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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons™
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Articles 1 - 8 of 8
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
The Costs And Benefits Of Library Site Licenses To Academic Journals, Ted Bergstrom, Carl Bergstrom
The Costs And Benefits Of Library Site Licenses To Academic Journals, Ted Bergstrom, Carl Bergstrom
Ted C Bergstrom
Scientific publishing is rapidly shifting from a paper-based system to one of predominantly electronic distribution, in which universities purchase site licenses for online access to journal contents. Will these changes necessarily benefit the scientific community? By using basic microeconomics and elementary statistical theory, we address this question and find a surprising answer. If a journal is priced to maximize the publisher s profits, scholars on average are likely to be worse off when universities purchase site licenses than they would be if access were by individual subscriptions only. However, site licenses are not always disadvantageous. Journals issued by professional societies …
The Iron Law Of Selfishness: Response To A Comment By Alexander Field, Ted Bergstrom
The Iron Law Of Selfishness: Response To A Comment By Alexander Field, Ted Bergstrom
Ted C Bergstrom
Alexander Field was not convinced of a result that I claimed in my JEP 2001 paper that in "haystack models" with non-assortative mating, if the number of descendants of founding group members is determined by an n-player prisoners' dilemma game, then the population will converge to a population of defectors. He thought that the result applied only if the groups were large. I respond with a more detailed discussion and show how the result works even when groups have only two members.
Evolution Of Social Behavior: Individual And Group Selection, Ted Bergstrom
Evolution Of Social Behavior: Individual And Group Selection, Ted Bergstrom
Ted C Bergstrom
How selfish does our evolutionary history suggest that humans will be? We explore models in which groups are formed and dissolved and where reproduction of individuals is determined by their payoffs in a game played within groups. If groups are formed ``randomly'' and reproductive success of group founders is determined by a multi-person prisoners' dilemma game, then selfish behavior will prevail over maximization of group payoffs. However, interesting models exist in which ``group selection'' sustains cooperative behavior. Forces that support cooperative behavior include assortative matching in groups, group longevity, and punishment-based group norms.
Storage For Good Times And Bad: Of Rats And Men, Ted Bergstrom
Storage For Good Times And Bad: Of Rats And Men, Ted Bergstrom
Ted C Bergstrom
How do rats and squirrels decide how much to hoard for the winter when they do not know how long the winter will be? This paper argues that natural selection is likely to result in random differences in the attitudes toward systemic risk by genetically identical individuals.
On The Evolution Of Altruistic Ethical Rules For Siblings, Ted Bergstrom
On The Evolution Of Altruistic Ethical Rules For Siblings, Ted Bergstrom
Ted C Bergstrom
This paper explores the evolutionary foundations of altruism among siblings and extends biologists' kin-selection theory to a richer class of games between relatives. It shows that a population will resist invasion by dominant mutant genes if individuals maximize a "semi-Kantian" utility function in games with their siblings. It is shown that a population that resists invasion by dominant mutants may be invaded by recessive mutants. Conditions are found under which a population resists invasion by dominant and also by recessive mutants. (JEL C70, D10, D63)
Primogeniture, Monogamy, And Reproductive Success In A Stratified Society, Ted Bergstrom
Primogeniture, Monogamy, And Reproductive Success In A Stratified Society, Ted Bergstrom
Ted C Bergstrom
This paper explores the workings of stratified societies in which there is primogeniture and where the nobility practice monogamous marriage with a double standard of sexual fidelity. We model a simple stratified society and define the reproductive values of the male and female nobility relative to that of commoners. We then explore implications of the hypothesis that preferences have evolved to favor maximization of reproductive value. The hypothesis is tested against fragmentary data from ancient civilizations and quite detailed information about the British aristocracy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
On The Economics Of Polygyny, Ted Bergstrom
On The Economics Of Polygyny, Ted Bergstrom
Ted C Bergstrom
About 80% of all societies recorded by anthropologists are polygynous (men have many wives). Even our own society is less monogamous than claimed. This paper attempts to explain such mysteries as why bride prices and dowries are not ``opposites'', why polygamous societies are usually characterized by positive bride prices and dowry is mainly confined to monogamous societies, why polyandry (women having multiple husbands) is rare, but not extinct, and why the more you have to pay for a wife the better you will treat her.
How Altruism Can Prevail In An Evolutionary Environment, Ted Bergstrom, Oded Stark
How Altruism Can Prevail In An Evolutionary Environment, Ted Bergstrom, Oded Stark
Ted C Bergstrom
This paper considers a series of examples in which evolution supports cooperative behavior in single-shot prisoners' dilemma. Examples include genetic inheritance for asexual siblings and for sexual diploid siblings. We also study two models of ``cultural inheritance''; one in which siblings copy either their parents or an extrafamilial role model and one in which neighbors arrayed along a circular road copy successful neighbors. Finally, we consider a model in which parents choose their behavior, realizing that it may be imitated by their children. A unifying principle of these models is that cooperative behavior more is likely to be sustained in …