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SelectedWorks

Telecommunications

2002

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Demand Reduction And Inefficiency In Multi-Unit Auctions, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel Jul 2002

Demand Reduction And Inefficiency In Multi-Unit Auctions, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel

Peter Cramton

Auctions typically involve the sale of many related goods. Treasury, spectrum and electricity auctions are examples. In auctions where bidders pay the market-clearing price for items won, large bidders have an incentive to reduce demand in order to pay less for their winnings. This incentive creates an inefficiency in multiple-item auctions. Large bidders reduce demand for additional items and so sometimes lose to smaller bidders with lower values. We demonstrate this inefficiency in an auction model which allows interdependent values. We also establish that the ranking of the uniform-price and pay-as-bid auctions is ambiguous in both revenue and efficiency terms. …

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Declaration Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton Feb 2002

Declaration Of Peter Cramton, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Comments in support of wireless number portability. For Leap Wireless.

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Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton Jan 2002

Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Auctions have emerged as the primary means of assigning spectrum licenses to companies wishing to provide wireless communication services. Since July 1994, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has conducted 33 spectrum auctions, assigning thousands of licenses to hundreds of firms. Countries throughout the world are conducting similar auctions. I review the current state of spectrum auctions. Both the design and performance of these auctions are addressed.

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