

School of Education and Human Development at the University of Colorado Denver

Choice behavior

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Articles 1 - 6 of 6

Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Benefit-Cost Analysis Of Enviromental Projects: A Plethora Of Biases Understating Net Benefits, Philip E. Graves Jan 2012

Benefit-Cost Analysis Of Enviromental Projects: A Plethora Of Biases Understating Net Benefits, Philip E. Graves

PHILIP E GRAVES

There are many reasons to suspect that benefit-cost analysis applied to environmental policies will result in policy decisions that will reject those environmental policies. The important question, of course, is whether those rejections are based on proper science. The present paper explores sources of bias in the methods used to evaluate environmental policy in the United States, although most of the arguments translate immediately to decision-making in other countries. There are some “big picture” considerations that have gone unrecognized, and there are numerous more minor, yet cumulatively important, technical details that point to potentially large biases against acceptance on benefit-cost …


Benefit-Cost Analysis Of Environmental Projects: A Plethora Of Systematic Biases, Philip E. Graves Jan 2010

Benefit-Cost Analysis Of Environmental Projects: A Plethora Of Systematic Biases, Philip E. Graves

PHILIP E GRAVES

There are many reasons to suspect that benefit-cost analysis applied to environmental policies will result in policy decisions that will reject those environmental policies. The important question, of course, is whether those rejections are based on proper science. The present paper explores sources of bias in the methods used to evaluate environmental policy in the United States, although most of the arguments translate immediately to decision-making in other countries. There are some “big picture” considerations that have gone unrecognized, and there are numerous more minor, yet cumulatively important, technical details that point to potentially large biases against acceptance on benefit-cost …


A Note On The Valuation Of Collective Goods: Overlooked Input Market Free Riding For Non-Individually Incrementable Goods, Philip E. Graves Jan 2009

A Note On The Valuation Of Collective Goods: Overlooked Input Market Free Riding For Non-Individually Incrementable Goods, Philip E. Graves

PHILIP E GRAVES

For at least fifty years economists have argued that vertically-aggregated marginal willingness to pay, when set equal to marginal provision cost, will result in optimal public good provision levels. This methodological approach would be expected to yield an exact analog, in terms of optimal levels of public good provision, to efficient provision of private goods in a perfect market setting. There is, however, a potentially serious flaw in the approach as actually practiced, since initial incomes are implicitly–and wrongly–taken to be optimal. From a given income, the output demand revelation problem has long been recognized–that there will be difficulty inferring …


A Note On The Design Of Experiments Involving Public Goods, Philip E. Graves Jan 2009

A Note On The Design Of Experiments Involving Public Goods, Philip E. Graves

PHILIP E GRAVES

Concern about potential free riding in the provision of public goods has a long history. More recently, experimental economists have turned their attention to the conditions under which free riding would be expected to occur. A model of free riding is provided here which demonstrates that existing experimental approaches fail to explore a potentially important real-world dimension of free riding. In a cash-in-advance economy, free riding becomes a two-stage problem, while existing experiments only address the second stage. That is, one would expect households with high demands for public goods relative to private goods to generate less income than households …


If The Large Wta-Wtp Gap For Public Goods Is Real (And There Are Good Reasons To Think So) Conventional Welfare Measures Are Simply Incorrect, Philip E. Graves Jan 2009

If The Large Wta-Wtp Gap For Public Goods Is Real (And There Are Good Reasons To Think So) Conventional Welfare Measures Are Simply Incorrect, Philip E. Graves

PHILIP E GRAVES

A robust finding in economics is that decision-makers often exhibit a much smaller dollar willingness to pay (WTP) for an item than the minimum amount that they claim to be willing to accept (WTA) to part with it. The spread between these two numbers is particularly large for public goods, raising serious public policy concerns regarding which number, if either, is appropriate for valuing such goods. A traditional utility maximizing model is presented here that predicts–as both measures are currently calculated–that WTA will exceed WTP, quite plausibly by a substantial amount for public goods. Moreover, it is shown here that …


The Wta-Wtp Gap And Welfare Measures For Public Goods, Philip E. Graves Jan 2009

The Wta-Wtp Gap And Welfare Measures For Public Goods, Philip E. Graves

PHILIP E GRAVES

A robust finding in experimental economics is that decision-makers often exhibit a much smaller dollar willingness to pay (WTP) for an item than the minimum amount that they claim to be willing to accept (WTA) to part with it. The spread between these two numbers is particularly large for public goods, raising serious public policy concerns regarding which number, if either, is appropriate for valuing such goods. A number of explanations for this phenomenon have been advanced, each perhaps of relevance in particular settings, with little consensus being achieved as to whether any explanation satisfactorily resolves the problem. The traditional …