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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Yale University

Series

2000

Coordination

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Global Games: Theory And Applications, Stephen Morris, Hyun Song Shin Sep 2000

Global Games: Theory And Applications, Stephen Morris, Hyun Song Shin

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

Global games are games of incomplete information whose type space is determined by the players each observing a noisy signal of the underlying state. With strategic complementarities, global games often have a unique, dominance solvable equilibrium, allowing analysis of a number of economic models of coordination failure. For symmetric binary action global games, equilibrium strategies in the limit (as noise becomes negligible) are simple to characterize in terms of ‘diffuse’ beliefs over the actions of others. We describe a number of economic applications that fall in this category. We also explore the distinctive roles of public and private information in …


Faulty Communication, Stephen Morris Aug 2000

Faulty Communication, Stephen Morris

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

The electronic mail game of Rubinstein (1989) showed that a lack of common knowledge generated by faulty communication can make coordinated action impossible. This paper shows how this conclusion is robust to having a more realistic timing structure of messages, more than two players who meet publicly but not as a plenary group, and strategic decisions about whether to communicate.


Faulty Communication, Stephen Morris Aug 2000

Faulty Communication, Stephen Morris

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

The electronic mail game of Rubinstein (1989) showed that a lack of common knowledge generated by faulty communication can make coordinated action impossible. This paper shows how this conclusion is robust to having a more realistic timing structure of messages, more than two players who meet publicly but not as a plenary group, and strategic decisions about whether to communicate.