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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
The Gettysburg Economic Review, Volume 3, Spring 2009
The Gettysburg Economic Review, Volume 3, Spring 2009
Gettysburg Economic Review
No abstract provided.
Long-Term Contracts And The Principal-Agent Problem, Elizabeth A.R. Purcell
Long-Term Contracts And The Principal-Agent Problem, Elizabeth A.R. Purcell
Gettysburg Economic Review
This paper examines the principal-agent problem within professional sports. Imperfect information between managers and players, as well as the guaranteed income a long-term contract provides, are predicted to provide players with the incentive to alter effort over the length of a contract – especially during the first year of a long-term contract. Regression analysis indicates that players’ performance levels decline during the first year of a long-term contract, suggesting that the effects of the principal-agent problem may outweigh competing effects. The study does not, however, suggest that players increase performance in the final year of a contract.