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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Common-Value Procurement Auctions With Renegotiation, Rimvydas Baltaduonis, Lucas Rentschler Oct 2014

Common-Value Procurement Auctions With Renegotiation, Rimvydas Baltaduonis, Lucas Rentschler

Economics Faculty Publications

This note contains the equilibrium bid functions for two types of common-value procurement auctions: 1) a procurement auction in which bids represent an enforceable contract; 2) a procurement auction in which, upon learning the true cost of supplying the good, the winning bidder can renegotiate the contract with the buyer, and each bidder must submit a bond with their bid, which is returned at the end of the auction unless they are the low bidder and renegotiate the contract.


El Mal De Chagas Y Su Potencial De Eliminación, Eileen Stillwaggon Aug 2014

El Mal De Chagas Y Su Potencial De Eliminación, Eileen Stillwaggon

Economics Faculty Publications

La Asamblea Mundial de la Salud ha elegido algunas enfermedades como blancos para la eliminación. Hay mucha esperanza y una alta probabilidad de que varias enfermedades, recientemente llamadas desatendidas, sean eliminadas en las próximas décadas. Vamos a presenciar el fin de la transmisión de la dracunculiasis, la filariosis linfática, la poliomielitis, y en las Américas por lo menos, la oncocercosis. Ya se ven éxitos significativos como la cuasi erradicación de la dracunculiasis y paso importantes en contra de otras aflicciones. [Original Spanish version]

The World Health Assembly has chosen some diseases as targets for elimination. There is much …


Risk Preferences And Prenatal Exposure To Sex Hormones For Ladinos, Diego Aycinena, Rimvydas Baltaduonis, Lucas Rentschler Aug 2014

Risk Preferences And Prenatal Exposure To Sex Hormones For Ladinos, Diego Aycinena, Rimvydas Baltaduonis, Lucas Rentschler

Economics Faculty Publications

Risk preferences drive much of human decision making including investment, career and health choices and many more. Thus, understanding the determinants of risk preferences refines our understanding of choice in a broad array of environments. We assess the relationship between risk preferences, prenatal exposure to sex hormones and gender for a sample of Ladinos, which is an ethnic group comprising 62.86% of the population of Guatemala. Prenatal exposure to sex hormones has organizational effects on brain development, and has been shown to partially explain risk preferences for Caucasians. We measure prenatal exposure to sex hormones using the ratio of the …


An Experimental Study Of Complex-Offer Auctions From Wholesale Energy Markets, Rimvydas Baltaduonis May 2014

An Experimental Study Of Complex-Offer Auctions From Wholesale Energy Markets, Rimvydas Baltaduonis

Economics Faculty Publications

A Payment Cost Minimization auction has been proposed as an alternative to the Offer Cost Minimization auction for use in wholesale electric power markets with an intention to lower procurement cost of electricity. Efficiency concerns have been raised for this proposal while assuming that the true production costs would be revealed to the auctioneer in a competitive market. Using an experimental approach, the study compares the performance of these two complex-offer auctions, controlling for the level of unilateral market power. The analysis finds that neither auction results in allocations that correspond to the true cost revelation. Two auctions perform similarly …


Valuation Structure In First-Price And Least-Revenue Auctions: An Experimental Investigation, Diego Aycinena, Rimvydas Baltaduonis, Lucas Rentschler Mar 2014

Valuation Structure In First-Price And Least-Revenue Auctions: An Experimental Investigation, Diego Aycinena, Rimvydas Baltaduonis, Lucas Rentschler

Economics Faculty Publications

In many auctions the valuation structure involves both private and common value elements. Existing experimental evidence (e.g. Goeree and Offerman in Am. Econ. Rev. 92(3):625–643, 2002) demonstrates that first-price auctions with this valuation structure tend to be inefficient, and inexperienced subjects tend to bid above the break-even bidding threshold. In this paper, we compare first-price auctions with an alternative auction mechanism: the least-revenue auction. This auction mechanism shifts the risk regarding the common value of the good to the auctioneer. Such a shift is desirable when ex post negative payoffs for the winning bidder results in unfulfilled contracts, as is …