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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Yale University

2000

Unique equilibrium

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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Global Games: Theory And Applications, Stephen Morris, Hyun Song Shin Sep 2000

Global Games: Theory And Applications, Stephen Morris, Hyun Song Shin

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

Global games are games of incomplete information whose type space is determined by the players each observing a noisy signal of the underlying state. With strategic complementarities, global games often have a unique, dominance solvable equilibrium, allowing analysis of a number of economic models of coordination failure. For symmetric binary action global games, equilibrium strategies in the limit (as noise becomes negligible) are simple to characterize in terms of ‘diffuse’ beliefs over the actions of others. We describe a number of economic applications that fall in this category. We also explore the distinctive roles of public and private information in …


Global Games: Theory And Applications, Stephen Morris, Hyun Song Shin Sep 2000

Global Games: Theory And Applications, Stephen Morris, Hyun Song Shin

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

Global games are games of incomplete information whose type space is determined by the players each observing a noisy signal of the underlying state. With strategic complementarities, global games often have a unique, dominance solvable equilibrium, allowing analysis of a number of economic models of coordination failure. For symmetric binary action global games, equilibrium strategies in the limit (as noise becomes negligible) are simple to characterize in terms of ‘diffuse’ beliefs over the actions of others. We describe a number of economic applications that fall in this category. We also explore the distinctive roles of public and private information in …


Does One Soros Make A Difference? A Theory Of Currency Crises With Large And Small Traders, Giancarlo Corsetti, Partha Dasgupta, Stephen Morris, Hyun Song Shin Aug 2000

Does One Soros Make A Difference? A Theory Of Currency Crises With Large And Small Traders, Giancarlo Corsetti, Partha Dasgupta, Stephen Morris, Hyun Song Shin

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

Do large investors increase the vulnerability of a country to speculative attacks in the foreign exchange markets? To address this issue, we build a model of currency crises where a single large investor and a continuum of small investors independently decide whether to attack a currency based on their private information about fundamentals. Even abstracting from signalling, the presence of the large investor does make all other traders more aggressive in their selling. Relative to the case in which there is no large investors, small investors attack the currency when fundamentals are stronger. Yet, the difference can be small, or …