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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons™
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- Incomplete contracts (2)
- Public goods (2)
- Social preferences (2)
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- Emulation (1)
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Articles 1 - 15 of 15
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Optimal Parochialism: The Dynamics Of Trust And Exclusion In Networks, Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis
Optimal Parochialism: The Dynamics Of Trust And Exclusion In Networks, Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis
Samuel Bowles
Networks such as ethnic credit associations, close-knit residential neighborhoods, ‘old boy’networks, and ethnically linked businesses play an important role in economic life but have been little studied by economists. These networks are often supported by cultural distinctions between insiders and outsiders and engage in exclusionary practices which we call parochialism. We provide an economic analysis of parochial networks in which the losses incurred by not trading with outsiders are offset by an enhanced ability to enforce informal contracts by fostering trust among insiders. We first model one-shot social interactions among self-regarding agents, demonstrating that trust (i.e., cooperating without using information …
Economic Incentives And Social Preferences: A Preference-Based Lucas Critique Of Public Policy, Samuel Bowles, Sandra Polanía Reyes
Economic Incentives And Social Preferences: A Preference-Based Lucas Critique Of Public Policy, Samuel Bowles, Sandra Polanía Reyes
Samuel Bowles
Policies and explicit incentives designed for self-regarding individuals sometimes are less effective or even counterproductive when they diminish altruism, ethical norms and other social preferences. Evidence from 51 experimental studies indicates that this crowding out effect is pervasive, and that crowding in also occurs. A model in which self-regarding and social preferences may be either substitutes or complements is developed and evidence for the mechanisms underlying this non-additivity feature of preferences is provided. The result is a preference-based analogue to the Lucas Critique restricting feasible implementation to allocations that are supportable given the effect of incentives on preferences.
Emulation, Inequality, And Work Hours: Was Thorsten Veblen Right?, Samuel Bowles, Yongjin Park
Emulation, Inequality, And Work Hours: Was Thorsten Veblen Right?, Samuel Bowles, Yongjin Park
Samuel Bowles
We investigate Veblen effects on work hours, namely the way that a desire to emulate the consumption standards of the rich induces longer work hours among the rest. Consistent with our model of these asymmetric social comparisons, greater inequality predicts longer work hours in ten OECD countries over the period 1963-1998. The country fixed effects estimates of the impact of inequality on hours are large, robust, and cannot be explained by conventional incentive effects. In the presence of Veblen effects, a social welfare optimum cannot be implemented by a flat tax on consumption but may be accomplished by progressive consumption …
International Trade, Factor Mobility And The Persistence Of Cultural-Institutional Diversity, Marianna Belloc, Samuel Bowles
International Trade, Factor Mobility And The Persistence Of Cultural-Institutional Diversity, Marianna Belloc, Samuel Bowles
Samuel Bowles
Cultural and institutional differences among nations may result in differences in the ratios of marginal costs of goods in autarchy and thus be the basis of specialization and comparative advantage, as long as these differences are not eliminated by trade. We provide an evolutionary model of endogenous preferences and institutions under autarchy, trade and factor mobility in which multiple asymptotically stable cultural-institutional conventions may exist, among which transitions may occur as a result of decentralized and un-coordinated actions of employers or employees. We show that: i) specialization and trade may arise and enhance welfare even when the countries are identical …
Is Altruism Bad For Cooperation?, Sung-Ha Hwang, Samuel Bowles
Is Altruism Bad For Cooperation?, Sung-Ha Hwang, Samuel Bowles
Samuel Bowles
Some philosophers and social scientists have stressed the importance for good government of an altruistic citizenry that values the well being of one another. Others have emphasized the need for incentives that induce even the self interested to contribute to the public good. Implicitly most have assumed that these two approaches are complementary or at worst additive. But this need not be the case. Behavioral experiments find that if reciprocity-minded subjects feel hostility towards free riders and enjoy inflicting harm on them, near efficient levels of contributions to a public good may be supported when group members have opportunities to …
The Determinants Of Earnings: Skills, Preferences, And Schooling, Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis, Melissa Osborne
The Determinants Of Earnings: Skills, Preferences, And Schooling, Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis, Melissa Osborne
Samuel Bowles
No abstract provided.
