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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Yale University

2006

Implementation

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Robust Implementation In Direct Mechanisms, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris May 2006

Robust Implementation In Direct Mechanisms, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process of iteratively eliminating strictly dominated messages leads to outcomes that agree with the social choice function for all beliefs at every type profile. In an interdependent value environment with single crossing preferences, we identify a contraction property on the preferences which together with strict ex post incentive compatibility is sufficient to guarantee robust implementation in the direct mechanism. Strict ex post incentive compatibility and the contraction property are also necessary for robust implementation in any mechanism, including indirect ones. The contraction property requires that …


Robust Implementation: The Case Of Direct Mechanisms, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris May 2006

Robust Implementation: The Case Of Direct Mechanisms, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process of iteratively eliminating strictly dominated messages leads to outcomes that agree with the social choice at every type profile. In an interdependent value environment with single crossing preferences, we identify a strict contraction property on the preferences which together with strict ex post incentive compatibility is sufficient to guarantee robust implementation in the direct mechanism. Strict EPIC and the contraction property are also necessary for robust implementation in any mechanism. The contraction property essentially requires that the interdependence is not too large. In a …


Robust Implementation: The Case Of Direct Mechanisms, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris Mar 2006

Robust Implementation: The Case Of Direct Mechanisms, Dirk Bergemann, Stephen Morris

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process of iteratively eliminating strictly dominated messages leads to outcomes that agree with the social choice at every type profile. In an interdependent value environment, we identify a strict contraction property on the preferences which together with strict ex post incentive compatibility and the strict single crossing property is sufficient to guarantee robust implementation in the direct mechanism. The contraction property essentially requires that the interdependence is not too large. In a linear signal model, the contraction property is equivalent to an interdependence matrix having …