Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
![Digital Commons Network](http://assets.bepress.com/20200205/img/dcn/DCsunburst.png)
Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons™
Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 1 of 1
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Strategic Buyers And Privately Observed Prices, Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Välimäki
Strategic Buyers And Privately Observed Prices, Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Välimäki
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
A model of repeated price competition with large buyers is analyzed. The sellers are allowed to offer different prices to different buyers and the buyers act strategically. The set of subgame perfect Equilibria is investigated under public and private monitoring. With public monitoring the equilibrium set with large buyers expands relative to the standard model where each buyer is small and behaves myopically. With private monitoring, where prices are not observable to the competing sellers, the set of equilibrium payoffs shrinks . In the finitely repeated game with private monitoring, all sales are made by the efficient seller. In the …