Social Preferences And Public Economics: Mechanism Design When Social Preferences Depend On Incentives, Samuel Bowles, Sung-Ha Hwang
Social Preferences And Public Economics: Mechanism Design When Social Preferences Depend On Incentives, Samuel Bowles, Sung-Ha Hwang
Samuel Bowles
Social preferences such as altruism, reciprocity, intrinsic motivation and a desire to uphold ethical norms are essential to good government, often facilitating socially desirable allocations that would be unattainable by incentives that appeal solely to self-interest. But experimental and other evidence indicates that conventional economic incentives and social preferences may be either complements or substitutes, explicit incentives crowding in or crowding out social preferences. We investigate the design of optimal incentives to contribute to a public good under these conditions. We identify cases in which a sophisticated planner cognizant of these non-additive effects would make either more or less use …
Social Segregation And The Dynamics Of Group Inequality, Samuel Bowles, Rajiv Sethi
Social Segregation And The Dynamics Of Group Inequality, Samuel Bowles, Rajiv Sethi
Samuel Bowles
We explore the dynamics of group inequality when segregation of social networks places the initially less affluent group at a disadvantage in acquiring human capital. Extending Loury (1977), we demonstrate that (i) group differences in economic success can persist across generations in the absence of either discrimination or group differences in ability, provided that social segregation is sufficiently great, (ii) there is threshold level of integration above which group inequality cannot be sustained, (iii) this threshold varies systematically but non-monotonically with the population share of the disadvantaged group, (iv) crossing the threshold induces convergence to a common high level of …
Power, Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis
Power, Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis
Samuel Bowles
We consider the exercise of power in competitive markets for goods, labour and credit. We offer a definition of power and show that if contracts are incomplete it may be exercised either in Pareto-improving ways or to the disadvantage of those without power. Contrasting conceptions of power including bargaining power, market power, and consumer sovereignty are considered. Because the exercise of power may alter prices and other aspects of exchanges, abstracting from power may miss essential aspects of an economy. The political aspect of private exchanges challenges conventional ideas about the appropriate roles of market and political competition in ensuring …
The Evolution Of Strong Reciprocity, Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis
The Evolution Of Strong Reciprocity, Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis
Samuel Bowles
A number of outstanding puzzles in economics may be resolved by recognizing that where members of a group benefit from mutual adherence to a social norm, agents may obey the norm and punish its violators, even when this behavior cannot be motivated by self-regarding, outcome-oriented preferences. This behavior, which we call strong reciprocity, is a form of altruism in that it benefits others at the expense of the individual exhibiting it. While economists have doubted the evolutionary viability of altruistic preferences, we show that strong reciprocity can invade a population of non-reciprocators and can be sustained in a stable population …
Walrasian Economics In Retrospect, Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis
Walrasian Economics In Retrospect, Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis
Samuel Bowles
Two basic tenets of theWalrasian model, behavior based on self-interested exogenous preferences and complete and costless contracting have recently come under critical scrutiny. First, social norms and psychological dispositions extending beyond the selfish motives of Homo economicus may have an important bearing on outcomes, even in competitive markets. Second, market outcomes depend on strategic interactions in which power in the political sense is exercised. It follows that economics must become more behavioral and more institutional. We can return to these themes of the classical tradition, now equipped with more the powerful mathematical tools developed over the past century.
Guard Labor: An Essay In Honor Of Pranab Bardhan, Samuel Bowles, Arjun Jayadev
Guard Labor: An Essay In Honor Of Pranab Bardhan, Samuel Bowles, Arjun Jayadev
Samuel Bowles
No abstract provided.
Economic Integration, Cultural Standardization, And The Politics Of Social Insurance, Samuel Bowles, Ugo Pagano
Economic Integration, Cultural Standardization, And The Politics Of Social Insurance, Samuel Bowles, Ugo Pagano
Samuel Bowles
No abstract provided.
Globalization And Redistribution: Feasible Egalitarianism In A Competitve World, Samuel Bowles
Globalization And Redistribution: Feasible Egalitarianism In A Competitve World, Samuel Bowles
Samuel Bowles
A reduction of impediments to international flows of goods, capital and professional labor is thought to raise the economic costs of programs by the nation state (and labor unions) to redistribute income to the poor and to provide economic security. But some of the more politically and economically successful examples of such policies -- for example Nordic social democracy and East Asian land reform-- have occurred in small open economies which would, on the above account, provide a prohibitive environment for egalitarian interventions. I present a model of globalization and redistribution to answer the following question: in a liberalized world …
Risk Aversion, Insurance, And The Efficiency-Equality Tradeoff, Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis
Risk Aversion, Insurance, And The Efficiency-Equality Tradeoff, Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis
Samuel Bowles
Under conditions of informational asymmetry, redistributing the property rights may improve work incentives but lead to an inefficient choice of entrepreneurial risk. We present a model in which reassignment of property rights does not affect factor prices and we show that there exist egalitarian asset redistributions that enhance allocative efficiency. The scope for such redistributions can be broadened by offering fair insurance protecting the independent entrepreneur against risk unassociated with the production process and against production uncertainties that are unrelated to the quality of their individual decisions. The market will generally supply insurance of this type suboptimally.