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San Jose State University

Economics

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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Some Possible Consequences Of A U.S. Government Default, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel Jan 2012

Some Possible Consequences Of A U.S. Government Default, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel

Jeffrey Rogers Hummel

The U.S. government faces a looming fiscal crisis. A default on Treasury securities appears inevitable. The short-run consequences for the economy will be painful. But the long-run consequences, both economic and political, could be beneficial. The most important long-run political benefit would be the imposition of fiscal discipline. The long-run economic benefit would be the alleviation of the future tax liabilities required to service the national debt, irrespective of whether those liabilities are correctly anticipated or not. A historical examination of the state government defaults of the 1840s provides one case study where the long-run consequences were indeed salutary.


Some Possible Consequences Of A U.S. Government Default, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel Jan 2012

Some Possible Consequences Of A U.S. Government Default, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel

Faculty Publications

The U.S. government faces a looming fiscal crisis. A default on Treasury securities appears inevitable. The short-run consequences for the economy will be painful. But the long-run consequences, both economic and political, could be beneficial. The most important long-run political benefit would be the imposition of fiscal discipline. The long-run economic benefit would be the alleviation of the future tax liabilities required to service the national debt, irrespective of whether those liabilities are correctly anticipated or not. A historical examination of the state government defaults of the 1840s provides one case study where the long-run consequences were indeed salutary.


If A Pure Market Economy Is So Good, Why Doesn’T It Exist? The Importance Of Changing Preferences Versus Incentives In Social Change, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel, Edward P. Stringham Jul 2010

If A Pure Market Economy Is So Good, Why Doesn’T It Exist? The Importance Of Changing Preferences Versus Incentives In Social Change, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel, Edward P. Stringham

Faculty Publications

Many economists argue that a pure market economy cannot come about because people will always have incentives to use coercion (Cowen and Sutter, 2005; Holcombe, 2004). We maintain that these economists leave out an important factor in social change. Change can come about by altering incentives or preferences, but since most neoclassical economists ignore changing preferences, they too quickly conclude that change is impossible. History shows that social change based on changes in preferences is common. By recognizing that preferences need not be constant, political economists can say much more about changing the world.


If A Pure Market Economy Is So Good, Why Doesn’T It Exist? The Importance Of Changing Preferences Versus Incentives In Social Change, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel, Edward P. Stringham Jan 2010

If A Pure Market Economy Is So Good, Why Doesn’T It Exist? The Importance Of Changing Preferences Versus Incentives In Social Change, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel, Edward P. Stringham

Jeffrey Rogers Hummel

Many economists argue that a pure market economy cannot come about because people will always have incentives to use coercion (Cowen and Sutter, 2005; Holcombe, 2004). We maintain that these economists leave out an important factor in social change. Change can come about by altering incentives or preferences, but since most neoclassical economists ignore changing preferences, they too quickly conclude that change is impossible. History shows that social change based on changes in preferences is common. By recognizing that preferences need not be constant, political economists can say much more about changing the world.


Why Default On U.S. Treasuries Is Likely, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel Aug 2009

Why Default On U.S. Treasuries Is Likely, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel

Jeffrey Rogers Hummel

No abstract provided.


Why Default On U.S. Treasuries Is Likely, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel Aug 2009

Why Default On U.S. Treasuries Is Likely, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Civil War Finance: Lessons For Today, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel Apr 2009

Civil War Finance: Lessons For Today, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


Civil War Finance: Lessons For Today, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel Jan 2009

Civil War Finance: Lessons For Today, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel

Jeffrey Rogers Hummel

No abstract provided.


Greenspan’S Monetary Policy In Retrospect: Discretion Or Rules?, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel, David R. Henderson Nov 2008

Greenspan’S Monetary Policy In Retrospect: Discretion Or Rules?, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel, David R. Henderson

Jeffrey Rogers Hummel

No abstract provided.


Toward A Libertarian Reconstruction Of Neoclassical Welfare Theory, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel Apr 2008

Toward A Libertarian Reconstruction Of Neoclassical Welfare Theory, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel

Faculty Publications

Many libertarians, especially those inclined toward the Austrian school of economics, counter the market-failure justification for government intervention by denying any legitimacy whatsoever to the neoclassical concept of efficiency. But properly interpreted, neoclassical efficiency, rather than providing an open-ended justification for all sorts of government intervention, provides one of the most powerful and comprehensive objections to government coercion in general.


Toward A Libertarian Reconstruction Of Neoclassical Welfare Theory, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel Jan 2008

Toward A Libertarian Reconstruction Of Neoclassical Welfare Theory, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel

Jeffrey Rogers Hummel

Many libertarians, especially those inclined toward the Austrian school of economics, counter the market-failure justification for government intervention by denying any legitimacy whatsoever to the neoclassical concept of efficiency. But properly interpreted, neoclassical efficiency, rather than providing an open-ended justification for all sorts of government intervention, provides one of the most powerful and comprehensive objections to government coercion in general.


Death And Taxes, Including Inflation: The Public Versus Economists, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel Jan 2007

Death And Taxes, Including Inflation: The Public Versus Economists, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel

Jeffrey Rogers Hummel

Inflation worries the general public much more than it does the economics profession, and economists remain perplexed as to exactly why. The costs that concern economists are inflation’s deadweight loss. But that is only a part of the losses that concern the public, because inflation simultaneously transfers some of people’s income into the hands of government. The fact that the seigniorage tax may pay for programs they favor is a separate issue. Moreover, unlike income and other taxes, which people in democratic countries may think they have some control over through voting, seigniorage appears utterly arbitrary. In fact, people can …


Death And Taxes, Including Inflation: The Public Versus Economists, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel Jan 2007

Death And Taxes, Including Inflation: The Public Versus Economists, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel

Faculty Publications

Inflation worries the general public much more than it does the economics profession, and economists remain perplexed as to exactly why. The costs that concern economists are inflation’s deadweight loss. But that is only a part of the losses that concern the public, because inflation simultaneously transfers some of people’s income into the hands of government. The fact that the seigniorage tax may pay for programs they favor is a separate issue. Moreover, unlike income and other taxes, which people in democratic countries may think they have some control over through voting, seigniorage appears utterly arbitrary. In fact, people can …


The American Militia And The Origin Of Conscription: A Reassessment, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel Oct 2001

The American Militia And The Origin Of Conscription: A Reassessment, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


The American Militia And The Origin Of Conscription: A Reassessment, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel Jan 2001

The American Militia And The Origin Of Conscription: A Reassessment, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel

Jeffrey Rogers Hummel

No abstract provided.


Problems With Austrian Business Cycle Theory, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel Jan 1979

Problems With Austrian Business Cycle Theory, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel

Jeffrey Rogers Hummel

No abstract provided.


Problems With Austrian Business Cycle Theory, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel Jan 1979

Problems With Austrian Business Cycle Theory, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


The Jacksonians, Banking, And Economic Theory: A Reinterpretation, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel Jul 1978

The Jacksonians, Banking, And Economic Theory: A Reinterpretation, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.


The Jacksonians, Banking, And Economic Theory: A Reinterpretation, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel Jan 1978

The Jacksonians, Banking, And Economic Theory: A Reinterpretation, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel

Jeffrey Rogers Hummel

No abstract provided.


The Monetary History Of America To 1789: A Historiographical Essay, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel Jan 1978

The Monetary History Of America To 1789: A Historiographical Essay, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel

Jeffrey Rogers Hummel

No abstract provided.


The Monetary History Of America To 1789: A Historiographical Essay, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel Jan 1978

The Monetary History Of America To 1789: A Historiographical Essay, Jeffrey Rogers Hummel

Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.