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Social and Behavioral Sciences Commons

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Public Economics

Research Collection School Of Economics

Series

2010

Articles 1 - 2 of 2

Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences

Unilateral Measures And Emissions Mitigation, Shurojit Chatterji, Sayantan Ghosal, Sean Walsh, John Whalley Jun 2010

Unilateral Measures And Emissions Mitigation, Shurojit Chatterji, Sayantan Ghosal, Sean Walsh, John Whalley

Research Collection School Of Economics

We discuss global climate mitigation that builds on existing unilateral measures to cut emissions. We document and discuss the rationale for such unilateral measures argue that such measures have the potential to generate positive spillover effects both within and across countries. In a simple dynamic model of learning we show that while single countries on their own may never get to the point of switching completely to low emission activities, a learning process with positive spillovers across nations is more likely to deliver a global switch to low emissions. We discuss the key features of a new global Intellectual Property …


Estimation Of Bidder Valuations In An Fcc Spectrum Auction, Jungwon Yeo May 2010

Estimation Of Bidder Valuations In An Fcc Spectrum Auction, Jungwon Yeo

Research Collection School Of Economics

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) uses auctions to allocate radio spectrum frequencies to wireless service providers. The innovation of the auction design is that it offers many heterogeneous licenses simultaneously in one ascending auction. This paper develops an empirical model and procedure to estimate bidder valuations. Given that the complex nature of the auction does not admit formal modeling in a general setting, I do not explore a particular model of equilibrium bidding. Instead, I propose two revealed preference inequalities which should hold in any reasonable model of these auctions. The first inequality requires that a bidder never bids on …