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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

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Mara Olekalns

Selected Works

2007

Social motives

Articles 1 - 2 of 2

Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Conflicting Social Motives In Negotiating Groups, Laurie Weingart, Jeanne Brett, Mara Olekalns, Philip Smith Dec 2006

Conflicting Social Motives In Negotiating Groups, Laurie Weingart, Jeanne Brett, Mara Olekalns, Philip Smith

Mara Olekalns

Negotiators’ social motives (cooperative versus individualistic) influence their strategic behaviors. This study used multi-level modeling and analyses of strategy sequences to test hypotheses regarding how negotiators’ social motives and the composition of the group influence group members’ negotiation strategies. Four-person groups negotiating a 5 issue mixed-motive decision making task were videotaped, transcribed, and coded. Group composition included two homogeneous conditions (all cooperators and all individualists) and three heterogeneous conditions (3 cooperators/1 individualist; 2 cooperators/2 individualists; 1 cooperator/3 individualists). Results showed that cooperative negotiators adjusted their use of integrative and distributive strategies in response to the social motive composition of the …


Loose With The Truth: Predicting Deception In Negotiation, Mara Olekalns, Philip Smith Dec 2006

Loose With The Truth: Predicting Deception In Negotiation, Mara Olekalns, Philip Smith

Mara Olekalns

Using a simulated, two-party negotiation, we examined how characteristics of the actor, target, and situation affected deception. To trigger deception, we used an issue that had no value for one of the two parties (indifference issue). We found support for an opportunistic betrayal model of deception: deception increased when the other party was perceived as benevolent, trustworthy and as having integrity. Negotiators’ goals also affected the use of deception. Individualistic, cooperative and mixed dyads responded differently to information about the other party’s trustworthiness, benevolence and integrity when deciding to either misrepresent or leverage their indifference issue. Mixed dyads displayed opportunistic …