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Research Collection School Of Economics

2010

Monitoring

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Applicant Screening And Performance-Related Outcomes, Fali Huang, Peter Cappelli May 2010

Applicant Screening And Performance-Related Outcomes, Fali Huang, Peter Cappelli

Research Collection School Of Economics

A fundamental problem faced by employers is how to elicit effort from employees. Most economic models suggest that employers meet this challenge by monitoring employees carefully to prevent shirking. But there is another option that relies on heterogeneity across employees, and that is to screen job candidates to find workers with a stronger work ethic who require less monitoring. We might therefore expect employers who screen candidates more intensively to monitor them less. Using data from a national sample of US employers, we find that employers who screen applicants more intensively for factors that should predict work ethic also monitor …