Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons™
Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 2 of 2
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Monetary Policy Preferences Of Individual Fomc Members: A Content Analysis Of The Memoranda Of Discussion, Henry W. Chappell Jr., Thomas M. Havrilesky, Rob Roy Mcgregor
Monetary Policy Preferences Of Individual Fomc Members: A Content Analysis Of The Memoranda Of Discussion, Henry W. Chappell Jr., Thomas M. Havrilesky, Rob Roy Mcgregor
Faculty Publications
The Memoranda of Discussion provide detailed records of Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting deliberations. Procedures are developed for coding the textual data in the Memoranda and assessing the reliability of those codings. The codings are then used in the estimation of parameters of individual FOMC members' reaction functions. Data from the 1970 to 1976 period are employed in the estimation. In the future, similar methods could be used to analyze newly released transcripts of FOMC meetings held after 1976.
Nondisclosure As A Contract Remedy: Explaining The Advance-Notice Puzzle, John T. Addison, John B. Chilton
Nondisclosure As A Contract Remedy: Explaining The Advance-Notice Puzzle, John T. Addison, John B. Chilton
Faculty Publications
Prior theoretical work predicts an underprovision of advance-notice contracts stemming from their enforcement costs. In the present model, it is rather the fundamental inability of workers to alienate their right to quit taken in conjunction with parameters central to job separation decisions that jointly determine the mix of notice and no-notice contracts observed in equilibrium. Not all equilibrium contracts are efficient, but there is no underprovision of notice. Mandating notice cannot improve on joint value and indeed may reduce it. Furthermore, although a mandate can be merely redistributive, there are cases in which it harms all parties.