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Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Paying Teachers To Earn Advanced Degrees: Evidence On Student Performance In Georgia, Noel D. Campbell, Edward J. Lopez
Paying Teachers To Earn Advanced Degrees: Evidence On Student Performance In Georgia, Noel D. Campbell, Edward J. Lopez
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Incumbent Deviations From Constituents: Further Tests, Noel D. Campbell, Edward J. Lopez, Tammy Rogers
Incumbent Deviations From Constituents: Further Tests, Noel D. Campbell, Edward J. Lopez, Tammy Rogers
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
Incorporating Policymaker Costs And Political Competition Into Rent-Seeking Games, R. Kenneth Godwin, Edward J. Lopez, Barry J. Seldon
Incorporating Policymaker Costs And Political Competition Into Rent-Seeking Games, R. Kenneth Godwin, Edward J. Lopez, Barry J. Seldon
Faculty Publications
We incorporate policymaker costs of supplying rents and variable intensities of competition among rent seekers into the standard rent-seeking game. By incorporating these aspects, the game has greater verisimilitude to the lobbying process. The first aspect captures the fact that in rent-seeking contests there is a positive probability that neither firm will obtain the rent. The second aspect captures the fact that firms seeking different rents still must compete for policymakers' resources. We find that lobbying expenditures, rent-seeking profits, and rent dissipation depend on the intensity of competition and the value of the rent relative to policymaker costs. For example, …
New Anti-Merger Theories: A Critique, Edward J. Lopez
New Anti-Merger Theories: A Critique, Edward J. Lopez
Faculty Publications
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate these new anti-merger instruments on the basis of economic theory and evidence. I first discuss how the economics of antitrust has developed over the years, with the intention of characterizing the intellectual inheritance of 1990s' antitrust regulators. Within this context, I then discuss each anti-merger instrument, how it has been applied in specific cases, and how it accords with underlying economic science. On the basis of these arguments, antitrust regulators should pause and reconsider the theoretical and empirical bases of applying unilateral effects and innovation markets to merger investigations.