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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Is There More Corruption In Larger Countries? Evidence Using Firm-Level Data, Mohammad Amin Jun 2011

Is There More Corruption In Larger Countries? Evidence Using Firm-Level Data, Mohammad Amin

Mohammad Amin

Existing studies show that the impact of country size on the level of corruption is sensitive to the dataset used and the sample of countries under study. The present paper contributes to the literature on country size and corruption by using newly available firm-level data on firm’s experience with corruption in 25 countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Our results show that the level of corruption rises sharply with country size as measured by the total population of a country. Contrary to claims in the literature, we find no evidence that the corruption and country size relationship is stronger …


Empowerment, Corruption And Economic Chaos In Sudan, Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed Jun 2011

Empowerment, Corruption And Economic Chaos In Sudan, Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed

Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed

In a country on the eve of losing one third of its land, 80% of potential natural resources and 75% of external exports value, economic future seems gloomy. Many opinions were given for economic solutions after the Southern Sudan secession. However, that does not support a theoretical framework that those are the only reasons for the expected economic collapse. Our theory here is that such collapse already happened because of economic mismanagement, corruption and hoarding initiated by the calls for empowerment and carried out by the regime's members. Such acts extended to the banks, economic institutions and randomized privatization. The …


Pillars Of Demise: Empowerment And Corruption, Economic Chaos And Political Disintegration In Sudan, Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed Jun 2011

Pillars Of Demise: Empowerment And Corruption, Economic Chaos And Political Disintegration In Sudan, Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed

Professor Issam A.W. Mohamed

In a country on the eve of losing one third of its land, 80% of potential natural resources and 75% of external exports value, economic future seems gloomy. Many opinions were given for economic solutions after the Southern Sudan secession. However, that does not support a theoretical framework that those are the only reasons for the expected economic collapse. Our theory here is that such collapse already happened because of economic mismanagement, corruption and hoarding initiated by the calls for empowerment and carried out by the regime's members. Such acts extended to the banks, economic institutions and randomized privatization. The …


Does Country Size Matter? (Short Note), Mohammad Amin Jun 2011

Does Country Size Matter? (Short Note), Mohammad Amin

Mohammad Amin

With the exception of trade openness, existing studies have failed to find any significant impact of country size on various social and economic variables. This note uses newly available firm-level and country-level data and shows that country size does matter with small countries performing better than large countries in areas such as trade facilitation, tax administration, burden of tax rates on private firms and corruption. The note also argues that the impact of country size on a variable of interest may not be uniform and it may depend on for example, how large the country is to begin with and …


Emergence And Persistence Of Inefficient States, Daron Acemoglu, Davide Ticchi, Andrea Vindigni Apr 2011

Emergence And Persistence Of Inefficient States, Daron Acemoglu, Davide Ticchi, Andrea Vindigni

Davide Ticchi

We present a theory of the emergence and persistence of inefficient states based on patronage politics. The society consists of rich and poor individuals. The rich are initially in power, but expect to transition to democracy, which will choose redistributive policies. Taxation requires the employment of bureaucrats. By choosing an inefficient state structure, the rich may use patronage and capture democratic politics, so reducing the amount of redistribution in democracy. Moreover, the inefficient state creates its own constituency and tends to persist over time. Intuitively, an inefficient state structure creates more rents for bureaucrats than would an efficient one. When …


Le Virtù Del Clientelismo, Riccardo Pelizzo Jan 2011

Le Virtù Del Clientelismo, Riccardo Pelizzo

riccardo pelizzo

The paper provides a critical discussion of Simona Piattoni's Le virtù del clientelismo.


A System Of Exemptions: Historicizing State Illegality In Indonesia, Robert Cribb Jan 2011

A System Of Exemptions: Historicizing State Illegality In Indonesia, Robert Cribb

Robert Cribb

No abstract provided.