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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Mandate-Based Health Reform And The Labor Market: Evidence From The Massachusetts Reform, Jonathan T. Kolstad, Amanda E. Kowalski
Mandate-Based Health Reform And The Labor Market: Evidence From The Massachusetts Reform, Jonathan T. Kolstad, Amanda E. Kowalski
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We model the labor market impact of the three key provisions of the recent Massachusetts and national “mandate-based” health reforms: individual and employer mandates and expansions in publicly-subsidized coverage. Using our model, we characterize the compensating differential for employer-sponsored health insurance (ESHI) — the causal change in wages associated with gaining ESHI. We also characterize the welfare impact of the labor market distortion induced by health reform. We show that the welfare impact depends on a small number of sufficient statistics” that can be recovered from labor market outcomes. Relying on the reform implemented in Massachusetts in 2006, we estimate …
Health Reform, Health Insurance, And Selection: Estimating Selection Into Health Insurance Using The Massachusetts Health Reform, Martin B. Hackmann, Jonathan T. Kolstad, Amanda E. Kowalski
Health Reform, Health Insurance, And Selection: Estimating Selection Into Health Insurance Using The Massachusetts Health Reform, Martin B. Hackmann, Jonathan T. Kolstad, Amanda E. Kowalski
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
We implement an empirical test for selection into health insurance using changes in coverage induced by the introduction of mandated health insurance in Massachusetts. Our test examines changes in the cost of the newly insured relative to those who were insured prior to the reform. We find that counties with larger increases in insurance coverage over the reform period face the smallest increase in average hospital costs for the insured population, consistent with adverse selection into insurance before the reform. Additional results, incorporating cross-state variation and data on health measures, provide further evidence for adverse selection.