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Full-Text Articles in Social and Behavioral Sciences
Distress Or Suffering: What Should Be Measured To Determine Animal Well-Being?, Ian J. H. Duncan
Distress Or Suffering: What Should Be Measured To Determine Animal Well-Being?, Ian J. H. Duncan
Sentience Collection
It is generally accepted that all the vertebrates and some of the invertebrates (those with large neural ganglia such as the cephalopods) are capable of subjective experiences. Amongst those experiences are the subjective, affective states, sometimes called 'feelings' or 'emotions'. The strong negative feelings are often lumped together as 'suffering' and the positive feelings as 'pleasure'. I have argued for many years that animal welfare/well-being is completely dependent on what the animal feels (Duncan, 1993, 1996, 2002). An animal's well-being is decreased by experiencing suffering and increased by experiencing pleasure. It's as simple as that.
The Changing Concept Of Animal Sentience, Ian J. H. Duncan
The Changing Concept Of Animal Sentience, Ian J. H. Duncan
Sentience Collection
A brief history of the concept of sentience is given. It is pointed out that the idea of sentience, at least in the mammals and birds, was accepted by lay people by the time of the Renaissance and before it was acknowledged by philosophers. It was not until the Enlightenment of the 18th century that philosophers started to accept the notion that animals have feelings. Towards the end of the 19th century, scientists and philosophers had developed a fairly sophisticated concept of sentience. Little consideration was given to sentience by scientists through much of the 20th century due to the …
The Question Of Animal Awareness, Francoise Wemelsfelder
The Question Of Animal Awareness, Francoise Wemelsfelder
Sentience Collection
The problem of animal awareness lies at the interface of science and philosophy. As a starting point for the study of phenomena such as awareness, mind, consciousness, etc., we hardly have any reference other than our own human experience and in the context of a nondualistic ontology this can be justified. In philosophy and psychology it appears to be very difficult to give direct operational definitions of terms such as consciousness, etc. So we might expect this to be even more difficult in the study of animals. A detailed knowledge of animals and their behaviour is necessary in order to …