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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons™
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Articles 1 - 6 of 6
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Bilateral Bargaining With Externalities, Catherine De Fontenay, Joshua Gans
Bilateral Bargaining With Externalities, Catherine De Fontenay, Joshua Gans
Catherine de Fontenay
This paper provides an analysis of a non-cooperative pairwise bargaining game between agents in a network. We establish that there exists an equilibrium that generates a coalitional bargaining division of the reduced surplus that arises as a result of externalities between agents. That is, we provide a non-cooperative justification for a cooperative division of a non-cooperative surplus. The resulting division is akin to the Myerson-Shapley value with properties that are particularly useful and tractable in applications. We demonstrate this by examining buyer-seller networks and vertical foreclosure.
The Relocation Of Crime, Catherine C. De Fontenay
The Relocation Of Crime, Catherine C. De Fontenay
Catherine de Fontenay
We add a new sector called Crime to a traditional two-sector two-input Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade between countries. Trade is found to increase crime in the resource-rich country and to reduce crime in the resource-poor country by an equal amount. The negative externality from increased crime can be strong enough to cancel out the gains from trade for the resource-rich country. The paper also explores the impact of aid, capital flows, and migration on crime rates, and how crime shapes the degree of specialization in each economy.
Vertical Integration And Competition Between Networks, Catherine De Fontenay, Joshua Gans
Vertical Integration And Competition Between Networks, Catherine De Fontenay, Joshua Gans
Catherine de Fontenay
No abstract provided.
Vertical Integration In The Presence Of Upstream Competition, Catherine De Fontenay, Joshua Gans
Vertical Integration In The Presence Of Upstream Competition, Catherine De Fontenay, Joshua Gans
Catherine de Fontenay
We analyze vertical integration to compare outcomes under upstream competition and monopoly. This is done in a model based on the property rights approach to firm boundaries and where multilateral negotiations are modeled using a fully specified, non-cooperative bargaining game. We demonstrate that vertical integration can alter the joint payoff of integrating parties in ex post bargaining; however, this bargaining effect is stronger for firms integrating under upstream competition than upstream monopoly. In contrast, where integration internalizes competitive externalities, ex post monopolization is more likely to occur under upstream monopoly than upstream competition.
The Dual Role Of Market Power In The Big Push: From Evidence To Theory, Catherine De Fontenay
The Dual Role Of Market Power In The Big Push: From Evidence To Theory, Catherine De Fontenay
Catherine de Fontenay
No abstract provided.
Can Vertical Integration By A Monopsonist Harm Consumer Welfare?, Catherine De Fontenay, Joshua Gans
Can Vertical Integration By A Monopsonist Harm Consumer Welfare?, Catherine De Fontenay, Joshua Gans
Catherine de Fontenay
No abstract provided.