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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons™
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- U.S. Supreme Court case (5)
- Taney Court (3)
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- Implied federal powers (2)
- Implied powers (2)
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- Adaptive deficit (1)
- Admissibility (1)
- Adversary System (1)
- Advice and consent (1)
- Appointment power (1)
- Atkins (1)
- Bank Recharter Bill (1)
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- Chief Justice John Marshall (1)
- Conflict of Interest (1)
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Articles 1 - 9 of 9
Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
'It Wasn't Supposed To Be Easy': What The Founders Originally Intended For The Senate's 'Advice And Consent' Role For Supreme Court Confirmation Processes, Michael W. Wilt
Channels: Where Disciplines Meet
The Founders exerted significant energy and passion in formulating the Appointments Clause, which greatly impacts the role of the Senate and the President in appointing Supreme Court Justices. The Founders, through their understanding of human nature, devised the power to be both a check by the U.S. Senate on the President's nomination, and a concurrent power through joint appointment authority. The Founders initially adopted the Senate election mode via state legislatures as a means of insulation from majoritarian passions of the people too. This paper seeks to understand the Founders envisioning for the Senate's 'Advice and Consent' role as it …
Texas, The Death Penalty, And Intellectual Disability, Megan Green
Texas, The Death Penalty, And Intellectual Disability, Megan Green
St. Mary's Law Journal
Abstract forthcoming
Defying Mcculloch? Jackson’S Bank Veto Reconsidered, David S. Schwartz
Defying Mcculloch? Jackson’S Bank Veto Reconsidered, David S. Schwartz
Arkansas Law Review
On July 10, 1832, President Andrew Jackson issued the most famous and controversial veto in United States history. The bill in question was “to modify and continue” the 1816 “act to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States. This was to recharter of the Second Bank of the United States whose constitutionality was famously upheld in McCulloch v. Maryland. The bill was passed by Congress and presented to Jackson on July 4. Six days later, Jackson vetoed the bill. Jackson’s veto mortally wounded the Second Bank, which would forever close its doors four years later at the …
Overruling Mcculloch?, Mark A. Graber
Overruling Mcculloch?, Mark A. Graber
Arkansas Law Review
Daniel Webster warned Whig associates in 1841 that the Supreme Court would likely declare unconstitutional the national bank bill that Henry Clay was pushing through the Congress. This claim was probably based on inside information. Webster was a close association of Justice Joseph Story. The justices at this time frequently leaked word to their political allies of judicial sentiments on the issues of the day. Even if Webster lacked first-hand knowledge of how the Taney Court would probably rule in a case raising the constitutionality of the national bank, the personnel on that tribunal provided strong grounds for Whig pessimism. …
M'Culloch In Context, Mark R. Killenbeck
M'Culloch In Context, Mark R. Killenbeck
Arkansas Law Review
M’Culloch v. Maryland is rightly regarded as a landmark opinion, one that affirmed the ability of Congress to exercise implied powers, articulated a rule of deference to Congressional judgments about whether given legislative actions were in fact “necessary,” and limited the ability of the states to impair or restrict the operations of the federal government. Most scholarly discussions of the case and its legacy emphasize these aspects of the decision. Less common are attempts to place M’Culloch within the ebb and flow of the Marshall Court and the political and social realities of the time. So, for example, very few …
The Confusing Language Of Mcculloch V. Maryland: Did Marshall Really Know What He Was Doing (Or Meant)?, Sanford Levinson
The Confusing Language Of Mcculloch V. Maryland: Did Marshall Really Know What He Was Doing (Or Meant)?, Sanford Levinson
Arkansas Law Review
All legal “interpretation” involves confrontation with inherently indeterminate language. I have distinguished in my own work between what I call the Constitution of Settlement and the Constitution of Conversation. The former includes those aspects of the Constitution that do indeed seem devoid of interpretive challenge, such as the unfortunate assignment of two senators to each state or the specification of the terms of office of representatives, senators, and presidents. I am quite happy to concede that “two,” “four,” and “six” have determinate meaning, though my concession is not based on a fancy theory of linguistics. It is, rather, a recognition …
Mcculloch At 200, David S. Schwartz
Mcculloch At 200, David S. Schwartz
Arkansas Law Review
March 6, 2019 marked the 200th anniversary of the Supreme Court’s issuance of its decision in McCulloch v. Maryland, upholding the constitutionality of the Second Bank of the United States, the successor to Alexander Hamilton’s national bank. McCulloch v. Maryland involved a constitutional challenge by the Second Bank of the United States to a Maryland tax on the banknotes issued by the Bank’s Baltimore branch. The tax was probably designed to raise the Second Bank’s cost of issuing loans and thereby disadvantage it relative to Maryland’s own state-chartered banks. Marshall’s opinion famously rejected the Jeffersonian strict-constructionist argument that implied powers …
The Need To Codify Roe V. Wade: A Case For National Abortion Legislation, Kathryn N. Peachman
The Need To Codify Roe V. Wade: A Case For National Abortion Legislation, Kathryn N. Peachman
Journal of Legislation
No abstract provided.
Between Brady Discretion And Brady Misconduct, Bennett L. Gershman
Between Brady Discretion And Brady Misconduct, Bennett L. Gershman
Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)
The Supreme Court’s decision in Brady v. Maryland presented prosecutors with new professional challenges. In Brady, the Supreme Court held that the prosecution must provide the defense with any evidence in its possession that could be exculpatory. If the prosecution fails to timely turn over evidence that materially undermines the defendant’s guilt, a reviewing court must grant the defendant a new trial. While determining whether evidence materially undermines a defendant’s guilt may seem like a simple assessment, the real-life application of such a determination can be complicated. The prosecution’s disclosure determination can be complicated under the Brady paradigm because …