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Articles 1 - 5 of 5
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Risk And Wealth In A Model Of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks, Bernardo Guimarães, Stephen Morris
Risk And Wealth In A Model Of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks, Bernardo Guimarães, Stephen Morris
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Market participants’ risk attitudes, wealth and portfolio composition influence their positions in a pegged foreign currency and, therefore, may have important effects on the sustainability of currency pegs. We analyze such effects in a global game model of currency crises with continuous action choices. The model, solved in closed form, generates a rich set of theoretical predictions consistent with many popular and academic (unmodelled) speculations about the onset and timing of currency crises. The results extend linearly to a heterogeneous agent population.
Risk And Wealth In A Model Of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks, Bernardo Guimarães, Stephen Morris
Risk And Wealth In A Model Of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks, Bernardo Guimarães, Stephen Morris
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We analyze the effect of risk aversion, wealth and portfolios on the behavior of investors in a global game model of currency crises with continuous action choices. The model generates a rich set of striking theoretical predictions. For example, risk aversion makes currency crises significantly less likely; increased wealth makes crises more likely; and foreign direct investment (illiquid investments in the target currency) make crises more likely. Our results extend linearly to a heterogeneous agent population.
Liquidity Black Holes, Stephen Morris, Hyun Song Shin
Liquidity Black Holes, Stephen Morris, Hyun Song Shin
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Traders with short horizons and privately known trading limits interact in a market for a risky asset. Risk-averse, long horizon traders supply a downward sloping residual demand curve that face the short-horizon traders. When the price falls close to the trading limits of the short horizon traders, selling of the risky asset by any trader increases the incentives for others to sell. Sales become mutually reinforcing among the short term traders, and payoffs analogous to a bank run are generated. A “liquidity black hole” is the analogue of the run outcome in a bank run model. Short horizon traders sell …
Catalytic Finance: When Does It Work?, Stephen Morris, Hyun Song Shin
Catalytic Finance: When Does It Work?, Stephen Morris, Hyun Song Shin
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
In a simple model of currency crises caused by creditor coordination failure, we show that bailouts that reduce ex post inefficiency will sometimes create ex ante moral hazard but will sometimes enhance the incentives for governments to take preventative actions. This model helps us understand a debate about the role of the IMF in catalyzing lending to developing countries.
Heterogeneity And Uniqueness In Interaction Games, Stephen Morris, Hyun Song Shin
Heterogeneity And Uniqueness In Interaction Games, Stephen Morris, Hyun Song Shin
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
Incomplete information games, local interaction games and random matching games are all special cases of a general class of interaction games (Morris (1997)). In this paper, we use this equivalence to present a unified treatment of arguments generating uniqueness in games with strategic complementarities by introducing heterogeneity in these different settings. We also report on the relation between local and global heterogeneity, on the role of strategic multipliers and on purification in the three types of interaction game.